Ο Omicron

character

οὐσία

Character, being: what a power directed at itself must itself possess · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordBeing, essence, nature; in ordinary speech, property, substance, what one has.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in the principle of 168d: “Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed?”
  • In this edition“Character”.
  • A place to read168b–e.
English renderings
τὴν οὐσίαν, tēn ousian, “the character”

Meaning

Οὐσία is the noun of the participle of “to be”: that which is one’s own, first in the sense of property, a man’s substance, and in the philosophers the being or nature of a thing, what it is. The edition’s note at 168d explains: “‘Character’ renders ousia, being or nature.”

Use in the book

The word gives the principle by which the parallel cases are judged: “Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed?” (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό), so that hearing would need a sound and sight a colour (168d–e; see ἄχρως; ὄψις).

The word is where the argument becomes metaphysical. Up to 168d the cases are things that do something to something else; οὐσία asks what a thing must be to do it to itself, and it turns the question of temperance into a question about being. Socrates says that “It needs a great man” to settle the question (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ), and the word does not return.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the cases it judges.

  1. 168dA power related to itself must have the character its power is directed at; hearing would have to have a sound.
  2. 168d–eSight, to see itself, would have to have some colour.

Translation in this edition

“The character” renders τὴν οὐσίαν (168d2); B, at 157e5, has οὐσία, “property” (W has it written above the line), where Burnet prints οἰκία with T and W (see οἰκία).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Euthyphro the word marks the difference between saying what a thing is and saying something true of it. Euthyphro has offered “loved by all the gods” as an account of the holy, and Socrates shows that the holy is loved because it is holy, while the god-loved is god-loved because it is loved, so that the two are not the same. Asked what the holy is, then, Euthyphro seems not to want to show its being, οὐσία, and names instead something the holy undergoes, a πάθος, that all the gods love it; what it is, he has still not told (10d–11b). The Charmides’ οὐσία is the being a power must have; the Euthyphro’s is the being a definition must state.