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rule, begin

ἄρχω

Rule by knowledge in the argument, rule by force after it · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἌρχειν is to be first: to begin, and to lead and rule; for “begin” Attic prose mostly uses the middle. Its noun ἀρχή is both “rule” and “beginning”.
  • In the CharmidesOf rule five times, in the picture of a household and city run by temperance (171d–e), in the dream that begins “If temperance ruled us as fully as could be” (173a), and in Critias’ claim that temperance would “rule over” the knowledge of the good (174e). Of beginning twice: Socrates tells Critias that he understood him “almost as soon as you began” (163d), and the boy will obey his guardian “starting from this very day” (176c).
  • In this edition“Rule” and “be ruled”; “began” and “starting” for the middle.
  • A place to read171d–172a, with 176c.
English renderings
ἤρχοντο, ērchonto, “were ruled”; ἤρχομεν, ērchomen, “we ruled”; ἄρχοι, archoi, “ruled”; ἄρχουσα, archousa, “rule over”; ἀρχομένου, archomenou, “began”; ἀρξάμενος, arxamenos, “starting”

Meaning

Ἄρχειν (archein) joins two ideas that English keeps apart: to be first in time, to begin, and to be first in rank, to command. The ἄρχων is a ruler, and at Athens the title of the chief magistrates; ἀρχή is office and empire as well as origin and first principle. The active governs a genitive of those ruled; the middle, ἄρχεσθαι, is the usual Attic word for beginning one’s own action.

Use in the book

Rule enters the dialogue with the knowledge that was to make temperance beneficial. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, the life without error would extend to “all the others who were ruled by us”; we would not allow “the others we ruled” to do anything but what they could do correctly, and a household and a city run by temperance would be run well, “and everything else that temperance ruled” (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος). The temperate are rulers, and the benefit of their knowledge passes to their subjects through command.

The dream extends the rule to the whole of life. “If temperance ruled us as fully as could be, being such as we are now defining it, wouldn’t everything be done according to the kinds of knowledge?” (173a–b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; ὄναρ). No false pilot or doctor or general would deceive us, and the human race would act and live knowledgeably (173b–d). But Socrates cannot see that it would therefore do well and be happy, and the argument finds that only the knowledge of good and bad makes us so (174b–c).

Critias tries to recover the benefit by rule. Temperance, he says, presides over the other kinds of knowledge, and so, “since it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well, it would benefit us” (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω). Socrates answers with the crafts: then temperance, and not medicine, would make us healthy, and would do the work of every craft (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός). To rule over a knowledge is not to have it, and temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, would be a ruler without a work of its own.

The middle sense closes the dialogue. Critias orders the boy to let Socrates charm him and not desert him; the boy will obey his guardian, and “Then I’ll do it,” he says, “starting from this very day” (176c; see ἐπίτροπος). The next lines are about plotting and force (176c–d; see βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι). The edition’s note at 176c reminds the reader that some twenty-five years later these two ruled Athens by force, Critias among the Thirty and Charmides among the Ten set over the Piraeus, the port of Athens. The dialogue that pictured temperance ruling a city by knowledge can be read as ending on the first day of a rule of another kind.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs, in both senses.

  1. 163dSocrates understood what Critias meant almost as soon as he began.
  2. 171d–eIf temperance were knowing what one knows and does not, we and all who were ruled by us would live without error; household, city and everything else temperance ruled would be run well.
  3. 173aThe dream: if temperance ruled us as fully as could be, everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge.
  4. 174eCritias: since temperance presides over the other kinds of knowledge, it would rule over the knowledge of the good as well, and benefit us.
  5. 176cThe boy will obey his guardian, starting from this very day.

Translation in this edition

“Ruled” and “rule” render the active and passive (171d8, 171e3, 171e7, 173a8, 174e1); at 174e1 ἄρχουσα, literally “ruling”, is “would rule over”, beside ἐπιστατεῖ (174d9), “presides over”, and the English keeps both. The middle is “began” at 163d1 and “starting” at 176c4. The noun ἀρχή appears in the phrase ἐξ ἀρχῆς, “from the beginning”, “at the start” (163d, 167b, 171d, 172c; see ἐξ ἀρχῆς).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first book of the Republic Socrates draws from the crafts a principle of rule that the Charmides can be read as assuming. The true pilot is a ruler of sailors and seeks what is advantageous for the sailor, not for himself; and “nor does anyone else who holds any office, while he acts as ruler, look to or prescribe his own advantage; he looks to the advantage of the man under his rule, the one for whom he does his work” (342d–e). Rule, so understood, is a craft, and its good is the good of the ruled; it can be read as the hope of 171d–e, that the ruled would share in the rulers’ freedom from error. In the fifth book the same hope becomes the dialogue’s most famous proposal: unless philosophers rule as kings in the cities, or those now called kings and rulers take to philosophy genuinely and adequately, there will be no rest from evils for cities (473c–d).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports that Socrates said that kings and rulers are not those who hold the sceptre, nor those chosen by whoever happens to be there, nor those who obtain office by lot, nor those who have used force or deception, but those who know how to rule; and he showed that, on a ship, the one who knows rules and everyone else, the owner included, obeys him.1 The list sets rule by knowledge against rule by force and fraud, and the last pages of the Charmides can be read as moving between the two.

Source note

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.9.10–11.