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temperately

σωφρόνως

Temperately: the manner of an action, which the doctor may have without knowing it · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe adverb of σώφρων: in a temperate way, with good sense, with restraint.
  • In the CharmidesThree times: a city “temperately managed” (162a), and the doctor who, having acted beneficially, “acted temperately” (164c) and “acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself” (164c).
  • In this edition“Temperately”.
  • A place to read164b–c.
English renderings
σωφρόνως, sōphronōs, “temperately”

Meaning

The adverb describes how something is done, as the adjective describes who does it. Greek could say that an act was done σωφρόνως, “temperately”, without saying that its agent was σώφρων, and the gap between the two descriptions is the gap the Charmides finds in the doctor.

Use in the book

The first use is a premise in the argument against doing one’s own business. A city whose law ordered every man to make his own cloak, shoes, oil-flask and strigil would not be well managed, the boy agrees; “And yet,” says Socrates, “a city that is temperately managed would be well managed” (161e–162a; see νόμος; οἰκέω). The adverb is granted without question: whatever temperance is, a city run by it is run well. The same assumption returns at 171e, where a household and a city governed by temperance would be bound to be run well (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία); there, with temperance taken as knowledge of knowledge, Socrates withdraws it at once: “I don’t think, Critias, we were right to agree to” (172d).

The second and third uses are the doctor’s. Critias has granted that the man who does what he ought is temperate, and that a doctor making someone healthy does what he ought (164b; see τὰ δέοντα). Then a doctor who does not know whether his treatment will help sometimes does not know how he has acted (164b–c; see οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν), and yet, Socrates tells Critias, “having acted beneficially, he acted temperately, by your account” (164c). Socrates draws the conclusion, that sometimes “he acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself” (164c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). The adverb has carried the step from the act to the man. Because the act was beneficial, it was temperate; because he acted temperately, he is temperate. Critias will not accept a temperate man who does not know himself, and rather than deny the step from the adverb to the verb he gives up the definition and calls temperance self-knowledge (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

The doctor’s case can be read as turning on a question the dialogue never states: whether an act done temperately makes its agent temperate. Critias accepts that it does, and pays for it with his definition.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adverb occurs.

  1. 162aA city that is temperately managed would be well managed.
  2. 164cHaving acted beneficially, the doctor acted temperately, by Critias’ account.
  3. 164cHe acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.

Translation in this edition

“Temperately” at all three places. At 162a4 Burnet prints γε, “a city that is temperately managed”, from a later hand in B, where B and T have τε (apparatus).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle states the distinction that Critias passed over. What the crafts produce holds its excellence within it, so that it is enough for the product to come out a certain way; but what is done according to the virtues is not done justly or temperately, σωφρόνως, because the act itself is a certain way. The agent must be in a certain state when he acts: he must know what he is doing, must choose it, and choose it for its own sake, and must act from a settled and unshakeable state; and of these, knowing counts for little or nothing towards having the virtues, while the other two count for everything. So an act is called temperate when it is the kind of act a temperate man would do; but a man is temperate not by doing such acts, but by doing them in the way the temperate do.1 By the first condition the doctor of 164c, who does not know whether he has helped, can be read as not having acted temperately at all. But Aristotle weighs knowing least of the three, and Critias, who wanted knowing to be the whole of temperance, would have found no ally in him.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4, 1105a26–b9.