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preside over

ἐπιστατέω

Temperance set over prophecy and over the kinds of knowledge · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo be set over, to preside, to superintend; ἐπιστάτης is the overseer, the master of a gang, the trainer, the chairman.
  • In the CharmidesTwice. In the dream temperance, “presiding over” prophecy, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets (173c); at the end Critias argues that temperance “presides over the other kinds of knowledge too” and so would rule over the knowledge of the good (174d–e).
  • In this edition“Presiding over”, “presides over”.
  • A place to read173a–d and 174d–175a.
English renderings
ἐπιστατοῦσαν, epistatousan, “presiding over (it)”; ἐπιστατεῖ, epistatei, “presides over”

Meaning

The verb is formed from ἐπιστάτης, “one set over” (from ἐφίστημι, “to set over”): the overseer of works, the supervisor of an animal’s training, the official who presided at Athens over the Council and the Assembly. To ἐπιστατεῖν is to have charge of something without being the one who does it. Its sound is close to ἐπίσταμαι, “to know”, and Critias’ verb can be read as joining the overseer’s charge to the knower’s claim.

Use in the book

The verb first appears in the dream. Socrates grants, if Critias likes, that prophecy too is a knowledge, “and that temperance, presiding over it,” turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἀποτρέπω; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; προφήτης). The overseer does not prophesy; it sorts prophets. The dream thus grants what the argument had denied at 170e–171c, the power to tell the expert from the pretender (see ἀληθινός).

The second use is Critias’ last defence. Socrates has shown that the knowledge that benefits is the knowledge of good and bad, not temperance (174d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Critias answers: “Why couldn’t it benefit us? … For if temperance really is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of kinds of knowledge, and presides over the other kinds of knowledge too, then surely, since it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well, it would benefit us” (174d–e; see ἄρχω; ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). Socrates replies with the restriction Critias himself accepted, that temperance is knowledge of knowledge “and of nothing else”, and temperance is left the craftsman of no benefit (174e–175a; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

The verb can be read as the dialogue’s word for what Critias wanted temperance to be. A presiding knowledge would neither heal nor build nor foretell, but would stand over those who do, as an overseer stands over workmen. The argument asks what an overseer must know to oversee, and Critias’ answer, knowledge of knowledge alone, is not enough.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 173cPresiding over prophecy, temperance turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets.
  2. 174d–e2If temperance presides over the other kinds of knowledge, Critias argues, it would rule over the knowledge of the good and benefit us.

Translation in this edition

“Presiding over” for the participle ἐπιστατοῦσαν with the genitive αὐτῆς (173c5), “presides over” for ἐπιστατεῖ with the dative (174d9). The ruling that follows, ἄρχουσα, is “rule over” (174e1; see ἄρχω).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Apology Socrates asks Callias, who had spent more on sophists than everyone else together, what overseer he means to hire for his two sons. If they were colts or calves, one could hire an overseer to make them fine and good in their proper excellence, a horse-trainer or a farmer; but since they are human beings, who is the one who knows this excellence, the human and civic kind? Callias names Evenus of Paros, a wise man visiting Athens, who teaches it for five minae (20a–b). The overseer, on this account, must know the excellence he is to produce. In the Statesman the visitor from Elea sets the master builder apart from his workmen: he is not himself a worker but a ruler of workers, contributing knowledge, not handiwork, and having judged he does not stop, as a calculator would, but gives each worker the orders fitted to him until they have finished the work (259e–260a). The Crito joins the overseer and the man who understands in one phrase (47b; see ἐπαΐω). Socrates himself once held the office the verb names, as Xenophon reports (Memorabilia 4.4.2; see ἐναντιόομαι).