From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordWork: a deed, a task, a labour; the thing produced by labour; and the function proper to a thing.
- In the CharmidesSeventeen times. Medicine produces health, “a fine work for us” (165d); temperance is asked “what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?” (165e); and the knowledge of good and bad is “the knowledge whose work is to benefit us” (174d).
- In this edition“Work”, “works”; “actions” once (159c).
- A place to read165c–166a and 174c–175b.
- English renderings
- ἔργον, ergon, “work”; ἔργα, erga, “works”, “actions”; ἔργων, ergōn, “works”; ἔργου, ergou, “work”
Meaning
Ἔργον covers what English divides among “deed”, “work” and “function”. It is a thing done, as against a word spoken; a piece of labour, as in Homer’s ἔργα, the tilled fields (Iliad 12.283); the product of a craft, a house or a cloak; and, in philosophy, the work proper to a thing, what it alone or best does. The craft model of the Charmides rests on the third sense and slides toward the fourth: every knowledge has a work, and the question is what temperance’s is.
Use in the book
The word first gathers the activities on which the argument against quietness and “doing one’s own business” rests: “all the actions of the body” are finer done quickly (159c), and “producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft” is doing something (161e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; τέχνη). Critias then makes it a word of honour, through Hesiod’s line that “work is no disgrace”: only what is made finely and beneficially is a work (163b–c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). Socrates then uses it of the craftsmen, asking whether each must know “when he is going to profit from the work he is doing, and when he is not” (164b; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).
The word governs the comparison of 165c–166a. Medicine produces health, “a fine work for us”, house-building houses, and temperance, as knowledge of oneself, is asked for its fine work (165d–e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias answers that calculation and geometry have no such work as “a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving” (165e–166a). Socrates concedes the point and moves the question from the work a knowledge produces to the object it is of (166a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός), and the word disappears from the argument for eight pages.
It returns to settle it. The knowledge that benefits is the one “whose work is to benefit us” (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν), and Critias’ claim that temperance would benefit by ruling it meets the question whether temperance would then do “the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work” (174e). Health belongs to another craft, and benefit too, since that work had been assigned to another (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). The last use is in the review of concessions, that by knowledge of knowledge one knows “the works of the other kinds of knowledge too” (175b; see ἄλογος). The word that Critias set aside at 166a returns at the end as the question he could not answer.
Places to read
Every passage in which the noun occurs.
- 159cAll the actions of the body are finer done quickly.
- 161eProducing any of the works of craft is doing something.
- 163b–cHesiod’s “work is no disgrace”; only what is made finely and beneficially is a work.
- 164bMust each craftsman know when he will profit from the work he is doing?
- 165d–166aMedicine produces health, a fine work, and house-building houses; what fine work does temperance produce? Calculation and geometry have no such work.
- 174dThe knowledge of good and bad is the one whose work is to benefit us.
- 174eWould temperance do the crafts’ work, and not each craft its own?
- 175aThe work of benefit was assigned to another craft.
- 175bBy knowledge of knowledge one was granted to know the works of the other kinds of knowledge.
Translation in this edition
“Work” and “works” throughout, with “actions” once, for τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἅπαντα ἔργα, “all the actions of the body” (159c13). The Key Words keep “works” for ἔργα and “work” for ἐργάζεσθαι through 161b–164c, so that the noun and the verb stand together as in the Greek.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Republic defines the word. Socrates asks Thrasymachus whether the work of a horse, or of anything, is not what one does with it alone, or best: we see only with eyes and hear only with ears, so these are their works, and a pruning knife does best the work of pruning (352d–353a). Each thing that has a work has a virtue by which it does it well; the soul’s work is to manage, rule and deliberate, and to live (353b–d; see εὖ πράττειν). In the second book the city is built on the same idea, each man doing the one work for which he is fitted by nature (370a–c; see ἐργάζομαι).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle makes the same question the hinge of his account of happiness. As the good of a flute-player or a sculptor or any craftsman lies in his work, so the good of man would lie in his, if he has one; and he asks whether the carpenter and the cobbler can have works and actions while man has none and is by nature idle.1 He finds it in an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, and so with virtue. The Charmides asks temperance for its work as Aristotle asks man for his, and its answer, that the knowledge whose work is to benefit is not temperance, leaves the question open that Aristotle answers.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097b24–1098a18.