From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΠεῖρα, “trial”, “attempt”, with λαμβάνω, “take”: to make trial of, to put to the test.
- In the CharmidesOnce: “That the doctor has some knowledge, then, the temperate man will know; but when he has to test what knowledge it is, won’t he look into what it is of?” (171a).
- In this edition“Test”.
- A place to read170e–171c.
- English renderings
- πεῖραν λαβεῖν, peiran labein, “to test”
Meaning
Πεῖρα lies behind the English “empirical”, through ἐμπειρία, “experience”, and is a cousin of Latin periculum, “peril”: a trial, an attempt, the experience gained by trying. To take a trial of something is to try it out, to find out by testing what it is or what it is worth, as one tests a horse or a friend.
Use in the book
The phrase names the task that defeats temperance. Knowledge of knowledge can tell that a man has some knowledge, since medicine is a knowledge; “but when he has to test what knowledge it is, won’t he look into what it is of?” (171a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). Each knowledge is defined by its objects (see ὁρίζω), so to test the doctor one must look into the healthy and the diseased, and only a doctor can do that (171a–c; see ᾗ ἰατρικός; ὁμότεχνος). The trial is the point at which knowing that someone knows must become knowing what he knows, and temperance, as defined, cannot make the step (see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν).
The phrase describes what Socrates spends the dialogue doing: making trial of what others say they know. He tests the boy’s opinion (159a) and Critias’ formula (163d–175b), and his tests succeed because he looks at what each claim is about. The phrase can be read as the irony at the centre of the dialogue: the testing that Socrates practises is the one thing temperance, on Critias’ account, could not do.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the argument it begins.
Translation in this edition
“To test what knowledge it is” renders πεῖραν λαβεῖν ἥτις ἐστίν (171a4), the phrase’s object a clause, “what [knowledge] it is”. “When he has to” renders δέον δέ, Goldbacher’s correction (Hermann proposed δεῖν δέ) of B’s δεῖ δή and T’s δὲ δή; “what it is of” renders ὧντινων, from a later hand in T (B ὡντινυν, T ὧντινῦν).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Protagoras Socrates proposes a way of testing that leaves the poets out. Gatherings like theirs, he says, if they are made up of men of the kind most of them claim to be, need no borrowed voices and no poets, who cannot be asked what they mean; when people bring the poets into a discussion, some say the poet means one thing and others another, and they argue about a matter they have no means of testing; such men talk among themselves in their own words, taking trial of one another and giving it. We too, he tells Protagoras, should put the poets aside and talk with each other directly, “taking trial of the truth and of ourselves” (347e–348a). The Protagoras makes trial of men and truth together; the Charmides asks whether a knowledge of knowledge could make trial of a man without the truth he claims to know.