From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordKnowledge of the future: the definition of prophecy, μαντική, that Socrates grants for the dream.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in the dream, where Socrates grants “that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be” (173c).
- In this edition“Knowledge of what is going to be”.
- A place to read173c–174b.
- English renderings
- ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, epistēmēn tou mellontos esesthai, “knowledge of what is going to be”
Meaning
The phrase is a definition offered as a concession. Prophecy, which Greeks practised by birds, entrails, oracles and dreams, is counted among the knowledges, and its object is τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, “what is going to be”. Granted that, prophecy becomes a craft like the others, with true practitioners and impostors.
Use in the book
Socrates grants the definition at the end of his dream, after the pilots, doctors and generals. “And if you like, let us grant that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be” (173c; see μαντική; συγχωρέω). The grant lets temperance, presiding over prophecy, sort its practitioners, turning away the impostors and setting up true prophets as foretellers of the future (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἐπιστατέω; προφήτης). Prophecy is the last craft the dream sets in order, and the boldest: the future is the hardest thing to claim to know, and the easiest to pretend to.
The prophet returns at once as Critias’ candidate for the happy man. Socrates suggests that he may mean “the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet”, and Critias accepts him “and another as well”, and Socrates guesses who the other is: a man who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now (173e–174a; see τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα). The question that follows passes over the prophet. Which of this man’s kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Not the knowledge of the future, but the knowledge of good and bad (174a–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).
The phrase can be read as the dialogue’s clearest case of a knowledge that does not make anyone happy. To know what will happen is not to know whether it will be good for us. The dream grants prophecy the rank of a knowledge in order to show that even a true prophet, set up by temperance, would leave that question open.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the prophet’s return.
Translation in this edition
“Knowledge of what is going to be” renders ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι (173c4), keeping the future infinitive; “foretellers of the future” renders προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων (173c6). Μαντική is “prophecy” and μάντις “prophet”.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Laches draws what can be read as the conclusion the Charmides implies. Nicias says that the prophet needs to know only the signs of what will be, whether death, illness or the loss of money awaits someone, or victory or defeat in war or in some other contest; but whether it is better for someone to suffer these things or not, why should the prophet be the judge of that, rather than anyone else? (195e–196a). Socrates then argues that there is not one knowledge of the past, another of the present and another of the future, but one knowledge of the same things at all times, as medicine oversees the healthy that is, was and will be; generalship provides best for what is going to be, and does not think it should serve prophecy but rule it, and the law orders that the prophet shall not rule the general but the general the prophet (198d–199a). On that account there is no separate knowledge of the future, and prophecy is subordinate to the knowledge that judges what is better.
Other ancient sources
The Greek formula for complete knowledge joins the three times. In the Iliad Calchas, the best of the bird-readers, “knew what is, what is going to be, and what was before”, and by the prophecy Apollo gave him he had led the Greek ships to Troy;1 in Hesiod the Muses breathe a god-given voice into the poet, so that he may make famous what will be and what was before, and they themselves tell what is, what will be and what was before.2 The all-knowing man of 174a, who knows the future, the past and the present, can be read as Calchas’ formula turned into a hypothesis, and the question that follows as asking what such knowledge is worth.
Source note
1. Homer, Iliad 1.68–72.
2. Hesiod, Theogony 31–32 and 38.