From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈληθής is true, of statements and reports; ἀληθῆ λέγειν, “to say true things”, is to be right.
- In the CharmidesThe dialogue’s test for a definition: “what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not” (161c), repeated when Critias takes the argument over (162e). The same test is put to the doctor, whose claims only medicine can judge (171b). In answers the word is the plain “True” or “You’re right”.
- In this edition“True”, “truly”, “right”, and “accurate” of the news from Potidaea (153c).
- A place to read161b–162e, from the rule to Critias’ taking over.
- English renderings
- ἀληθής, alēthēs, “true”; ἀληθῆ λέγειν, alēthē legein, “be right”; ἀληθῆ λέγεται, alēthē legetai, “are said truly”
Meaning
Ἀληθής (alēthēs) is formed from the negative prefix and the root of λανθάνειν (lanthanein), “to escape notice”: in its make-up, what does not escape notice (see ἀλήθεια). It is said of reports and speakers, of what is so, and in the neuter plural of true things said. Its adverb, in the phrase ὡς ἀληθῶς, “truly, really”, marks the real against the counterfeit and is treated with ἀληθινός (see ἀληθινός).
Use in the book
The word first measures a report. “Well, the word here … is that the fighting was very heavy, and that many people we know were killed in it.” “The word,” I said, “is reasonably accurate” (153b–c).
It becomes a rule when Charmides offers a definition he has heard. Socrates suspects Critias; Charmides asks, “But what difference does it make, Socrates … whom I heard it from?” “None,” I said. “For in any case what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not.” “Now you are talking sense,” said he (161c). When Critias takes the argument over, Socrates restates the purpose: “I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not” (162e). When Critias complains that Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about (166c), Socrates answers with the same rule turned on persons: Critias is to dismiss the question which of them is being refuted (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν).
The rule is kept in argument and broken in the drama. The boy who said that the source made no difference is the one who, when the saying fails, “laughed slyly and looked across at Critias” (162b); and the narrator, who said “None”, tells his friend that “it was entirely true, as I had suspected, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias” (162c). Critias, “as angry with Charmides as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet’s own verses”, takes the saying back as his own (162d–e). The dialogue tests the saying and shows the man.
The test returns in the argument about the doctor. The man who looks into medicine “correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased”, and Critias agrees that he must examine “whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly” (171b). No one can do this without medicine (171b–c). The truth of a claim can be judged only by knowledge of its subject, and that is the point on which knowledge of knowledge fails (see ἀληθινός; ᾗ ἰατρικός).
Places to read
Every passage in which the adjective occurs.
- 153cThe report of the heavy fighting at Potidaea is reasonably accurate.
- 160aCharmides answers “True”: quick-wittedness is a sharpness of the soul.
- 161cWhat matters is not who said it, but whether what is said is true.
- 162cIt was entirely true, as Socrates had suspected, that Charmides had the definition from Critias.
- 162eSocrates would rather look into it with Critias, to see whether what was said is true.
- 164aPerhaps nothing stops Critias from being right that temperance is the doing of good things.
- 166aSocrates grants, “That’s true”: calculation and geometry have no work like a house.
- 168cCritias answers “True”: there is no double of anything but a half.
- 171aCritias answers “True”: medicine is a knowledge.
- 171bThe examiner of a doctor must see whether the things said are said truly and the things done done rightly.
- 174dCritias answers “You’re right”: without the knowledge of good and bad, nothing would be done well and beneficially.
Translation in this edition
The edition renders by context: “reasonably accurate” for ἐπιεικῶς ἀληθῆ (153c); “true” in the rule and its restatement (161c, 162e) and in the narrator’s “entirely true” (162c); “right” for ἀληθῆ λέγειν (164a); “You’re right” (174d) and “That’s true” (166a) for the same Ἀληθῆ λέγεις; “True” as an answer (160a, 168c, 171a); and the adverb “truly” for ἀληθῆ λέγεται, “are said truly” (171b).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Phaedrus states the rule of 161c as a rebuke. When Phaedrus mocks Socrates for making up stories from Egypt or wherever he pleases, Socrates reminds him that at the shrine of Zeus at Dodona, the ancient oracle in north-western Greece, it was said that the first prophetic words came from an oak, and that the people of that time, not being as wise as the young men of today, were simple enough to listen to an oak or a rock so long as it told the truth: “but for you, it may be, it matters who is talking and from what land; you do not ask only whether things are so or otherwise” (275b–c).