From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The phraseThe coming about well of each thing: an articular infinitive, with the adverb εὖ, “well”, and γίγνεσθαι, “come to be”, “be done”.
- In the CharmidesOnce, at 174c–d: “But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent.”
- In this edition“Being done well”.
- A place to read174b–d.
- English renderings
- τὸ εὖ … τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι, to eu … toutōn hekasta gignesthai, “each of these things being done well”
Meaning
Εὖ is the adverb of good: well, rightly, to good effect. With γίγνεσθαι it names the success of what happens, not the happening itself, and it is the same adverb that the dialogue’s question about happiness turns on (see εὖ πράττειν). The articular infinitive makes the success a thing that can be present or absent, as the sentence goes on to say.
Use in the book
The phrase is the result of a subtraction. Socrates asks Critias to take the knowledge of good and bad away from the others, and Critias agrees that medicine, cobbling, weaving, the pilot’s art and generalship would do their work “No less” (174c; see ἐξαιρέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ὑγιαίνω; ὑποδέω; ὑφαντική). Then: “But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent” (174c–d; see ἀπολείπω).
The two answers draw the line on which the rest of the argument depends. Each craft keeps its product without the knowledge of good and bad: the doctor still heals, the pilot still keeps us from dying at sea. What goes is the “well”, and the edition’s pair “well and beneficially” shows what the word means here: done well is done to our benefit. The doctor of 164b–c does not always know when his treatment benefits: the crafts do not know their own benefit. From the phrase Socrates draws his conclusion: the knowledge whose work is to benefit us is not temperance, but the knowledge of good and bad (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν).
The phrase can be read as answering the question Critias’ first definition left open. The doer of good things at 163e did not need to know that they were good; the doctor of 164b–c benefited his patient without knowing it (see τὰ δέοντα). At 174c–d the benefit has a knowledge of its own, separate from every craft and from temperance as Critias defined it. The “well” in “do well”, which the dialogue had let slide from acting rightly to faring happily (see εὖ πράττειν), is here given its source.
Places to read
The phrase’s place, with the subtraction that leads to it.
Translation in this edition
“Each of these things being done well and beneficially” renders τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὠφελίμως (174c9–d1); the English puts the subject first, as the Greek does, and gives the verb, “will be gone from us”, a clause of its own after a colon. “Beneficially” keeps the family the Key Words render “benefit” throughout (see ὠφέλιμος). At 174d1 the perfect participle ἀπολελοιπός is B²’s and T’s, where B first wrote ἀπολελοιπώς (apparatus).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Euthydemus makes the same distinction through use. Its argument that goods must be not only had but used, and used rightly, since wrong use is worse than leaving a thing alone, is told elsewhere (280b–281a; see εὐδαιμονέω), and so is its conclusion, that it is knowledge that leads and sets the action right and gives men not only good fortune but doing well (281a–b; see ἐπιστημόνως). The Euthydemus’ knowledge of right use can be read as the Charmides’ knowledge of the “well”, and the Euthydemus goes on, as the Charmides does not, to call it wisdom.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle gives the same fact as the reason why ethics cannot be exact. The fine and the just, he says, admit of much variation and wandering, so that they seem to exist by convention only and not by nature; and good things too have this wandering, because harm comes to many from them: some have perished through wealth, others through courage.1 What the Charmides assigns to a knowledge, Aristotle takes as a limit on what can be known precisely.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.3, 1094b14–19.