From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The phraseThe neuter plural of κακός, “bad”: bad things, harms, evils.
- In the CharmidesFour times in two places: everything, “bad and good alike”, starts from the soul (156e); and Socrates’ question, “Then the man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things?” (163e), which Critias answers in his own words: “the man who makes not good things but bad ones is not temperate” (163e).
- In this edition“Bad”.
- A place to read163c–164c.
- English renderings
- τὰ κακά, ta kaka, “bad”, “bad things”; κακά, kaka, “bad (things)”
Meaning
Κακός is bad in every sense, of poor quality, cowardly, low-born, harmful, wicked (see κακός). The neuter plural names bad things as harms: what injures the body or the man. The plural keeps that sense of benefit and harm wherever it occurs.
Use in the book
The first use is the Thracian’s, that everything “bad and good alike” starts from the soul (156e; see ἐπιρρέω; τὰ ἀγαθά). Bad things here are above all sicknesses, of the body and of the whole man, and their source is a soul in bad condition; the charm that makes temperance in the soul is their cure.
The second is Critias’. Socrates asks him to define his doing more plainly: “Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?” “It is.” “Then the man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things?” Critias turns the question back, “And don’t you think so, my good fellow?”, and Socrates refuses to answer for himself: “Let’s not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now” (163e; see ἐάω; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). Critias then states it as his own: “I say that the man who makes not good things but bad ones is not temperate, and that the one who makes good things and not bad ones is”, and gives the plain definition told elsewhere (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). Bad things have already been ruled out of “one’s own”: Hesiod, on Critias’ reading, counted “everything harmful as belonging to others” (163c; see ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός). The temperate man, on this definition, cannot do anything bad, because whatever he did that was bad would not have been his own doing.
The definition fails at the first case Socrates brings. The doctor sometimes acts “beneficially or harmfully” and does not know which (164b–c; see βλαβερῶς; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν). A doctor who harms his patient does bad things, and so by Critias’ rule is not temperate; and he cannot tell whether he has. Critias wanted a definition under which the temperate man could not go wrong, and got one under which he could not know whether he had. The pair good and bad returns at the end as the object of the one knowledge that makes men happy, and the return is told elsewhere (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν).
Places to read
Every passage in which the plural occurs.
Translation in this edition
“Bad” at 156e7 and 163e4–9, kept, with “good”, at every joint where the pair appears (156e, 163e, 174b–d; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν). Never “evil”, as the Key Words explain (see κακός).
Elsewhere in Plato
In this passage the Timaeus reverses the Thracian’s direction. Most of the excesses of pleasure for which men are blamed as bad by choice are blamed wrongly, says Timaeus, for no one is bad by his own will: a bad man grows bad through a poor state of body and an upbringing without education, and these befall every man unwelcome and unwilled (86d–e). In the Charmides bad things flow from the soul to the body; here they flow from the body into the soul. In the Theaetetus Socrates tells Theodorus that bad things can never perish, since the good must always have some contrary, nor can they be established among the gods; of necessity they haunt mortal nature and this region, and so one should try to flee from here to there as quickly as possible, and the flight is becoming like god as far as one can (176a–b). There bad things belong to mortal life itself, to be fled rather than cured; the Thracian’s charm promised a cure.