From the book
The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert, Volumes I–II
Joseph Joubert · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordCertitude is the firmness with which an opinion is held; doute names its unsettled condition or a suspension of judgment.
- In JoubertThe ground-and-feet comparison separates certainty from truth: truth is to mind what light is to eyes, while certainty gives opinion firm ground.
- In this editionThe English translation keeps truth and certainty distinct, and “or rather” marks the change from extinguishing to veiling.
- A place to beginCertainty gives opinion footing; doubt is motion without firm ground.
- English renderings
- certainty; doubt
Meaning
Certitude is the firmness with which an opinion is held; doute names its unsettled condition or a suspension of judgment.
Use in the book
The ground-and-feet comparison separates certainty from truth: truth is to mind what light is to eyes, while certainty gives opinion firm ground. Doubt is swaying or fluctuation. Yet a proposed wise philosophical doubt would veil dazzling light so that another organ could judge. Its parenthetic “if it existed” prevents that proposal from becoming an unqualified endorsement of a school of doubt. The reported remark about mute creatures values a charitable uncertainty, suggesting that not every unsettled judgment is merely a defect. These are different occasions and valuations, not a tidy movement from doubt to certainty.
Places to read
- II, p. 502, entry 14, ¶1Certainty gives opinion footing; doubt is motion without firm ground.
- II, p. 655, entry 8, ¶1A hypothetical wise doubt would veil dazzling light.
- II, p. 734–735, entry 8, ¶1A reported speaker finds charitable value in a doubt about animals.
Translation in this edition
The English translation keeps truth and certainty distinct, and “or rather” marks the change from extinguishing to veiling. The anomalous quoted English Doumbs creature is retained; the unnamed woman is not identified. Ordinary sans doute can mean certainly and is not itself evidence of philosophical skepticism.
Source note
Beaunier 1938, II, pp. 502, 655, 734, 735.