From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordInquiry, search, investigation; the noun of ζητεῖν.
- In the CharmidesThree times. Speed is praised “in the soul’s inquiries and in deliberation” (160a); Critias complains, “you are conducting your inquiry as though they were alike” (165e); and at the end “our inquiry is no more able to find the truth” (175d).
- In this edition“Inquiry”, “inquiries”.
- A place to read175b–d.
- English renderings
- ζητήσεσιν, zētēsesin, “inquiries”; ζήτησιν, zētēsin, “inquiry”; ζήτησις, zētēsis, “inquiry”
Meaning
The noun names the act of seeking and the process of an investigation (see ζητέω). In Plato it can mean a single search for an answer or the whole course of an argument, and, in the plural, the mind’s inquiries in general. Aristotle uses it for deliberation, which he calls a kind of search (see βουλεύομαι).
Use in the book
The first use is general. In the argument against quietness Socrates says that “in the soul’s inquiries and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person … who is thought to deserve praise, but the one who does it most easily and most quickly” (160a–b; see ἀνευρίσκω; βουλεύομαι). Inquiry is one of the soul’s activities, and quickness is its virtue.
The second use is Critias’ objection to the method. Temperance is not like the other kinds of knowledge, “and yet you are conducting your inquiry as though they were alike” (165e; see ζητέω). The comparison with medicine and building, which Socrates thought the natural way to inquire, is to Critias the wrong one.
The third use personifies the inquiry. After listing the concessions they made without warrant, Socrates says that, though it found them simple-minded and easy to deal with, “our inquiry is no more able to find the truth”, and that it has mocked the truth by showing their definition of no benefit (175c–d; see ἀλήθεια; εὐηθικός). The edition’s note at 175d: “Socrates personifies the inquiry as an insolent mocker”. The inquiry has become an agent that defeats those who conduct it.
Places to read
Every passage in which the noun occurs.
Translation in this edition
“The soul’s inquiries” for ταῖς ζητήσεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς (160a8), “conducting your inquiry” for ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν (165e5), and “our inquiry” for ἡ ζήτησις (175d1), as the Glossary records.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Meno puts the problem of inquiry as a paradox. Meno asks how Socrates will look for something when he does not know at all what it is: what will he propose to look for, and if he finds it, how will he know that this is what he did not know? Socrates restates it as an eristic argument: a man can inquire neither into what he knows, since he knows it and has no need of inquiry, nor into what he does not know, since he does not even know what to inquire into (80d–e). The concession that Socrates at the end calls more absurd than anything is the reverse of this: that one could know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all (175c; see ἄλογος). Beside the Meno, the end of the Charmides can be read as the paradox of inquiry turned on knowledge of knowledge. Theaetetus’ ease in learning and inquiry, which Theodorus compares to a stream of oil flowing without a sound, is told under δυσμαθία (Theaetetus 144a–b).