From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe middle of προσποιέω, “to make over”: to make something one’s own, to lay claim to it, and so, of what one does not have, to pretend.
- In the CharmidesFour times: Critias’ ruse, “What’s to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?” (155b); the man “who pretends to be a doctor, but is not” (170e), and the one who “does not know them but pretends or thinks he does” (171c); and, in the dream, the pretender who would no longer escape our notice (173b).
- In this edition“Pretending”, “pretends”, “pretended”.
- A place to read170e–171c.
- English renderings
- προσποιήσασθαι, prospoiēsasthai, “pretending”; προσποιούμενον, prospoioumenon, “(the man) who pretends”, “pretends”; προσποιούμενος, prospoioumenos, “who pretended”
Meaning
Ποιεῖν is “make”, and the middle with πρός, “to oneself”, is to make a thing over to oneself. The claim can be honest, to adopt or take on; most often it is a claim to what one lacks, a knowledge, a virtue, a feeling, and so a pretence. The word does not decide whether the pretender knows that he is pretending, and the dialogue, at its third use (171c), adds a word to make the difference.
Use in the book
The dialogue opens with a pretence licensed. Critias calls the boy over on the excuse of his morning headaches, and asks Socrates, “What’s to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?” “Nothing,” Socrates answers. “Only let him come” (155b; see κεφαλή; κωλύω). When the boy asks, Socrates “did somehow manage to answer” that he knew it (155e), and the conversation begins with a pretended doctor. The pretence is not quite empty. The remedy he describes is a leaf with a charm, and the charm turns out to be beautiful words for the soul (155e–157a; see ἐπῳδή; λόγοι καλοί).
The verb returns as the thing temperance was to catch. If temperance is only a knowledge of knowledge, the temperate man “will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not” (170e; see ἀληθινός; διακρίνω). The conclusion repeats it: temperance will be able to tell “neither a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does, nor anyone else who knows anything at all” (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). The pair “pretends or thinks” separates the impostor, who knows that he does not know, from the man who believes he knows, whom Socrates’ questioning exposes (see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; οἴομαι). In the dream, where temperance rules, no pilot would deceive us, “nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know” (173b; see ἀλαζών; λανθάνω; στρατηγός).
The first and the last uses can be read together. The figure the dream’s temperance would have caught, a doctor pretending to know, is the figure Socrates played at the start. The temperance the argument looked for could not have told whether he knew the remedy, and the dialogue does not settle it either; what it shows is the pretended doctor, through the whole conversation, saying that he does not know (165b–c; see ζητέω).
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 155bCritias: what is to stop Socrates pretending to the boy that he knows a remedy for the head?
- 170eTemperance could not distinguish the man who pretends to be a doctor from the one who truly is.
- 171cIt could tell no doctor who knows his craft from one who pretends or thinks he does.
- 173bIn the dream, no one who pretended to know what he did not know would escape our notice.
Translation in this edition
“Pretending” for προσποιήσασθαι (155b5), with the infinitive of the thing claimed, ἐπίστασθαι, “that you know”; “who pretends” for τὸν προσποιούμενον (170e1); “pretends” for προσποιούμενον (171c7), paired with οἰόμενον, “thinks he does”; “who pretended” for προσποιούμενος (173b3).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Apology the verb names what Socrates’ examinations bring to light. The young men who copy him and examine others, and the anger of the men they examine, are told elsewhere (23c; see ἐξετάζω). Those men, Socrates says, call him a corrupter of the young; asked what he does or teaches to corrupt them, they have no answer, and rather than look at a loss they fall back on the charges that lie ready to hand against anyone who philosophizes. What they will not say is the truth: that they have been exposed as men who make out that they know and know nothing (23d).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle places the boaster and the dissembler on either side of the truthful man, in what concerns pretension, προσποίημα, in words and deeds. The boaster seems to be one who lays claim, προσποιητικός, to things of good repute that are not his, or to more of them than are; the dissembler, the εἴρων, goes the other way, denying what he has or making it smaller; and the man between them, plain and straightforward, truthful in how he lives and in what he says, admits that what is his is his, neither enlarging nor shrinking it.1 The examples Aristotle gives of the boaster are told elsewhere (4.7, 1127b17–20; see ἀλαζών). On his scale Socrates’ claim at 155e can be placed with the boaster; his conduct in the argument, disowning knowledge, Aristotle places himself, naming Socrates among the dissemblers who disown what is held in esteem (4.7, 1127b22–26).
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127a20–26.