Τ Tau

its own work

τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον

Each craft’s own work, which Socrates refuses to hand over to temperance · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseA craft’s own work: the product or result proper to each art, which no other art produces.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at 174e: “And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work?”
  • In this edition“Its own work”.
  • A place to read174c–175a.
English renderings
τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον, to hautēs ergon, “its own work”

Meaning

Ἔργον is the work a thing does and the work it makes: the house of the builder, the cloak of the weaver, the health of the doctor (see ἔργον). The reflexive αὑτῆς, “its own”, ties the work to the craft whose work it is. Greek used the phrase of a division of labour, each to its own task; here it is a division of objects, each knowledge to its own product.

Use in the book

The phrase answers Critias’ last attempt. Socrates has found that the knowledge that makes us happy is the knowledge of good and bad, and that without it the crafts still make their products but nothing is done well and beneficially (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). Critias proposes that temperance, if it presides over all knowledge, would rule this knowledge too, and so benefit us (174d–e; see ἄρχω; ἐπιστατέω). Socrates replies with a question about health: “Would it also make us healthy … and not medicine? And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work?” (174e; see ἰατρική). Then the restriction Critias himself accepted, that temperance is knowledge only of knowledge “and of nothing else”, settles it (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; διαμαρτύρομαι). Temperance is not the craftsman of health, nor of benefit, since that work too belongs to another (174e–175a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The phrase keeps the principle on which the whole second half of the argument has rested. Every knowledge is of something other than itself, even one that, like calculation, has no work to show as building shows a house and weaving a cloak (165d–166b; see ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστήμη τινός). Critias’ temperance was to be the one exception, a knowledge of knowledge with no object of its own; at the end he tries to make it the rule over the rest, and the principle refuses. If each craft does its own work, a knowledge that rules them all has nothing of its own to do.

The answer can be read as the dialogue’s judgement on Critias’ politics as well as his logic. The picture of 171d–172a was of a household and a city run by temperance, where no one tried to do what he did not know and everything was handed to those who knew it (see διοίκησις; οἰκέω). Socrates’ question turns that picture against Critias: a ruler who knows no craft can only rule the crafts by doing their work for them, and the phrase says he cannot.

Places to read

The phrase’s place, with the claim it answers and the verdict that follows.

  1. 174d–e2Critias: temperance, presiding over all knowledge, would rule the knowledge of the good and benefit us.
  2. 174eSocrates: would temperance make us healthy, and not medicine, or do each craft’s own work?
  3. 174e–175aHealth belongs to another craft, and so does benefit.

Translation in this edition

“Its own work” renders τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον (174e5), with ἑκάστη, “each of those crafts”; both questions rest on corrections, “would it also” on Schanz’s κἂν, where B and T have καί (174e3), and “and not each of those crafts” on Hermann’s οὐχ αἱ, where B and T have οὐχί, which Madvig bracketed (174e4; apparatus); “the other things belonging to the crafts” renders τἆλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν (174e4), and “make us healthy” the infinitive ὑγιαίνειν (see ὑγιαίνω). The Glossary lists ἔργον, “work (noun)”, at 174d–e and 175a–b among its places (see ἔργον).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic states the principle in the same words. Socrates’ argument against Thrasymachus that each craft has its own power and gives its own benefit, medicine health and piloting safety at sea, is told elsewhere (1.346a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). It ends with the wage: earning wages is a craft of its own, so that medicine makes health and the wage-earning that goes with it the fee, building makes a house and wage-earning the pay, and “each of them works its own work”, τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται, and does good to the thing it has been put in charge of (1.346d). The Charmides has the same two examples, medicine and piloting (174c), and draws the same line round each craft’s product.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle puts the principle into nature. Nature, he says in the Politics, makes nothing as the bronze-smiths make the Delphian knife, stingily, but one thing for one use; for each instrument is best finished when it serves not many works but one.1 The figure can be read as the Charmides’ answer in small: a knowledge set to do every work would be a Delphian knife.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Politics 1.2, 1252b1–5.