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disbelief

ἀπιστία

What some would doubt and others not, and a man who does not trust himself · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἈπιστία is disbelief, distrust, want of πίστις, “trust, belief”. To “provide disbelief” is to give someone grounds for doubt.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in Socrates’ sorting of the things that might relate to themselves: hearing and sight, motion moving itself and heat burning itself “would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others” (168e–169a). The family is wider: Socrates asks the boy whether he believes Homer (161a), says that some cases “are very strongly doubted” (168e), and does not trust himself to decide (169a).
  • In this edition“Disbelief”; the verb ἀπιστεῖσθαι is “be doubted”, and πιστεύειν is “believe” and “trust”.
  • A place to read168e–169b.
English renderings
ἀπιστίαν ⟨ἂν⟩ παράσχοι, apistian an paraschoi, “would raise disbelief”

Meaning

Ἀπιστία (apistia) is the negative of πίστις, the trust one places in a person, a word or an argument. It covers both the state of not believing and the quality of a thing that is hard to believe. The family runs through the vocabulary of persuasion, since πείθειν, “persuade”, shares its root with πίστις: what one believes is what one has been persuaded of (see πείθω; πιστεύω).

Use in the book

The word marks a grade between the impossible and the possible. Socrates has gone through sight, hearing, desire, wish, love, fear, opinion, the greater and the double, and sorts them: some are “altogether impossible”, the magnitudes and numbers; the rest are doubted (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος). The doubted cases are described by their effect on hearers. They “would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others”. Disbelief is not a property of the thing, as impossibility is; it depends on who is asked, and the question needs “a great man” to settle it (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ).

The family then turns on the speaker. “I, for my part, don’t trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions” (169a; see πιστεύω). The man who has just said that some would disbelieve and some would not places himself among those who cannot decide, and so neither affirms that a knowledge of knowledge can exist nor accepts that it is temperance (169a–b; see ἀποδέχομαι; διισχυρίζομαι). Against this distrust he sets one thing he does hold, by a “prophetic hunch”, that temperance is beneficial and good (169b; see μαντεύομαι).

The first use of the family is the opposite case. Refuting modesty, Socrates asks the boy whether he does not believe “that Homer is right” about modesty and the man in need, and the boy says that he does (161a; see αἰδὼς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ). The boy’s trust in a poet costs him his definition; Socrates’ distrust of himself keeps the question about knowledge open. The dialogue can be read as preferring the second: belief taken from authority settles too quickly, and an admitted doubt is what lets the inquiry go on.

Places to read

The one passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 168e–169aHearing and sight, self-moving motion and self-burning heat would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others.

Translation in this edition

Ἀπιστίαν ⟨ἂν⟩ παράσχοι (169a1), literally “would provide disbelief”, is “would raise disbelief”. The particle ἄν, which makes the verb potential, is Heindorf’s addition (apparatus, a1), printed by Burnet in angle brackets. The verb of the family is “be doubted” at 168e (see ἀπιστέω); πιστεύειν is “believe” at 161a and “trust” at 169a.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Republic Socrates names two kinds of disbelief that match the two questions of the Charmides. Asked to explain how the guardians are to share women and children, he says that it is not easy to go through, since it raises many grounds for disbelief, more even than what came before: it would be disbelieved that what is proposed is possible, and, even if it came about entirely, it would be disbelieved that it would be best (450c). In the Charmides the questions are whether a knowledge of knowledge is possible and, if it is, whether it would benefit us (167b, 169b; see ὠφέλιμος).

In the Phaedo disbelief becomes a danger. Phaedo, who tells the story of Socrates’ last day, recalls that after the objections of Simmias and Cebes the listeners felt themselves thrown back into disbelief, not only of the arguments already given but of any that might follow (88c). Socrates warns them against becoming haters of argument, as men who have trusted too readily without skill become haters of men (89d–e). The Charmides can be read as showing the other way: Socrates distrusts himself, not argument.