From the book
Stobaeus, Volume I
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Falsehood
ψεῦδος
pseudosPseudos denotes falsehood; pseudēs means false.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordPseudos denotes falsehood; pseudēs means false.
- In StobaeusThe Epicurean notice denies falsity to perception and impression while allowing it to some beliefs.
- In this edition“False” is not automatically “deceptive”: the latter can imply an intention absent from the passage.
- A place to beginFalse belief is distinguished from true perception and impression.
- English renderings
- falsehood; the false
Meaning
Pseudos denotes falsehood; pseudēs means false. The term’s application to an appearance, belief, or statement is part of the philosophical disagreement.
Use in the book
The Epicurean notice denies falsity to perception and impression while allowing it to some beliefs. The Sophist passage explicitly includes thought, belief, and appearance among things in soul that can be false or true. The difference requires attention to what each account means by appearance and how it relates to belief. A single English word does not establish a shared classification.
Places to read
Translation in this edition
“False” is not automatically “deceptive”: the latter can imply an intention absent from the passage. The technical differences are preserved in the accompanying definitions.
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 475, 498.
From the book
The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert, Volumes I–II
Joseph Joubert · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Falsehood
mensonge; menteur; mentir
Mentir and mensonge distinguish lying from straightforward factual error, while Joubert also asks whether a lie can prevent self-deception, just as a truth can deceive.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordMentir and mensonge distinguish lying from straightforward factual error, while Joubert also asks whether a lie can prevent self-deception, just as a truth can deceive.
- In JoubertThe categorical account of the false mind describes deception directed both inward and toward others, opposed to sincerity and frankness.
- In this editionThe English translation retains always and never in the false-mind passage without weakening them into probabilities.
- A place to beginThe false mind is described as lying to itself and others.
- English renderings
- lying; lie; lies
Meaning
Mentir and mensonge distinguish lying from straightforward factual error, while Joubert also asks whether a lie can prevent self-deception, just as a truth can deceive.
Use in the book
The categorical account of the false mind describes deception directed both inward and toward others, opposed to sincerity and frankness. Its assertion should be read beside the separate caution that sincerity does not guarantee an accurate mind: the moral orientation of a mind is not identical with infallibility. An early question presses a different distinction, asking whether some lies might prevent listeners from deceiving themselves, just as some truths deceive. It leaves the answer open. The final conditional presents silence as the remaining choice when one wishes neither to lie nor to wound in unnamed circumstances.
Places to read
- II, p. 681, entry 6, ¶2The false mind is described as lying to itself and others.
- II, p. 681, entry 6, ¶5Frankness is placed opposite the false mind.
- I, p. 155, entry 5, ¶1The relation of lies and self-deception is posed as a question.
- II, p. 843, entry 10, ¶1Avoiding both lying and injury can lead to silence.
- II, p. 659, entry 8, ¶1Sincerity is distinguished from infallibility and guaranteed accuracy.
Translation in this edition
The English translation retains always and never in the false-mind passage without weakening them into probabilities. The question about protective lies remains a question, and the silence sentence retains its contextual such. These witnesses do not create blanket permission to deceive.
Source note
Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 155; II, pp. 659, 681, 843.
From the book
Centuries of Meditations
Thomas Traherne · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Falsehood
falsehood; forgery; counterfeit claim
Falsehood is untruth, and in the relevant passage it carries the further sense of fraudulent pretence.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordFalsehood is untruth, and in the relevant passage it carries the further sense of fraudulent pretence.
- In TraherneTraherne compares the scholar who studies happiness without enjoying it to an alchemist who claims the philosopher’s stone but produces none of its benefits.
- In this editionThe noun occurs within an analogy about fraudulent possession, not as a general theory of lying.
- A place to beginThe supposed alchemist’s unused stone illustrates the falsehood of claiming happiness without enjoying it.
Meaning
Falsehood is untruth, and in the relevant passage it carries the further sense of fraudulent pretence. What is claimed to have been acquired is not borne out by its use.
Use in the book
Traherne compares the scholar who studies happiness without enjoying it to an alchemist who claims the philosopher’s stone but produces none of its benefits. The absence of practical fruit exposes the claim: either the possession is counterfeit or its value has not really been understood. The test is pointedly inward as well as polemical. One must devote time to possessing happiness after spending time in search of it.
Places to read
- IV.11The supposed alchemist’s unused stone illustrates the falsehood of claiming happiness without enjoying it.
In this edition
The noun occurs within an analogy about fraudulent possession, not as a general theory of lying. Its force comes from the difference between verbal profession and enacted enjoyment.
Source note
Primary text: IV.11.