Φ Phi

claim

φάσκω

To claim, to profess, as against to know: the pretender’s verb, and Critias’ assumption about Socrates · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo say, assert, claim: an iterative form of φημί, “say”, often of a claim the speaker does not make good.
  • In the CharmidesFour times: “you are treating me as though I claimed to know”, Socrates tells Critias (165b); the temperate man cannot examine another “who claims to know something” (170d); no one who “claimed to be a pilot, but was not” would deceive us (173b); and the argument did not allow knowledge of knowledge “or say that there was” (175b).
  • In this edition“Claim”; “say”.
  • A place to read170d–171c and 173a–c.
English renderings
φάσκοντος, phaskontos, “claimed”, “say”; φάσκοντα, phaskonta, “claims”; φάσκων, phaskōn, “claimed”

Meaning

Φάσκω is to say, and to keep saying, and in use it is often the verb of an assertion that is only an assertion: what someone claims or professes, as against what he is. With an infinitive it is to claim to be or to know something. In the Charmides it stands against the verbs of knowing, and the gap between them is where the second of Socrates’ two questions, whether a knowledge of knowledge would benefit us, does its damage: such a knowledge could not tell those who know from those who only claim to (170d–171c).

Use in the book

The word first characterizes Socrates as Critias sees him. Critias offers his account “if you do not agree”, and Socrates answers, “you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask”: he inquires because he does not know (165b–c; see τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι). Critias takes the questioner to be a claimant; Socrates denies the claim.

In the test of the knowledge of knowledge the word names the man to be tested. The temperate man, knowing only that he knows and not what, will not be able “to examine someone else who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it” (170d; see ἐξετάζω); he cannot tell “the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is” (170e; see προσποιέομαι). In the dream that follows, the pretenders are all exposed: “No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know” (173b; see ἀλαζών; κυβερνήτης; ὄναρ). At the end the verb is turned on the argument itself, which did not allow knowledge of knowledge “or say that there was” (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The inquirers conceded what their own argument had not claimed.

The four places make a pattern. The dialogue’s first claimant is Socrates, falsely accused of claiming; its last is the argument, which never claimed what was granted on its behalf. Between them stand the pretenders whom the dream would expose and the knowledge of knowledge could not. The dialogue can be read as asking where Critias stands among them: the man who claims that temperance is a knowledge of what one knows and does not know, and cannot show that such a knowledge exists.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 165bCritias treats Socrates as though he claimed to know the answers to what he asks.
  2. 170dThe temperate man cannot examine another who claims to know something.
  3. 173bUnder temperance no one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us.
  4. 175bThe argument did not allow knowledge of knowledge, or say that there was.

Translation in this edition

“Claimed to know” renders φάσκοντος … εἰδέναι (165b5–6); “claims to know something” φάσκοντά τι ἐπίστασθαι (170d5–6); “claimed to be a pilot” φάσκων εἶναι (173b2); “or say that there was” οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι (175b7), with the argument as subject.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon’s Socrates kept his companions from the pretender’s claim. His argument that one who wished to seem a good flute-player without being one would make himself a laughing-stock, and a pretended pilot or general would destroy those he least wished to and come to grief himself, is told elsewhere (Memorabilia 1.7.1–3; see ἀλαζών). He called it no small cheat to take money or goods from someone by persuasion and keep them, but by far the greatest to have deceived others, being worth nothing, into believing one fit to lead the city.1 The Charmides’ dream exposes the pretended pilot and doctor; Xenophon’s greatest cheat, the worthless man who persuades the city that he is fit to lead it, can be read as the pretender the Charmides leaves unnamed.

Source note

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.7.5.