From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA perfect with present sense, “I have seen”, so “I know”: the commonest Greek verb of knowing a fact or a thing.
- In the CharmidesSome seventy-five times, from Critias’ “I think you’ll know in a moment” (154a) to the boy’s “But by Zeus, Socrates, I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t” (176a); at the centre, in the formula “knowing what one knows and what one does not know” (167a).
- In this edition“Know”; the Glossary explains that εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι “all ‘know’, so that the formula ‘knowing what one knows and what one does not know’ keeps the same verb wherever it recurs (167a–b, 169d–170a, 170d, 171d, 172a, 172c).”
- A place to read167a–b.
- English renderings
- εἴσεσθαι, eisesthai, “(you’ll) know”; οἶσθα, oistha, “you know”; οἶδα, oida, “I know”; εἴσῃ, eisēi, “you’ll know”; ἴσθι, isthi, “rest assured”; εἰδέναι, eidenai, “to know”, “knowing”; εἰδώς, eidōs, “(when I) don’t”, “(what he in fact) knows”; οἶδεν, οἶδε, oiden, oide, “(he) knows”; εἰδόσιν, eidosin, “(in) knowing (it)”; εἴσεται, eisetai, “will (he) know”; ᾔδει, ēidei, “(he) knew”; ἴσασιν, isasin, “(what) we knew”; εἰδῶμεν, eidōmen, “(may) know”; εἰδότα, eidota, “(the one) who knows”; εἰδείη, eideiē, “knew”; εἰδείην, eideiēn, “(could I) know”
Meaning
Οἶδα is the perfect of the root that gives ἰδεῖν, “see”: to know is to have seen. It is the plain word for knowing that something is so, or knowing a person or a thing, and it makes no claim to expertise, as ἐπίσταμαι does, or to recognition, as γιγνώσκω does. Its negative, οὐκ οἶδα, is the ordinary “I don’t know”, and Socrates’ profession of ignorance is made in it (Apology 21d; see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι).
Use in the book
The verb runs through the conversation at three levels. In the prologue it is acquaintance: Critias tells Socrates he knows the boy, and Socrates swears that he does (154a–b; see νὴ Δία). In the boy’s exchanges it is the honest “I don’t know”: asked what doing one’s own business could be, he answers, “By Zeus, I don’t know” (162b; see μὰ Δία), and at the end he does not know whether he has temperance (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω). And in the argument with Critias it becomes the object of knowledge itself. Critias defines temperance as knowing oneself; Socrates turns that into knowing “what one knows and what one does not know” (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν), and the formula is worked over until it yields only knowing “that one knows and that one does not know” (170d; see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν), and at last the absurdity that one should know, in some way, what one does not know at all (175c; see ἀδύνατος).
The boy’s two answers frame Critias’ formula. At 162b he says he does not know what the formula means; at 176a he says he does not know whether he has temperance, “For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?” The argument has been about whether anyone could know what he knows and does not know; the boy, at the end, knows exactly what he does not know, and can be read as the one person in the room who has done what Critias’ definition demanded.
Places to read
The passages in which the verb carries the argument; its uses in ordinary speech are not listed.
- 162bThe boy: “By Zeus, I don’t know”; perhaps the formula’s author did not know what he meant.
- 165b–c2Socrates inquires with Critias because he himself does not know.
- 166dSocrates fears thinking he knows what he does not.
- 167a–bThe temperate man alone will know what he knows and what he does not; is it possible to know this?
- 169d–170a2How does knowledge of knowledge make one able to know what one knows and does not know?
- 170c–dThe temperate man will know only that he knows, not what.
- 170eThe doctor knows nothing about knowledge, and so not about medicine either.
- 171d–172aIf the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, we would live without error.
- 172cSocrates proposes to grant that one can know knowledge, and that temperance is knowing what one knows and does not know.
- 173bNo one who pretended to know what he did not know would escape notice.
- 174aThe prophet, who knows all that is going to be.
- 175cIt is impossible to know, in some way, what one does not know at all.
- 176aThe boy: “I don’t know whether I have it or whether I don’t.”
Translation in this edition
“Know” throughout, except Critias’ εὖ … ἴσθι, “rest assured” (157d6), for οἶδα and its forms as for γιγνώσκω and ἐπίσταμαι (see γιγνώσκω; ἐπίσταμαι), so that the English formula is the same wherever the Greek varies the verb.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Euthydemus plays the same logic for comedy, though with ἐπίσταμαι and its adjective ἐπιστήμων, not οἶδα. Euthydemus asks Socrates whether he knows anything; yes, many things, small ones; then he is knowing, ἐπιστήμων, and if knowing, he must know everything, for a man who did not know something would be not-knowing, and cannot be knowing and not-knowing at once (293b–d). The sophist’s argument and Critias’ formula can be read as sharing a fault the Charmides exposes at 170c: they treat “knowing” as a state one has or lacks without asking what it is knowledge of.