From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΔιάνοια, thought: the power and the act of thinking; a mind, an intention, the meaning of a saying.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in Critias’ joke that the boy’s headache will be a godsend “if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well” (157c–d). The verb of the same family, διανοεῖσθαι, comes once, also from Critias (164e).
- In this edition“Mind”.
- A place to read157a–d.
- English renderings
- τὴν διάνοιαν, tēn dianoian, “his mind”
Meaning
The noun is formed from διανοεῖσθαι, “to think through”, with διά and the root of νοῦς, “mind”. In ordinary Greek it is the thinking part of a man, his understanding, and also what he means or intends. Plato uses it both ways, and the Republic gives it a narrower, technical sense.
Use in the book
Critias’ joke is told under ἀναγκάζω (157c–d). What concerns the noun is the word he chose. Socrates had reported the Thracian’s teaching about the soul: “the soul, my dear fellow … is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words”, and from them temperance comes to be in souls (157a; see ἐγγίγνομαι; λόγοι καλοί; ψυχή). Critias answers with “mind”: the boy will be forced “to improve his mind as well”, and he adds at once that Charmides is thought already to surpass his contemporaries in temperance (157d). The substitution can be read as Critias hearing the charm as an improvement of the intellect, where Socrates had named a virtue of the soul. His own definitions, when they come, will make temperance a knowledge.
The verb of the same family comes in Critias’ account of Delphi. The god addresses those who enter his temple differently from men, “and that, I think, is what the dedicator had in mind when he dedicated it” (164e; see ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν). Both uses are Critias’, and both claim to see into a mind, the boy’s that needs improving and the dedicator’s that meant “Be temperate”. The man who claims so readily to know other minds is the man whose definition, knowing oneself, the dialogue then examines.
Places to read
The passage in which the noun occurs, and the passage in which its verb does.
Translation in this edition
Τὴν διάνοιαν (157c9) is an accusative of respect, “better in his mind”, and the English turns the phrase into “improve his mind”. The participle διανοούμενος (164e4) is “had in mind”.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Sophist the visitor from Elea gets Theaetetus to agree that thought and speech are the same, except that the conversation the soul holds within itself with itself, without voice, has been given the name thought, διάνοια (263e). The Theaetetus says the same of thinking (189e–190a; see αἴσθησις). On this account a charm of beautiful words that improves the mind would work as thought itself works, by conversation (see διαλέγομαι).
In the Republic Glaucon, summing up the divided line, says that Socrates seems to give the name thought, not understanding, to the habit of mind of geometers and their like, since it stands between opinion and understanding; Socrates accepts this, and sets four conditions of the soul against the four sections of the line: insight, thought, conviction and likeness-making (511d–e).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle takes it that every διάνοια is either practical, or productive, or theoretical, and so places the study of nature among the theoretical.1 The Charmides’ argument about whether temperance must produce a work (165c–166a) can be read as asking which of these kinds of thought temperance is.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1, 1025b25.