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answer for

ὑπέχειν λόγον

To be accountable for an answer: the burden Charmides wants to pass to Critias, and Critias takes up · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseTo hold out an account, to submit to account: ὑπέχω, “hold under”, “undergo”, with λόγος, “account”.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at 162c: Charmides, “wanting not to answer for the definition himself but to have Critias answer for it”, keeps prodding him.
  • In this edition“Answer for”.
  • A place to read162b–e.
English renderings
ὑπέχειν λόγον, hypechein logon, “answer for”

Meaning

Ὑπέχειν λόγον is a phrase of accountability: to stand an audit, to answer to a charge, to give an account of what one has done or said when called on. In the Laws an official who fails to exact a fine is to answer for it, λόγον ὑπεχέτω, at his audit (6.774b). Applied to an argument, it names the obligation of the one who has put a claim forward to defend it under questioning, the burden that διδόναι λόγον, “give an account”, describes from the other side (see διδόναι λόγον).

Use in the book

The phrase marks the change of answerers. Charmides has offered his third definition, doing one’s own business, and Socrates has called it a riddle and reduced it to absurdity (161b–162b; see αἴνιγμα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The boy, asked what it could mean, says that perhaps even the man who said it did not know what he meant, and laughs slyly, looking across at Critias (162b; see ὑπογελάω). Critias, the narrator says, had long been eager to shine before the company (162c; see φιλοτίμως); “So Charmides, wanting not to answer for the definition himself but to have Critias answer for it, kept prodding him, and made out that he had been refuted” (162c–d; see ἀπόκρισις; ἐλέγχω). Critias, angry “as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet’s own verses” (162d; see ὑποκριτής), takes the argument over: “I agree entirely … and I take it over” (162e).

The phrase shows that the boy has understood how the conversation works. A definition is not merely said; whoever says it must answer for it, and the boy, who had it from Critias, declines a liability that is not his. Critias’ agitation has already confirmed what Socrates suspected, that the saying was Critias’ (162c; see ἀκούω), and the boy’s manoeuvre is the turning point of the dialogue’s cast. From here Critias answers for every definition, and the boy does not speak again until 176a. The dialogue can be read as testing the accountability of a man who holds his views from others: the boy repeats a saying and will not answer for it; Critias answers for it and cannot hold it.

Places to read

The phrase’s place, with the change of answerers it brings about.

  1. 162c–dCharmides, not wanting to answer for the definition himself, prods Critias to answer for it.
  2. 162eCritias agrees and takes the argument over.

Translation in this edition

“Answer for” renders ὑπέχειν λόγον (162c7), and the English repeats the verb for the elliptical second half, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνον τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, “but to have Critias answer for it”, where the Greek leaves the infinitive understood. Whether “he had been refuted” at 162d1 means Charmides or Critias, the edition’s note at 162d says, “is left open by the Greek, and by the English”.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon’s Socrates is charged with refusing the burden he lays on others. When Hippias boasts that he has something new to say about justice and Socrates asks to hear it, Hippias answers that he will not tell him before Socrates declares what he thinks justice is: “it is enough that you mock the others, questioning and refuting everyone, while you yourself are unwilling to answer for your account to anyone, ὑπέχειν λόγον, or to declare your opinion about anything.”1 Socrates replies that he never stops showing what he thinks just, if not in words, then in deeds. In the Charmides the burden is shifted between his partners, not laid on Socrates; but at 165b Critias assumes, much as Hippias does, that Socrates has answers of his own and is keeping them back (see τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι).

Source note

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.4.9–10.