Π Pi

pay attention

προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν

To hold the mind towards something: Socrates watching the boys, the boy told to look within, Critias told to attend to the argument · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΠροσέχειν, “to hold towards, to bring to”, with τὸν νοῦν, “the mind”: to turn one’s mind to something, to attend.
  • In the CharmidesThree times: Socrates, as the boy comes in, “I watched the boys too” (154c); to the boy, “pay closer attention and look within yourself” (160d); to Critias, “Just pay attention to the argument itself” (166e).
  • In this edition“Watched”; “pay closer attention”; “pay attention”.
  • A place to read166c–e.
English renderings
προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν, proseschon ton noun, “I watched”; προσέχων τὸν νοῦν, prosechōn ton noun, “pay (closer) attention”, “pay attention”

Meaning

Προσέχειν is to hold one thing towards another, and of a ship to put in to shore; with τὸν νοῦν, “the mind”, it is to bring one’s mind to bear on something, and the noun is often left out. The idiom names attention as an act directed at an object, and the dative says what the object is: τοῖς παισί, “the boys”, τῷ λόγῳ, “the argument”.

Use in the book

The three uses turn the mind on three objects, and they move inward and then outward again. At the boy’s entrance Socrates attends to the onlookers. Everyone in the room seemed in love with Charmides, and that, Socrates says, was less surprising among the grown men: “But I watched the boys too, and not one of them was looking anywhere else, not even the littlest: they were all gazing at him as if he were a statue” (154c–d; see ἄγαλμα; νοῦς; παῖς). The attention is a narrator’s, turned on the effect of beauty in others.

The second use turns attention on the boy’s own soul. After his first definition has failed, Socrates asks for another: “Then once more, Charmides … pay closer attention and look within yourself. Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present, and what sort of thing it would be that could produce such a person” (160d; see ἐμβλέπω; πάρειμι). The comparative can be read as measuring the first answer, which matched what people say of the quiet (159b; see ἡσυχιότης). The boy obeys, thinks the question over “to himself” (160e; see πρὸς ἑαυτό), and gives an answer taken, as he was bidden, from what he finds in himself, modesty (160e; see αἰδώς).

The third turns attention from persons to the argument. Critias, stung at being refuted, is told to let go of who is being refuted: “Just pay attention to the argument itself” (166e; see ἔα χαίρειν; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον). The order of the three can be read as the dialogue’s own movement: from beauty seen in a body, through a soul asked to look at itself, to an argument that matters apart from whoever holds it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 154cSocrates watched the boys too, all gazing at Charmides as at a statue.
  2. 160dThe boy is to pay closer attention, look within himself, and consider what temperance makes him.
  3. 166eCritias is to pay attention to the argument itself and look to see what becomes of it under refutation.

Translation in this edition

“Watched” for προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν (154c6), where the narrator’s English wants a verb of looking; “pay closer attention” for μᾶλλον προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (160d5); “pay attention” for προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (166e1). The verb that follows at 166e2, σκόπει, “look”, is Heindorf’s conjecture (see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον). The noun’s other uses are told under νοῦς. At 154c7 “was looking anywhere else” renders ἄλλοσ’ ἔβλεπεν as written in the Coislin manuscript; T runs the words together, ἀλλοσέβλεπεν, and B and W have ἄλλος ἔβλεπεν, “(no) other was looking”.

Elsewhere in Plato

At the start of the Apology Socrates asks the jurors for the one thing he thinks just: to let his manner of speaking go, which may be worse or may be better, and to look at this alone and turn their minds to it, whether what he says is just or not; for that, he says, is what makes a good judge, as telling the truth makes a good speaker (18a). It is the request he makes of Critias: attend to what is said, not to the speaker. In the Meno, when the search for teachers of virtue has found none, he turns the phrase on the inquirers themselves. It seems, he says, that he and Meno are men of little worth, Meno not adequately taught by Gorgias, nor he by Prodicus; so before anything else they must bring their minds to bear on themselves and look for someone who will make them better in at least one respect (96d–e; see Πρόδικος).