From the book
Phaedrus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordCollection brings dispersed cases into one view; division follows their natural articulations. Together they let an account say what it is about without confusing kinds that share a name.
- In the PhaedrusThe palinode describes human understanding as going from many perceptions into one, gathered by reasoning, and calls this recollection (249b–c). The later description of collection resembles that movement, but its immediate question is how the speeches on love became clear and could move from censure to praise. At 265c Socrates calls much of their content play and isolates two forms of procedure whose power would be valuable to grasp by craft.
- In this edition“Figure” renders ἰδέα and “form” εἶδος in the cited passages. At 266a2 the printed “one” is Heindorf’s addition; the apparatus does not show an unqualified unanimous text. At 266b7 Burnet’s printed participle underlies “by his nature” of the capable person; the alternative reading reported in the note makes the one and many what is naturally so. The method’s general requirement should not be made to depend on suppressing that difference.
- A place to readFigures within us; many perceptions gathered into one.
Meaning
Collection brings scattered cases into one view; division separates them according to their natural differences. Socrates compares good division with cutting at joints instead of hacking a body apart (265d–e). He then rereads the speeches as distinguishing a harmful, left-hand love from a divine, right-hand love. The method asks whether a grouping fits its subject, rather than treating every convenient classification as true.
Use in the book
The palinode describes human understanding as going from many perceptions into one, gathered by reasoning, and calls this recollection (249b–c). The later description of collection resembles that movement, but its immediate question is how the speeches on love became clear and could move from censure to praise. At 265c Socrates calls much of their content play and isolates two forms of procedure whose power would be valuable to grasp by craft.
The first procedure defines the subject by taking a single view of scattered material. Socrates credits his initial definition of love with making its speech clear and in agreement with itself, whether the definition was well or badly made. The second procedure is discriminating rather than destructive. A bad butcher breaks a part instead of cutting at its joints (265e). The image presents kinds as having articulations that the inquiry must respect, not as passive material for the speaker’s convenience.
Socrates retrospectively describes the two speeches as taking an irrational or aberrant condition in common and then cutting towards left and right. The first pursued a left-handed love and censured it; the other found divine love on the right and praised it as the cause of great goods (266a–b). The bodily analogy explains how things can be paired and share a name while differing in character. The palinode’s divine love is not made identical in value with the condemned love merely because both are called love.
This retrospective description is an account of the speeches’ methodological pattern. It is not necessary to make every stage of the earlier speeches conform to a fully displayed classification tree: Socrates himself is extracting what can be learned from them. In the examination of rhetoric, the same method applies to souls and speeches. Determine whether the nature is simple or multiform, count its forms if there are several, and explain each one’s powers and relations (270d–271b).
The final demand is to define the subject and cut by forms “down to the uncuttable” (277b). This gives the analysis an appropriate stopping-point; it does not supply an exhaustive catalogue of the indivisible kinds or their number. A competent speech then fits the relevant form of account to the nature of its hearer.
Places to read
- 237dFigures within us; many perceptions gathered into one.
- 249b–cFigures within us; many perceptions gathered into one.
- 263a–cClasses of subjects, collection, natural division and dialecticians.
- 265c–266c23Classes of subjects, collection, natural division and dialecticians.
- 270d–271bApplication to natures, souls and speeches.
- 273d–eApplication to natures, souls and speeches.
- 277b–cDefinition and division to the uncuttable in the final summary.
Translation in this edition
“Figure” renders ἰδέα and “form” εἶδος in the cited passages. At 266a2 the printed “one” is Heindorf’s addition; the apparatus does not show an unqualified unanimous text. At 266b7 Burnet’s printed participle underlies “by his nature” of the capable person; the alternative reading reported in the note makes the one and many what is naturally so. The method’s general requirement should not be made to depend on suppressing that difference.
Lexical detail
Εἶδος and ἰδέα can describe a form, shape or kind. The edition distinguishes them by “form” and “figure”. Their occurrence is not by itself a declaration that every kind under discussion is a separately existing reality. At 237d the two ruling tendencies within us are figures; at 263b the classes of agreed and disputed subjects are forms. At 265d–e the words articulate a method.
Συναγωγή brings together; διαίρεσις separates. The names at 266b follow concrete descriptions: see scattered things together and lead them into one figure, then cut again by forms at the joints as they are naturally constituted. Collection and division are coordinated operations, not permission first to lump everything arbitrarily and then to subdivide at will.
Attested forms
εἴδη (265e · Burnet p. 54) — “forms”. Division is to follow forms and natural joints.
ἰδέαν (265d · Burnet p. 54) — “figure”. Scattered things are led into one figure.
συναγωγῶν (266b · Burnet p. 54) — “collections”. Socrates calls himself a lover of collections and divisions.
διαιρέσεων (266b · Burnet p. 54) — “divisions”. Paired with collections as what enables speaking and intelligence.
Research and interpretation
McCoy’s summary identifies collection and division as a model of organic unity. The dialogue gives an image and a retrospective account, not a completed classification of every kind of soul. The added hen at 266a and participle at 266b remain edition-specific textual qualifications.
Printed textual evidence
The supplied edition’s reported readings can be checked in its Greek apparatus: 266a2 (apparatus); 266b7 (apparatus).
ἁπλοῦς · πολυειδής
Simple and many-formed distinguish a nature treated as one constitution from a nature requiring analysis into several forms. Socrates says the investigator must first determine which fits the object, then examine its powers or those of each form. In the application to soul, this is a methodological requirement, not a completed catalogue.
haplous · polyeidēs · Simple and many-formed · paired adjectives
Single in the relevant constitution, or displaying several forms.
The method first asks which description fits its object. If simple, it investigates that object’s powers; if multiform, it counts the forms and examines each. Applied to soul, this remains a question that a genuine teacher must answer, not a completed enumeration in the passage.
Attested: ἁπλοῦν (270d · Burnet p. 61) — “simple”.
Attested: πολυειδές (270d · Burnet p. 61) — “of many forms”. Alternative to simple in the methodological question.
See: Form, collection and division; Nature, whole and part
The 271 witness requires a serious teacher to determine soul’s unity or multiplicity.
Plato, Phaedrus 271, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).
ἄρθρον
Joints are the natural articulations that a good division should respect. Socrates compares dividing by forms to cutting a body at its joints, avoiding a bad butcher’s breaking of a part. The concrete image explains discriminating analysis, rather than authorizing arbitrary subdivisions.
Read: 265e.
arthron · Joint · dictionary headword
An articulation at which an appropriately conducted division cuts.
The plural occurs in the instruction to divide by forms “at the joints” as they naturally lie. It gives a bodily image to discriminating analysis and contrasts with the fracture of a part by bad workmanship.
Attested: ἄρθρα (265e · Burnet p. 54) — “joints”.
See: Form, collection and division; Nature, whole and part
The rhetoric scholarship connects a speech’s organization with the subject’s own divisions.
Charles L. Griswold, Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry, §5.1 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
ἄτμητος
Uncuttable marks the endpoint to which a competent division must proceed. In his final account of rhetoric, Socrates requires defining the subject and dividing it by forms until it cannot appropriately be divided further. The passage sets a requirement; it does not supply a finished list of every terminal form.
Read: 277b.
atmētos · Uncuttable · dictionary headword
Not further divisible at the endpoint required by the method.
The final summary asks the speaker to define and divide by forms down to this point. It does not enumerate the terminal forms or state that every possible division has already been carried out in the conversation.
Attested: ἀτμήτου (277b · Burnet p. 70) — “uncuttable”.
See: Dialectic and conversation; Form, collection and division
μάγειρος
The bad butcher represents someone who divides a subject without respecting its natural structure, damaging the parts instead of separating them properly.
At 265e Socrates contrasts cutting at the joints with breaking parts as a bad butcher does.
mageiros · Butcher · dictionary headword
A cook or butcher, here someone whose bad cutting damages an articulated body.
The bad butcher breaks parts instead of cutting at the joints. The analogy instructs the inquirer to respect the natural articulations of the subject. It does not say that division should be violent or that classifications are arbitrary cuts.
Attested: μαγείρου (265e · Burnet p. 54) — “butcher”.
See: Form, collection and division; Nature, whole and part
Sayre’s public chapter summary connects this image with division by natural joints. It supports the methodological comparison, not arbitrary classification.
Plato, Phaedrus 265e — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText); Kenneth M. Sayre, Division in the Phaedrus and the Sophist, public chapter summary.
ὁμώνυμος
Having the same name does not mean having the same character. Socrates uses the term to distinguish kinds of love that share a name.
At 266a the two speeches find a censured left-hand love and a praised divine love of the same name.
homōnymos · Of the same name · dictionary headword
Sharing a name, without thereby sharing all the same qualities.
Socrates first compares paired bodily parts called left and right, then the left love and the divine love discovered by the other speech. Their shared name does not cancel the difference between what is censured and what is praised.
Attested: ὁμώνυμον (266a · Burnet p. 54) — “of the same name”.
See: Definition and agreement; Form, collection and division