From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΓιγνώσκω, “know”, “recognise”, with the reflexive ἑαυτόν and a dependent clause: not to know oneself, how one has acted.
- In the CharmidesOnce: “Then sometimes … the doctor, having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted” (164b–c).
- In this edition“Does not know himself—how he has acted”.
- A place to read164a–d.
- English renderings
- οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν, ou gignōskei heauton hōs epraxen, “does not know himself—how he has acted”
Meaning
Greek can make a person the object of a verb of knowing and add a clause saying what about him is known: “I know you, who you are”. Here the object is the doctor himself, and the clause, ὡς ἔπραξεν, says what he does not know: how he acted. The construction lets the sentence say both “he does not know how he acted” and “he does not know himself”.
Use in the book
Critias has said that craftsmen may be temperate while making other people’s things, and that the man who does what he ought is temperate (163a, 164b). Socrates asks whether a doctor must know when his treatment is beneficial and when not, and whether each craftsman must know when he will profit from his work; “Perhaps not” (164b; see ὀνίνημι). Then: “Then sometimes … the doctor, having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted. And yet, having acted beneficially, he acted temperately, by your account” (164b–c). The step that follows asks, in another verb, whether such a man “acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself—that he is temperate?” (164c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).
The phrase is what Critias cannot accept, and his refusal changes the dialogue. Rather than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate, he would take back what he agreed, and he would almost say that “this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself” (164d; see ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν). The negative comes first: the dialogue arrives at self-knowledge by way of a man who lacks it and does good all the same. It can be read as the strongest objection to Critias’ definition, made before he gives it.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with Critias’ answer.
Translation in this edition
“Does not know himself—how he has acted” renders οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν (164c1), keeping the reflexive as the verb’s object so that the phrase prepares “know thyself”. At 164c the same dash introduces the parallel ἀγνοεῖ δ’ ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ, “does not know himself—that he is temperate” (164c6).