Truth and falsehood

Use in the book

Charmides fears that denying his temperance will show Critias and his other admirers to be false (158d). The English “liar” gives the personal sting, though a false assessment need not be deliberate lying. At 161c Socrates explicitly removes personal origin as the test: examine whether what is said is true. This is repeated when Critias takes over the account (162e).

At 171b the medical examiner considers whether claims are true and performances correct. The different predicates matter: evaluating expertise involves more than determining that a speaker is socially credible. At 173c the dream imagines use of genuine craftsmen and true prophets, contrasting authentic competence with imposture.

In the final passage the inquiry fails to discover truth and instead mocks it (175c–d). This is personified disappointment at the fate of their account, not an assertion that truth itself is relative or unknowable. Socrates retains the conviction that temperance is a great good. The dialogue's unresolved conclusion distinguishes failure to establish the truth in this investigation from abandonment of truth as its standard.

Places to read

1. 158dCharmides’ fear of discrediting those who praise him
2. 161c–162e23Truth prioritized over authorship
3. 171bTruth of statements and correctness of acts as separate tests
4. 173cGenuine expertise in the dream
5. 175c–eTruth not discovered by the completed inquiry

Translation in this edition

“True”, “truly” and “genuine” can render related alēth- forms in different functions. “Liar” at 158d is forceful personal English; the Greek adjective itself does not settle whether Critias' error would be intentional.

ἀδικέω

Attested: εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε (ei mē adikō ge). Unless I am mistaken; an idiomatic qualification of Charmides' recognition of Socrates' name, not a confession of wrongdoing. References: 156a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀδικέω. See Truth and falsehood.

ἀλήθεια

Attested: ἀλήθειαν (alētheian). Truth, the object which the inquiry finally fails to find despite the partners’ generous concessions. References: 175d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλήθεια. See Truth and falsehood.

ἀληθής

Attested: ἀληθῆ / ἀληθὲς (alēthē / alēthes). True or truthful; applies to reports and claims, without making the speaker’s confidence proof of them. References: 153c, 164a, 171b, 161c, 162c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀληθής. See Truth and falsehood.

ἐπιεικῶς

Attested: ἐπιεικῶς (epieikōs). Fairly or reasonably accurately; qualifies Socrates' confirmation of the battle report. References: 153c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιεικῶς. See Truth and falsehood.

ψευδής

Attested: ψευδῆ (pseudē). False or untruthful; Charmides risks contradicting Critias’ praise if he denies possessing temperance. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ψευδής. See Truth and falsehood.

διαφέρει (diapherei)

Makes a difference; Charmides challenges the relevance of the speaker's identity to the truth of the saying. References: 161c. Lemma: διαφέρω. See Truth and falsehood.

τυγχάνουσιν (tynchanousin)

With a supplementary participle, establishes what people are in fact doing or being; here they are the boy's advance party and admirers. References: 154a. Lemma: τυγχάνω. See Truth and falsehood.