From the book
Alcibiades II
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The word“Protective ignorance” is an explanatory heading, not a phrase supplied by the Greek.
- In Alcibiades IIThe initial generalisation that ignorance causes men’s worst mistakes is corrected at 143c.
- In this editionThe translation keeps the sequence “of some things”, “for some people”, “in some state” at 143c and 144c.
- A place to readBlame of ignorance is restricted by object, person and condition.
Meaning
“Protective ignorance” is an explanatory heading, not a phrase supplied by the Greek. The text speaks of ignorance of some things, for some people in a certain condition, and of people “so disposed” who hold “such opinions”. These restrictions are essential to the valuation: the same absence of knowledge need not benefit another person or the same person differently disposed.
Use in the book
The initial generalisation that ignorance causes men’s worst mistakes is corrected at 143c. Socrates introduces a wiser possible objector who would demand qualifications. The Pericles and Orestes cases provide them: ignorance of a particular identity is good for someone already committed to a destructive action against that individual. It interrupts the means through which a mistaken practical judgment would become an accomplished deed.
The prevention is counterfactual and carefully bounded. Socrates imagines that whenever Alcibiades approaches the attack he continues not to recognise Pericles. The conclusion follows because his object is Pericles rather than an arbitrary victim. “Better” therefore compares ignorance with recognition while holding the harmful disposition fixed; it does not compare ignorance with a complete knowledge of the best, which would correct the purpose itself.
The later thesis about ungoverned expertise generalises this concern with enabling conditions. Knowledge or believed knowledge makes a person readier to act, and readiness can increase harm when judgment is missing. The final pause in prayer similarly protects Alcibiades while education remains necessary. Protection through restraint is an interim achievement; the text does not recommend preserving destructive opinions or make ignorance the positive content of wisdom.
Places to read
- 143b–c2Blame of ignorance is restricted by object, person and condition.
- 144bRepeated non-recognition would repeatedly prevent the specified attack.
- 144cThe conclusion explicitly concerns those so disposed and holding such opinions.
- 146dReadiness produced by knowledge explains how it may worsen an agent’s condition.
- 150c–151a2Postponing unsafe prayer and sacrifice provides a practical parallel, not the same lexical claim.
Translation in this edition
The translation keeps the sequence “of some things”, “for some people”, “in some state” at 143c and 144c. Removing those phrases turns a conditional argument into the unqualified praise of ignorance that the text does not give.