Self-relation

Use in the book

Critias' proposal combines two distinct relations: knowledge knowing other knowledges and knowledge knowing itself. Socrates' first analogies preserve both, adding a further exclusion. Sight would see itself and other sights but no colours, hearing itself and other hearings but no sounds (167c–d). This is not just the claim that an ordinary capacity could have an additional reflexive exercise. It removes its normal objects and assigns only capacities as objects. The affective analogies repeat that structure.

The next stage isolates a general condition on self-application (168b–d2). If a thing exercises its power on itself, it must itself have the character the power requires in its object. A greater thing is greater than a smaller; if it is greater than itself, it must also be smaller than itself. Likewise double and half, more and less, heavier and lighter, older and younger. These comparisons concern the same thing in the same relation; ordinary cases of one person being older than someone but younger than someone else are irrelevant.

The sensory examples give a different kind of consequence. Hearing that hears itself would need sound; sight that sees itself would need colour. Socrates does not straightforwardly derive a formal contradiction from being both sight and coloured, as he does from the incompatible comparative positions. At 168e he expressly distinguishes cases deemed wholly impossible from those that provoke disbelief in some people but perhaps not others. Motion moving itself and heat burning itself belong to the latter discussion.

A “great man” would have to determine whether no powers can apply to themselves, whether some can and some cannot, and, if so, where knowledge belongs (169a). Socrates disclaims competence to settle that classification. The transition at 169d grants possibility; it is not a proof of either unrestricted reflexivity or its universal impossibility.

Two common interpretive shortcuts are therefore unsafe. First, the failure of “greater than itself” does not by itself establish the failure of “knows itself”: the argument explicitly calls for discrimination among kinds of power. Second, modern examples of awareness of awareness do not automatically answer the challenge, because Critias' proposed knowledge excludes other objects and is credited with complete diagnostic authority. A satisfactory defense must specify the content and limits of the reflective power.

The personal inference at 169e raises a separate reflexive issue. A person possessing a knowledge that knows itself is said to know himself. The first reflexive refers to the knowledge, the second to the possessor. Socrates leaves that inference unchallenged at this point, but it must not be smuggled into the preceding relational tests as if the relata were unchanged.

No appeal to a full theory of Forms is required to identify these questions. The text analyzes powers, their objects, comparative predicates and the conditions of self-application. Connections with other Platonic accounts may illuminate it, but its own conspicuous suspension of judgment must remain visible.

Places to read

1. 166c–167a2Other-directed and reflexive cognition combined
2. 167c–168a2Capacity-only analogies excluding ordinary objects
3. 168b–d2Self-application requires the character proper to the object
4. 168e–169b2Impossible and disputed cases distinguished; classification left open
5. 169d–e2Possibility granted; reflexive shifts from knowledge to its possessor

Translation in this edition

Burnet deletes “except knowledge” at 169a. Restoring it without qualification makes the statement assume an exception before asking whether knowledge belongs among exceptions. At 168d ousia is translated “character”, naming the nature or property required of the object, not necessarily a separately existing entity.

θερμότης

Attested: θερμότης (thermotēs). Heat; the proposed case of heat burning itself is one of the self-applying powers whose possibility Socrates leaves disputed. References: 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: θερμότης. See Self-relation.

κίνησις

Attested: κίνησις (kinēsis). Motion; the possibility of motion moving itself is considered among capacities that may act on themselves, without a settled verdict here. References: 168e. Lexical identification: lemma: κίνησις. See Self-relation.

μέγας

Attested: μεγάλου (megalou). Great, in intellectual stature or ability; Socrates says it takes a great man to decide adequately which capacities can be related to themselves. References: 169a. Lexical identification: lemma: μέγας. See Self-relation.

κάειν (kaein)

Burn or heat; asks whether heat could exercise its power upon itself. References: 168e. Lemma: καίω. See Self-relation.

κινεῖν (kinein)

Move; tests whether motion itself could be what moves itself. References: 168e. Lemma: κινέω. See Self-relation.

μεγάλου (megalou)

Great or outstanding; a person of considerable intellectual capacity is needed to settle reflexive powers. References: 169a. Lemma: μέγας. See Self-relation.

πιστεύω (pisteuō)

Trust or have confidence; Socrates does not trust his own ability to settle the reflexivity question. References: 169a. Lemma: πιστεύω. See Self-relation.