From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTo know knowledge and its lack: the definition with its verb, the verb taking its own noun for object.
- In the CharmidesTwice. Socrates asks whether the good of temperance, “knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge”, is only that its owner learns more easily and examines better (172b); then, to look again at its benefit, he grants “both that it is possible to know knowledge” and what was laid down at the start (172c).
- In this edition“Knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge”, “to know knowledge”.
- A place to read172b–d.
- English renderings
- τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, to epistēmēn epistasthai kai anepistēmosynēn, “knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge”; ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην, epistasthai epistēmēn, “to know knowledge”
Meaning
The phrase states the definition as an activity. The verb takes its own noun for its object, as if knowledge were one more thing to be known, like a remedy or the Greek language (see ἐπίσταμαι).
Use in the book
The phrase comes when the great benefit has been lost. The life without error (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία) has turned out to need a knowledge “of this kind” that has turned up nowhere (172a). Socrates offers a smaller good: “Well then … is this the good that temperance has, as we are now finding it to be, knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge: that whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns, and everything will appear more clearly to him, since in addition to each thing he learns he has a view of the knowledge as well; and that he will examine others better about the things he himself has learned, while those who examine without it will do so more feebly and poorly?” (172b; see ἀσθένεια; ἐναργής; ἐξετάζω; προσκαθοράω). Then the comparison: “Is it some such things as these, my friend, that we shall get out of temperance, while we have been looking at something greater, and seeking for it to be greater than it is?” “Perhaps that is how it is” (172b–c).
Socrates then lets even this go: “Perhaps … And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose” (172c; see χρηστός). Granting “both that it is possible to know knowledge, and, as for what we laid down at the start that temperance is, knowing what one knows and what one does not know”, he asks whether, granted all this, it benefits at all (172c–d; see ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ὀνίνημι), and withdraws the agreement that it would be a great good for each to do what he knows (172d; see ἀναμάρτητος).
The lesser good can be read as the most plausible thing the dialogue says about a knowledge of knowledge, and it is dropped as too small. A learner who sees, beside each thing he learns, his own knowledge of it, and an examiner who knows within his own field what knowing is, are not fantasies; they describe a reflective habit of mind. The dialogue sets it aside because it is not great enough to be temperance, not because it is false.
Places to read
Every passage in which the phrase occurs.
Translation in this edition
“Knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge” renders τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην (172b2–3); “to know knowledge” renders ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην (172c7). In the second place the manuscripts add a second infinitive, εἰδέναι, “to know”, after δυνατὸν εἶναι; Burnet brackets it on Heusde’s conjecture, and the English does not translate it.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Meno shows the lesser good at work. Meno’s slave, questioned about the double square, at first thought he knew and answered boldly; now he is at a loss, and does not think he knows. Has he been harmed by being numbed like the torpedo-fish’s victims? No: he is better off with regard to the thing he did not know, and has been helped towards finding out how it stands, for now he would search gladly, not knowing, whereas before he would have thought he spoke well about it to many people many times; he would not have tried to search for or learn what he thought he knew until he fell into perplexity and longed to know (84a–c; see ἀπορία). The knowledge that one does not know can be read as making the slave learn, as Socrates says at 172b that knowing knowledge and its lack makes a man learn more easily. The end of the Theaetetus, where the young man, delivered of his false beliefs, will be gentler for not thinking he knows what he does not (210c), is told under ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν.