Σ Sigma

follow, happen

συμβαίνω

To come together, to fall out; of an argument, to follow: the verb of consequence that Critias refuses, asserts and is finally found to lack · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo go together; of events, to fall out, to happen to someone; of propositions, to follow, to result.
  • In the CharmidesFour times: Critias’ protest that he would sooner retract than accept what “necessarily follows” (164c), his claim that self-knowledge “does follow” from knowledge of knowledge (169d), the good things that “would happen to us” under temperance (173b), and the concessions “that did not follow in the argument” (175b).
  • In this edition“Follow”; “happen” at 173b.
  • A place to read169d–e and 175b.
English renderings
συμβαίνειν, symbainein, “(necessarily) follows”; συμβαίνει, symbainei, “it (does) follow”; συμβαίνοι, symbainoi, “would happen”; συμβαίνονθ’, symbainonth’, “(that did not) follow”

Meaning

Συμβαίνω is βαίνω, “go”, with σύν: to go together, to come to terms; of things, to come about, to befall; of statements, to follow from others. The two senses lie close in Greek, since what follows from premises is what comes about when they are granted. The perfect participle, τὸ συμβεβηκός, “what has come along”, became Aristotle’s word for an accident: what belongs to a thing and can truly be said of it, but neither of necessity nor for the most part, like the treasure a man comes upon when he digs a pit to set a plant in.1

Use in the book

Critias meets the verb first as a threat. Socrates has shown that a doctor who acts beneficially acts temperately without knowing it, and Critias answers, “If you think that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier, I would sooner take back some of it”, rather than concede the conclusion (164c–d; see ἀναγκαῖος; ἀνατίθημι; συγχωρέω). He will give up premises rather than accept the consequence, and its denial becomes his next definition.

At 169d he uses the verb himself, as an assertion. Socrates has granted for the sake of argument that knowledge of knowledge is possible, and asks how it makes one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not; Critias replies, “Certainly, … and it does follow, Socrates”, and gives his reason: whoever has knowledge of itself will be knowing himself, as whoever has speed is fast (169d–e; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; τάχος). Socrates allows that consequence and presses the one he asked about: “That isn’t what I’m disputing … But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?” (169e; see ἀμφισβητέω). Critias has proved that something follows, but not the thing in question.

In the dream the verb means what happens to us. If temperance ruled and no pretender deceived us, Socrates asks, “what else would happen to us than that we would be healthier in body than we are now, and come through safe when in danger at sea and in war …?” (173b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; σῴζω). The happy consequences are granted, and only one is withheld, that by acting knowledgeably we would do well (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

The reckoning brings the two senses together. “And yet we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument” (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω). The dialogue’s question can be read as asking of temperance, in both senses, what συμβαίνει: what follows from the definition, and what would come of it for us. The concessions supplied the first only by granting what did not follow, and the second never came.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 164c–dCritias would sooner take back his agreements than accept what necessarily follows from them.
  2. 169dHe claims that knowing oneself does follow from knowledge of knowledge.
  3. 173bUnder temperance’s rule, what would happen to us is health and safety.
  4. 175bThey have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument.

Translation in this edition

“Follow” at 164c9, 169d9 and 175b5, “happen” at 173b5. At 164c9 Burnet records Hirschig’s deletion of εἰς before τοῦτο; at 173b5 the ἤ, “than”, that completes Socrates’ question is Heindorf’s conjecture, where Stobaeus has μή, and Stobaeus also moves τι next to ἄλλο; at 175b5 Schanz would omit ἐν before τῷ λόγῳ (apparatus).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the verb the hinge of his definition of a deduction, συλλογισμός: a λόγος in which, once certain things have been put down, something different from them comes about of necessity, συμβαίνει, because they are so.2 His deduction can be read as the thing Critias claims at 169d and Socrates finds missing at 175b: a consequence that comes from the premises themselves and not from the partners’ readiness to grant them.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.30, 1025a14–19.

2. Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.1, 24b18–20.