From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTo say the same as another: to agree, to admit, to concede.
- In the CharmidesSome fifteen times, the Glossary’s “partners’ steps in the argument”, from the boy’s difficulty “either to agree or to deny” (158c) to Socrates’ withdrawal, “I don’t think, Critias, we were right to agree to” (172d), and his last word for their definition, “what we long ago agreed on” (175d).
- In this edition“Agree”; “admit” at 173e.
- A place to read165b–c.
- English renderings
- ὁμολογεῖς, homologeis, “do you agree”; ὁμολογεῖν, homologein, “to agree”; ὡμολόγεις, hōmologeis, “were you agreeing”; ὡμολόγηκα, hōmologēka, “I agreed”; ὡμολόγησα, hōmologēsa, “I agreed”; ὁμολογῶ, homologō, “I agree”; ὡμολογήσαμεν, hōmologēsamen, “we agreed”; ὁμολογοῦνται, homologountai, “(you) admit”; ὡμολογημένων, hōmologēmenōn, “I agreed to”; ὁμολογήσοντος, homologēsontos, “will agree”; ὡμολογηκέναι, hōmologēkenai, “to agree to”; ὁμολογεῖται, homologeitai, “is agreed”; συνομολογοῦντες, synomologountes, “agreed on”
Meaning
Ὁμολογέω, from ὁμός, “same”, and λέγω, “say”, is to say the same thing as someone: to agree with him, to grant his point, to confess a fact. In a Socratic conversation it is the answerer’s act: each step stands because he has said yes to it, and a refutation shows that his agreements cannot all stand together.
Use in the book
Three kinds of agreement meet in the dialogue. The boy’s is refused. Asked whether he agrees with Critias that he already has enough temperance, he answers that it is not easy, in the circumstances, “either to agree or to deny” (158c): to deny would make Critias a liar, to agree would be self-praise (158d; see αἰσχυντηλός). The edition’s note at 158c reads the blush and the refusal as a picture of temperance in its commonest sense, modesty (see ἀνερυθριάω). When the boy does agree, his agreements are used against him: “Weren’t you agreeing just now that temperance is fine?” (160e; see καλός), and the definition by modesty falls.
Critias’ agreements are positions to defend or retract. He denies having agreed to what Socrates draws from him (163a; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες), and rather than concede that a man could be temperate without knowing himself he would take back what he had agreed: “If you think that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier, I would sooner take back some of it” (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι). When he offers Socrates his own account, he offers it on condition that Socrates does not agree: “now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself” (165b).
Socrates’ agreement follows inquiry. “You are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask, and as though I will agree with you if only I want to. That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know. So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not” (165b–c; see ζητέω). He holds to this when the agreement is his own: “I don’t think, Critias, we were right to agree to” the claim that temperance would be a great good as the guide of household and city, because “we too easily agreed” (172d–e; see διοίκησις). The dialogue can be read as teaching through the verb that agreement is earned by examination and may be withdrawn by it, which is why its last agreements, the concessions of 175b–c, are disowned (see ὁμολογία).
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 158cDoes the boy agree with Critias that he is temperate? It is not easy to agree or deny.
- 160eThe boy agreed that temperance is fine.
- 163aCritias denies having agreed that those who do other people’s business are temperate.
- 164cCritias would sooner take back what he agreed than concede a temperate man who does not know himself.
- 165b–c2Critias’ account, if Socrates does not agree; Socrates will agree or not only after looking into it.
- 172d–e2They agreed too easily that it would be a great good for each to do what he knew and hand over what he did not know to those who knew.
- 173eCritias does not admit that those who live knowledgeably about crafts are happy.
- 175a–bWhat is agreed to be the finest of all things has turned out to be of no use to them.
- 175dWhat they long ago agreed on and made up between them has proved of no benefit.
Translation in this edition
“Agree” renders the verb throughout, “admit” at 173e8 (ὁμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ, “are admitted by you”), and “agreed on” the compound συνομολογοῦντες at 175d3. At 165b7 “as though I will agree with you” renders ὁμολογήσοντός σοι, Heusde’s conjecture, the future participle; B and T have ὁμολογήσαντός σου, “as though I had agreed with you”. The Glossary notes that at 162e and 166b “agree” renders συγχωρεῖν, “concede” (see συγχωρέω).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Gorgias Socrates distinguishes his kind of proof from the law court’s. Polus can bring almost everyone, Athenians and foreigners alike, to testify against him: Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates son of Scellias, an Athenian general whose fine offering stands in the shrine of Pythian Apollo, the whole house of Pericles; “but I, being one, do not agree with you; for you do not compel me”. Unless Socrates can produce Polus himself as his single witness, agreeing with what he says, he thinks he has accomplished nothing worth speaking of; nor has Polus, unless Socrates alone bears witness for him and he lets all the others go (472a–c). The Crito’s warning that Crito should not agree, against his own opinion, to the principle that one must never do wrong is told elsewhere (49c–d; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν).