Ο Omicron

those who do other people’s business

οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες

Those who do other people’s business: the consequence Critias will not accept · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe opposite of the formula τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν: those who do, or busy themselves with, what belongs to others.
  • In the CharmidesAt 163a, twice: in Socrates’ objection, that Critias “says there is nothing to stop those who do other people’s business from being temperate too”, and in Critias’ sarcastic reply.
  • In this edition“Those who do other people’s business”.
  • A place to read162e–163c.
English renderings
τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας, tous ta tōn allōn prattontas, “those who do other people’s business”; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες, hoi ta tōn allōn prattontes, “those who do other people’s business”

Meaning

“Doing other people’s business” is what the Athenians called meddling, πολυπραγμοσύνη, the vice that the ordinary sense of “doing one’s own business” excluded (see πολυπραγμονέω). Socrates’ argument has made it something else: if doing is making, every craftsman who makes things for others does their business, and Critias has just granted that such craftsmen may be temperate.

Use in the book

Critias has agreed that all craftsmen make something, that they make other people’s things as well as their own, and, with “What’s to stop them?”, that they may be temperate even so (162e–163a; see δημιουργός; κωλύω). Socrates draws the conclusion: “Nothing stops me … But see whether it doesn’t stop the man who laid it down that temperance is doing one’s own business, and then says there is nothing to stop those who do other people’s business from being temperate too” (163a). Critias answers with scorn: “Oh yes … I suppose I agreed that those who do other people’s business are temperate, just because I agreed that those who make other people’s things are!” (163a). The edition’s note at 163a explains: “Critias’ answer is sarcastic: he had agreed about making (poiein), and never about doing (prattein), and he is about to explain the difference.”

So the phrase forces the distinction on which Critias’ part of the argument begins. To save the formula he must separate making from doing (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν), and the separation turns “doing one’s own business” into “the doing of good things” (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). The meddlers whom the formula was meant to exclude never appear again; the phrase served only to make Critias say what he meant by “doing”.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the distinction it provokes.

  1. 163aSocrates: the formula’s author says that nothing stops those who do other people’s business from being temperate; Critias denies having agreed to that.
  2. 163b–cCritias distinguishes making from doing and working, citing Hesiod.

Translation in this edition

“Those who do other people’s business” renders τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας (163a8) and οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες (163a10–11). Critias’ reply is a statement, not a question, as Burnet punctuates it, keeping the manuscripts’ που, “I suppose”, where Cobet proposed ποῦ, “where?”; and “just because I agreed” renders εἰ, Heindorf’s conjecture, where B has ἦ, T ἣ and W ᾗ (163a11).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic draws the line the Charmides’ craftsmen blur. If a carpenter sets his hand to a cobbler’s work, or a cobbler to a carpenter’s, or one man tries to do both, the city takes no great harm; but when a man who is by nature a craftsman or some other money-maker, swollen with wealth or a following or strength, tries to pass into the class of warriors, or a warrior, unfit for it, into that of the counsellors and guardians, or one man tries to do all these at once, this exchange and meddling, Socrates says, is the city’s ruin (434a–c). The doing of other people’s business that matters in the Republic is the exchange of offices, not of crafts, and the judges’ rule that each should hold what is his own is told elsewhere (433e–434a; see ἀλλότριος).