Speech, knowledge and method

Logos: speech, account and reason

λόγος, logos, “speech; account; reason”

The same Greek word joins the compositions Phaedrus loves, the accounts by which they are tested, and the reason that directs a life. Its value depends on what a speech knows and what it can do with a hearer.

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe same Greek word joins the compositions Phaedrus loves, the accounts by which they are tested, and the reason that directs a life. Its value depends on what a speech knows and what it can do with a hearer.
  • In the PhaedrusPhaedrus first brings a λόγος as something already composed by Lysias (227c–228b). At 228d Socrates guesses that he has “the speech itself” beneath his cloak. The written object can make the absent Lysias present for purposes of reading, but the closing discussion will ask how much presence a book really supplies. Phaedrus’ distinction between remembering the expressions and recounting their thought already separates a speech’s wording from what it is about.
  • In this editionThe edition renders λόγος by local sense: “speech” at 227c, “reason” at 237e, and “arguments” at 260e. At 256a it prints λόγου, a correction in Coisl. 155, and translates “reason”; B and T have the plural λόγων, reported as “words” in the note. The article follows the printed text without treating that correction as unanimous manuscript evidence.
  • A place to readThe composition, its wording, and “the speech itself” in the book.

Meaning

Logos is a speech, an account or the reason expressed in one; its meaning changes with the occasion. Lysias’ written speech can be carried under a cloak, while the first speech speaks of the reason that guides judgement. Near the end, the knowledgeable account planted in a learner can answer and defend itself (276a). Calling something a logos therefore does not already make it true, rationally sound or alive.

Use in the book

Phaedrus first brings a λόγος as something already composed by Lysias (227c–228b). At 228d Socrates guesses that he has “the speech itself” beneath his cloak. The written object can make the absent Lysias present for purposes of reading, but the closing discussion will ask how much presence a book really supplies. Phaedrus’ distinction between remembering the expressions and recounting their thought already separates a speech’s wording from what it is about.

In Socrates’ first speech opinion leads “by reason” towards the best, while desire drags “without reason” towards pleasure (237e–238c). This description belongs to a speech later repudiated for treating love simply as bad; it nevertheless gives a usable contrast between direction by an account and uncontrolled impulse. The palinode does not discard speech: its obedient horse is guided by command and λόγος alone (253d–e), and the better pair resist with modesty and reason (256a).

The account of soul expressly distinguishes saying what soul is from saying what it resembles (245e–246a). A λόγος may therefore state a definition or offer an acknowledged likeness. At 247c Socrates insists on truth when speaking about truth; later he describes his hymn more cautiously as perhaps touching truth and perhaps wandering elsewhere (265b). The reader must retain both assertions rather than treating the word λόγος as a certificate for the myth.

In the rhetoric inquiry arguments themselves approach, testify, protest and require Phaedrus to answer (260e–261a). Here the translation’s “arguments” makes the local sense clear, while the Greek sustains the drama of speeches that behave like living agents. Rhetoric is then defined as soul-leading through λόγοι. An excellent speech has its own body and connected parts (264c), but even a beautifully ordered written speech cannot answer a new question unaided (275d–e).

The better λόγος is written with knowledge in the learner’s soul (276a). It can defend itself, speak to the right people, and remain silent when that is fitting. This is not an automatic privilege of sound over marks: recited speeches delivered without questioning and teaching are also denied great seriousness (277e–278a). The decisive contrast is between an account possessed and tested by a knower and an utterance that merely circulates.

Places to read

  1. 227c–228e23The composition, its wording, and “the speech itself” in the book.
  2. 237e–238c2Reason directing opinion, and desire acting without it.
  3. 245e–247c234Account, likeness and the demand to speak truth.
  4. 253d–e2Speech guides the good horse; reason resists the inferior impulse.
  5. 256aSpeech guides the good horse; reason resists the inferior impulse.
  6. 260e–261aArguments speak; a speech is compared to an animal.
  7. 264cArguments speak; a speech is compared to an animal.
  8. 275d–276aWritten and living accounts; recitation without examination.
  9. 277e–278aWritten and living accounts; recitation without examination.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders λόγος by local sense: “speech” at 227c, “reason” at 237e, and “arguments” at 260e. At 256a it prints λόγου, a correction in Coisl. 155, and translates “reason”; B and T have the plural λόγων, reported as “words” in the note. The article follows the printed text without treating that correction as unanimous manuscript evidence.

Lexical detail

Λόγος can be an utterance or a connected speech, an explanatory account or an argument, and in some settings reason. These are related senses, not interchangeable English labels. A λόγος may be written or spoken, long or brief, true or misleading. Its name alone confers neither truth nor rationality. In this dialogue the plural often names the speeches that the friends eagerly collect and hear; elsewhere it names the considerations by which a proposed art is examined.

The verb λέγειν means to say or speak. A phrase such as “by speech” need not mean “by rational demonstration”: the hearer, occasion and surrounding contrast decide. Conversely, when λόγος is rendered “reason”, the dialogue has not introduced an entirely different Greek object from the speeches that stand before the two men.

Attested forms

λόγος (227c · Burnet p. 2) — “speech”. Lysias’ written composition on love.

λόγῳ (237e · Burnet p. 15) — “by reason”. Instrumental dative: acquired opinion leads towards the best by reason.

λόγοι (260e · Burnet p. 47) — “arguments”. Arguments are personified as approaching to challenge rhetoric.

Research and interpretation

Middle Liddell’s speech, account and reason senses support keeping these uses apart. Native 276a gives the living account additional conditions, rather than making those conditions part of every occurrence. The singular logou at 256a follows an editorial correction documented in apparatus 40-2.

Liddell and Scott, Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon, λόγος.

ἀποτορνεύω

Turning on a lathe is a craftsman’s precise shaping, applied here to verbal expression. Socrates calls Lysias’ words clear, rounded and carefully turned, while asking separately whether his speech says what is needed. The metaphor praises finish without treating polished language as sufficient proof of a good argument.

Read: 234e.

apotorneuō · Turn on a lathe · dictionary headword

Finish by turning on a lathe; figuratively, fashion verbal expression precisely.

The perfect passive describes the exact shaping of Lysias’ words. The workshop metaphor makes stylistic polish visible but leaves open the larger question of what the speech says. It is an image of workmanship, not evidence that physical written letters were literally lathed.

Attested: ἀποτετόρνευται (234e · Burnet p. 11) — “turned on the lathe”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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γνωμολογία

Maxim-speech is the use of general sayings as a rhetorical resource. Socrates lists it among Polus’ accomplishments, beside doubling and image-speech. Its concrete role here is a named item in the teachers’ repertoire; the dialogue does not give a specimen maxim or say that this device alone constitutes good rhetoric.

Read: 267c.

gnōmologia · Maxim-speech · dictionary headword

Speech employing maxims or general sayings.

One of the verbal accomplishments attributed to Polus. Its place in the catalogue shows how a recognizable kind of expression can become a teachable device. The later argument asks what turns the device into an appropriate part of a persuasive whole.

Attested: γνωμολογίαν (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “maxim-speech”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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διάθεσις

Arrangement is the ordering of a speech’s material. Socrates distinguishes it from finding something new to say: even unavoidable arguments can deserve praise for their arrangement. His later demand that parts fit one another and the whole gives this ordering an intelligible purpose.

Read: 236a.

diathesis · Arrangement · dictionary headword

Disposition or ordering of a speech’s material.

Socrates distinguishes finding things to say from arranging them. Even shared or necessary material may be arranged well. The later requirement that a speech’s parts fit each other and its whole makes arrangement more than decorative variation: placement needs an intelligible reason.

Attested: διάθεσιν (236a · Burnet p. 13) — “the arrangement”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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διήγησις

Narration is a connected telling, named as the second component in the handbook account of a speech. Socrates places testimonies after it. Elsewhere he says a full account of soul’s nature would require a long divine narration, showing that the noun is not confined to courtroom storytelling.

Read: 266e; 246a.

diēgēsis · Narration · dictionary headword

A connected telling of the matter or events, listed as a speech’s second component.

Testimonies follow upon this narration in the handbook sequence. The earlier contrast at 246a between a divine, long narration of soul’s true nature and a shorter human likeness shows that narrating need not always mean forensic storytelling.

Attested: διήγησίν (266e · Burnet p. 55) — “narration”.

Attested: διηγήσεως (246a · Burnet p. 27) — “narration”. What soul is calls for a divine and long narration; the human account gives a likeness.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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ἐπίγραμμα

An epigram is an inscribed composition, here the verses said to belong on Midas’ tomb. Socrates argues that their lines can be rearranged without making a difference and compares them with Lysias’ ordering. The example tests the need for connected structure; it does not authenticate the tomb’s inscription.

Read: 264c.

epigramma · Inscription or epigram · dictionary headword

A short inscribed composition, here the verses attributed to Midas’ tomb.

Socrates claims the lines can be rearranged without difference and uses them as a comparison for Lysias’ sequence. The poem’s bronze maiden promises continued announcement, but its role here is primarily compositional: a succession of lines is not yet a necessary order.

Attested: ἐπιγράμματος (264c · Burnet p. 52) — “epigram”.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason; Writing and letters

The rhetoric scholarship explains why mere sequence must become an organized whole.

Charles L. Griswold, Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry, §5.1 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

εὐέπεια

Fine diction is elegance in the wording of a speech. Socrates says Licymnius supplied Polus with words for achieving it: this is equipment for expression, rather than proof that the speaker understands the subject or can organize a complete speech.

Read: 267c.

euepeia · Fine diction · dictionary headword

The quality of speaking well or elegantly at the level of expression.

Licymnius’ words are described as given to Polus for making fine diction. The possession of striking vocabulary belongs to the preliminary equipment of speech and remains distinct from the true account of its subject and the fitting of a whole.

Attested: εὐεπείας (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “fine diction”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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εὕρεσις

Finding or invention concerns discovering what to say. Socrates distinguishes it from arranging material: where an argument must use an obvious point, the arrangement deserves the credit; where suitable material is difficult to discover, finding it can deserve praise too. This assessment of composition does not prove the proposed attack on love.

Read: 236a.

heuresis · Finding or invention · dictionary headword

The finding of material to say, distinguished from its arrangement.

At 236a Socrates allows that some argumentative material is unavoidable: when using that material, the speaker deserves praise for arrangement rather than discovery. Where material is not necessary and is hard to find, discovery too may deserve praise. The division of credits does not prove the anti-love premise on which the proposed speech proceeds.

Attested: εὕρεσιν (236a · Burnet p. 13) — “the finding”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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ζῷον

A living creature is the model for a speech whose parts belong together. Socrates says a speech needs its own body, with a head, feet and middle fitted to the whole. This explains good organization; the later living account taught in a soul also has the separate ability to answer and defend itself.

Read: 264c; 276a.

zōion · Animal or living creature · dictionary headword

A living creature used as the model for a speech’s integrated body.

Every speech should have its own body, neither headless nor footless, with middle and extremities fitting each other and the whole. This concerns organized composition. The later “living and ensouled” account adds the distinct capacity to answer and defend itself.

Attested: ζῷον (264c · Burnet p. 52) — “animal”.

See: Living speech and defence; Logos: speech, account and reason; Nature, whole and part

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Λικύμνιος

Licymnius is the named source of words supplied to Polus for polished expression, within Socrates’ catalogue of rhetorical accomplishments.

At 267b–c Polus’ verbal resources are followed by words attributed to Licymnius.

Likymnios · Licymnius · proper name represented by related adjective

The name behind words said to have been supplied for Polus’ fine diction.

The continuous text uses an adjective formed from the name, not the personal-name lemma displayed here. Its function is to identify a source of vocabulary within the technical catalogue. No general theory of Licymnius is supplied by the dialogue.

Attested: Λικυμνίων (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “of Licymnius”. Adjectival attribution of words to Licymnius.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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Μίδας

Midas is the man named in a reported tomb inscription used to test whether a composition has a necessary order.

At 264c–d Socrates quotes the bronze maiden’s declaration that Midas lies buried beneath her.

Midas · Midas · proper name

The Phrygian named as the recipient of a tomb inscription.

Socrates reports that some say the quoted epigram was inscribed for Midas. The attribution is reported, not independently certified. No gold-touch story enters this passage; the relevant image is the bronze maiden and the interchangeability of the poem’s lines.

Attested: Μίδᾳ (264c · Burnet p. 52) — “Midas”.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason; Writing and letters

Fowler retains “some say” for the attribution. The passage uses the inscription’s arrangement, without invoking Midas’ gold-touch story or proving the monument’s history.

Plato, Phaedrus 264c, 264d — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

ὀρθοέπεια

Correctness of diction is the verbal accomplishment associated with Protagoras in Socrates’ catalogue of rhetorical techniques.

At 267c Socrates answers the question about Protagorean contributions by naming correctness of diction and other fine things.

orthoepeia · Correctness of diction · dictionary headword

Right or correct verbal expression.

Socrates identifies this as a Protagorean accomplishment when Phaedrus asks about Protagoras’ contributions. The dialogue does not specify a full grammar here; the local point is another impressive specialty within the handbook tradition.

Attested: Ὀρθοέπειά (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “correctness of diction”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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παράδειγμα

An example is a particular case that lets the speakers inspect an otherwise general account. It can teach by revealing faults rather than by offering a model to imitate.

At 262c Phaedrus asks for examples of craft and craftlessness, and Socrates turns to their speeches.

paradeigma · Example · dictionary headword

An example by which an otherwise bare account can be examined.

Phaedrus requests examples of craft and craftlessness. The speeches already performed supply them. At 264e Socrates says Lysias’ speech can profit a reader who does not attempt to imitate its faults: an example may teach by contrast, not only as a model to copy.

Attested: παραδείγματα (262c · Burnet p. 49) — “examples”.

See: Craft and expertise; Definition and agreement; Logos: speech, account and reason

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Πρωταγόρας

Protagoras is the teacher whose accomplishments Phaedrus asks Socrates to include among rhetorical techniques.

At 267c the question about Protagorean things receives the answer “correctness of diction” and an unspecified further range.

Prōtagoras · Protagoras · proper name represented by related adjective

The teacher whose contributions Phaedrus asks to include in the catalogue.

The source uses a possessive adjective, “Protagorean things”. Socrates answers with correctness of diction and unspecified further beautiful accomplishments. The indefinite extension should not be converted into a reconstructed list of doctrines absent from this exchange.

Attested: Πρωταγόρεια (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “Protagorean things”. Neuter plural adjective for Protagorean accomplishments.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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Πῶλος

Polus is the teacher whose collection of verbal techniques receives the extravagant description “Muse-shrines of speeches”.

At 267b–c his resources include doubling, maxim-speech and image-speech, followed by words supplied by Licymnius.

Pōlos · Polus · proper name

The teacher whose verbal resources are described as Muse-shrines of speeches.

Doubling, maxim-speech and image-speech form the local list. The extravagant title presents a wealth of expression, while the subsequent investigation distinguishes these resources from the organization and knowledge of the art itself.

Attested: Πώλου (267b · Burnet p. 56) — “Polus”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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ῥῆμα

An expression is the particular wording of an account, distinguished from its summarized thought or the method needed to compose it well.

At 228d Phaedrus offers Lysias’ thought in summary rather than the exact expressions.

rhēma · Expression or wording · dictionary headword

A spoken expression or the particular words in which something is said.

Phaedrus distinguishes remembering Lysias’ exact expressions from recounting the thought in summary (228d). At 271c Socrates says stating the expressions themselves is not easy, but offers the requirements for writing by craft. The distinction leaves room for an account of method without pretending to supply every exact formula.

Attested: ῥήματα (228d · Burnet p. 3) — “expressions”.

Attested: ῥήματα (271c · Burnet p. 62) — “expressions”. The exact formulations are distinguished from the requirements for masterly writing.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason; Memory and reminding

Fowler preserves the distinction and Socrates’ later reluctance at 271c to prescribe exact formulations. A method need not supply a fixed script for every speech.

Plato, Phaedrus 228d, 271c — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

στρογγύλος

Rounded means smoothly finished, here as praise of the wording of Lysias’ speech. It does not by itself commend the speech’s argument.

At 234e Socrates distinguishes clear, rounded expressions from having said what the subject requires.

strongylos · Rounded · dictionary headword

Rounded or smoothly finished, here of Lysias’ words.

Socrates separates the clarity and finish of the expressions from whether the composer has said what the subject requires. The praise is therefore qualified by its object: rounded wording does not settle completeness or truth of thought.

Attested: στρογγύλα (234e · Burnet p. 11) — “rounded”.

See: Craft and expertise; Logos: speech, account and reason

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χαλκοῦς

Bronze describes the material of the maiden in the tomb epigram used to test a speech’s arrangement.

At 264d the bronze maiden declares that she will announce Midas’ burial while waters flow and trees flourish.

chalkous · Bronze · dictionary headword

Made of bronze, describing the speaking maiden of the tomb inscription.

The maiden’s durable material accompanies a promise to announce Midas’ burial as long as water flows and trees flourish. The poem supplies an example of lines Socrates says can stand in different orders. The material is not presented as a solution to writing’s later inability to answer.

Attested: Χαλκῆ (264d · Burnet p. 52) — “of bronze”.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason; Writing and letters

Fowler preserves the material and enduring announcement. Socrates’ immediate point is the lines’ interchangeable order, not a solution to writing’s later inability to answer questions.

Plato, Phaedrus 264d — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

χύδην

Pell-mell means without an articulated order. Socrates uses it to question why Lysias’ topics follow one another as they do.

At 264b he asks whether there is any necessity for the second item to come second rather than elsewhere.

chydēn · Pell-mell · adverb

In a heap or without articulated order.

Socrates asks whether Lysias’ material appears thrown together in this fashion. His test is whether the second item must occupy the second place or whether some reason dictates the sequence. The question targets arrangement, not every individual sentence’s elegance.

Attested: χύδην (264b · Burnet p. 52) — “pell-mell”.

See: Logos: speech, account and reason; Nature, whole and part

Fowler’s helter-skelter rendering preserves the challenge to arrangement. It does not deny that an individual expression may be polished.

Plato, Phaedrus 264b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).