From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΠρός with the accusative, “towards, in relation to”, and ἄλλο, “something else”: a power or a thing directed at another.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in the question that Socrates leaves to a great man: “whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else” (169a).
- In this edition“In relation to something else”.
- A place to read168b–169a.
- English renderings
- πρὸς ἄλλο, pros allo, “in relation to something else”
Meaning
With the accusative, πρός marks direction, and so relation: what a thing faces, what it is measured against. Aristotle made it the name of a class, τὸ πρός τι, the relative: the greater is greater than something, the double double of something (see διπλάσιος). Πρὸς ἄλλο is the ordinary case, the relation that needs a second term.
Use in the book
The phrase states, in its one place, the rule that the whole argument has taken for granted. Every knowledge Socrates names is of something “distinct from the knowledge itself”: calculation of the even and the odd, weighing of the heavy and the light (166a–b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος). Every sight, hearing, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion is of something other than itself (167c–168a; see ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων), and every relative has its correlate: the greater is greater than something smaller, and “there is no double of anything but a half” (168b–c; see διπλάσιος; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). Critias’ claim is that temperance alone breaks the rule, a knowledge of itself as well as of the others (166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν).
After the parallels Socrates puts the matter in general form and declines to settle it: “It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases: whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else; or whether some are and some are not; and again, if there are things that relate to themselves, whether among them is the knowledge that we say temperance is” (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ; πρὸς ἑαυτό). The phrase gives the first horn its content. If nothing has its power in relation to itself, everything has it only in relation to something else, and a knowledge of knowledge is impossible. Socrates does not choose between the horns. He leaves the decision to a great man and grants the possibility for now, as he puts it, “to keep our argument moving” (169d; see πρόειμι).
Every knowledge that survives the argument is of the ordinary kind, directed at something else. Medicine makes us healthy, cobbling shod and generalship safe in war (174c; see σκυτική; στρατηγική), and the knowledge of good and bad, the last candidate, is of what makes the others’ work turn out well (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The one knowledge turned towards itself is the one that cannot be shown to do any good. The dialogue can be read as ending, without saying so, where the phrase put the burden of proof: what is not shown to be an exception falls under the rule.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the passages that state the rule it names.
- 166a–b2Each knowledge is of something distinct from the knowledge itself: calculation of the even and the odd, weighing of the heavy and the light.
- 166cCritias: all the other kinds of knowledge are of something else, this one alone of itself and of the others.
- 167c–168a2No sight, hearing, sense, desire, wish, love, fear or opinion is of itself and the others without being of what the others are of.
- 168b–cThe greater is greater than something smaller; there is no double of anything but a half.
- 169aIt needs a great man to determine whether nothing has its power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else.
Translation in this edition
“In relation to something else” renders πρὸς ἄλλο (169a4–5), with ἀλλά as “but only”, in the same sentence as “in relation to itself” for πρὸς ἑαυτό, so that the two halves of the alternative stand side by side. The words πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, “except knowledge”, which the manuscripts have between them and Burnet brackets after Schleiermacher, are told elsewhere (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Sophist the visitor from Elea uses the same distinction to tell the different apart from being. He takes it that Theaetetus will grant that of the things that are, some are spoken of as themselves by themselves, αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά, and others always in relation to others, πρὸς ἄλλα; and the different is always in relation to a different. Were the different like being, sharing in both kinds, there would sometimes be a different thing that was not different from anything; as it is, whatever is different turns out of necessity to be just what it is by being of another (255c–d). The Sophist’s different is the model of what is wholly in relation to something else. The Charmides asks about a case that the Sophist’s division does not name: a knowledge that would still be of something, its power still turned towards an object, but with itself as that object; and it finds no way to show that there is such a thing. The Republic’s list of relatives, with knowledge among them, is told elsewhere (4.438b–d; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle’s account of relatives, which opens with the Charmides’ greater and double, is told elsewhere (Categories 7, 6a36–b6; see διπλάσιος).