From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΠρόνοια is forethought, and in philosophy the care with which the gods or nature order the world; the ἄτομοι, "uncuttables", are the indivisible bodies of Epicurus, which make things by combining and unmake them by coming apart.
- In the Meditations"Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms" (4.3.2): in ten chapters Marcus sets the two against each other, and where he draws conduct from them it is the same on both, no resentment, no blame, no trouble, no acting at random; at 12.14 fate makes a third. In the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, he once decides it, "But surely an ordered universe" (4.27), though "But surely" is a correction.
- In this editionΠρόνοια is "providence", and "forethought" where it is a ruler's (8.3); ἄτομοι is always "atoms"; κυκεών is "jumble", φυρμός "confusion", ἀντεμπλοκή "intertwining", σκεδασμός "scattering" and σκορπισμός "dispersal".
- A place to read6.10, where both members of the disjunction are filled out and each is given its reply.
Meaning
Πρόνοια (pronoia) is formed from προνοεῖν (pronoein), "to think beforehand": forethought, provision for what is to come. Philosophy made it the care with which the gods or nature order the world, and the Stoics made it doctrine: the universe is governed "according to mind and providence", as Chrysippus, the school's third head, wrote in his On Providence, mind pervading every part of it as soul pervades us.1 Ἄτομος (atomos), from the negative prefix and τέμνειν (temnein), "to cut", is "uncut", "indivisible". Epicurus, the Athenian founder of the school of the Garden, taught that the whole is bodies and void, and that the bodies from which compounds are made are "uncuttable and unchangeable", so that something remains when the compounds are dissolved.2
In Marcus the noun πρόνοια is a man's only at 8.3; elsewhere it belongs to the gods, whose works "are full of providence" (2.3), and to nature (9.1.4). Ἄτομοι are always plural and always the other member of the disjunction. Around them he sets words for a world without order: κυκεών (kykeōn), "jumble", a drink of barley, wine and cheese that separates unless it is stirred, as the edition's note at 4.27 explains; φυρμός (phyrmos), "confusion", from φύρειν (phyrein), "to knead, to mix up"; ἀντεμπλοκή (antemplokē), "intertwining"; and σκεδασμός (skedasmos), "scattering".
Use in the book
Marcus gives himself the formula in the chapter on retreat into oneself, against resentment at "what is allotted from the whole": "Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms, and all that proved the universe to be as it were a city" (4.3.2). At 6.10 both members are filled out: "Either a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering; or unity, order and providence. If, then, the former, why do I even crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion? … And why am I even troubled? For the scattering will come upon me, whatever I do. But if the other is the case, I revere, I stand steady, and I take courage in the one who governs." The replies differ; the conduct is the same. At 9.39 the question stands after both members: "Either all things happen from one intelligent spring, as to one body, and the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole; or atoms, and nothing but a jumble and scattering. Why, then, are you troubled?" Blame is excluded on both: "If in another's, whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness" (8.17). So is aimlessness. After a sentence that the edition's note calls obscure, "For in a way, atoms or things without parts", Marcus sums up: "if God, all is well; if at random, do not you too act at random" (9.28).
Book XII adds a third member, fate (see Fate and allotment): "Either a necessity of fate and an order not to be transgressed, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader." Each has its reply: "why do you resist?"; "make yourself worthy of help from the divine"; and, if a confusion without a guide, "be glad that in such a surge you yourself have in yourself a ruling mind; and if the surge carries you away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the little breath, the rest; for the mind it will not carry away" (12.14; see Mind and reason). At 12.24 the pair is chance and providence: what happens from outside "is either by chance or by providence; and one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence".
Elsewhere the disjunction is a preface. "Whether atoms or nature, let it be laid down first that I am a part of the whole governed by nature" (10.6.1); "if not atoms, nature that governs the whole; if this, the worse for the sake of the better, and these for one another" (11.18.1; see Kinship and cooperation). In Leopold's text Marcus once decides it: "Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together. But surely an ordered universe. Or can a kind of order subsist in you, and disorder in the totality?" (4.27). The decision rests on two corrections Leopold prints: "mixed together" is the συμπεφυρμένος (sympephyrmenos) of Johann Matthias Schultz, who edited the Meditations in 1802, and "But surely", ἀλλὰ μήν (alla mēn), that of G. H. Rendall, the English translator of the Meditations; the manuscripts read "or a jumble heaped together, but an order all the same". The question that follows argues for order in either text.
Death falls under the disjunction. Alexander of Macedon and his muleteer "came, in death, to the same state; for either they were taken back into the same seminal reasons of the universe, or they were scattered alike into atoms" (6.24). "On death: either scattering, if atoms; but if unity, either quenching or migration" (7.32); the three possibilities return in other words at 8.25 (see Death) and 11.3 (see Soul), and the scattering at 6.4 and 10.7.2 (see Dissolution).
Of providence itself Marcus says little. "The works of the gods are full of providence. The works of fortune are not apart from nature, or from the spinning together and interweaving of the things that providence governs" (2.3; see Nature). The common nature had its impulse towards this world-order "by a certain original impulse of providence" (9.1.4), and the gods "chiefly provide" for the community (6.44.1; see Gods). What he prays for he can have now if, among other things, he will "entrust the future to providence" (12.1.1).
The two members are not equal. Providence has content, unity, order, a governor in whom Marcus takes courage; the atoms have only names of disorder, and that member is never argued for. The disjunction can be read as less a confession of doubt than a way of cutting conduct loose from physics: whichever member is true, resentment, blame, trouble and aimlessness are excluded, and Marcus asks the same of himself. Where the whole may lack order, he keeps it in himself, the "ruling mind" of 12.14; this can be read as the question of 4.27 turned round: there the order in himself was a reason to believe in order in the whole; here, if the whole is a surge, the order within is what the surge cannot carry away.
Places to read
Every chapter in which πρόνοια and its family, ἄτομοι, or one of the words of the alternative (ἀμερής, κυκεών, συμφύρειν, φυρμός, ἀντεμπλοκή, σκεδασμός and its family, σκορπισμός) occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; these include all ten chapters in which the disjunction is set out. Other words of the root of φυρμός, rendered "befoul", "muddled", "kneaded lump" and "indiscriminately", are left out.
- 1.16.3GreekAmong the qualities of Antoninus Pius, Marcus' adoptive father: looking ahead from far off, and arranging the smallest matters in advance without theatre.
- 2.3GreekThe works of the gods are full of providence, and the works of fortune are not apart from nature or from the interweaving of the things that providence governs.
- 2.11.1GreekIf there are no gods, or they do not care for human affairs, Marcus asks what it is to him to live in a universe empty of gods or empty of providence.
- 4.3.2GreekAgainst resentment at what is allotted from the whole, Marcus is to renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms.
- 4.27GreekEither an ordered universe or a jumble; Marcus asks whether a kind of order can subsist in him and disorder in the totality, when all things are so distinguished, diffused and in sympathy.
- 6.4GreekAll underlying things will very soon change, and be turned to vapour if substance is unified, or else be scattered.
- 6.10GreekEither a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering, or unity, order and providence: if the first, the scattering will come whatever Marcus does; if the second, he reveres and takes courage in the one who governs.
- 6.24GreekAlexander and his muleteer came to the same state in death, either taken back into the seminal reasons of the universe or scattered alike into atoms.
- 6.44.1GreekIf the gods took no counsel about Marcus individually, they took counsel about the common affairs, the community for which they chiefly provide.
- 7.32GreekOn death: scattering, if atoms; otherwise quenching or migration.
- 7.50GreekAfter Euripides' lines on what returns to earth and to heaven comes another account: a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms and a dispersal of the elements.
- 8.3GreekBeside Diogenes, Heraclitus and Socrates, Alexander, Gaius and Pompey had forethought for many things and were slaves to many.
- 8.17GreekTo blame the atoms or the gods is madness alike; one must blame no one.
- 8.25GreekThe famous dead are all of a day, and Marcus is to remember that his little compound must be scattered, or his little breath quenched, or removed and posted elsewhere.
- 8.51GreekA clear spring into which mud is thrown will quickly scatter it and wash it out; so the understanding can stay pure.
- 9.1.4GreekThe common nature had its impulse towards this world-order by an original impulse of providence.
- 9.28GreekEither the understanding of the whole has an impulse towards each thing, or it had its impulse once; in a way, atoms or things without parts; if God, all is well, and if at random, Marcus is not to act at random too.
- 9.39GreekEither all things come from one intelligent spring, or atoms and nothing but a jumble and scattering; on either, Marcus asks why he is troubled.
- 10.6.1GreekWith atoms as one member of the disjunction, Marcus lays down first that he is a part of the whole governed by nature, and that nothing advantageous to the whole harms the part.
- 10.7.2GreekDissolution is either a scattering of the elements of which a thing was compounded or a turning of them into earth and air, taken up into the reason of the whole.
- 10.18GreekEach underlying thing is to be conceived as already dissolving, as it were in putrefaction or scattering.
- 11.3GreekA soul is ready if it must at once be released from the body and be quenched or scattered or remain together.
- 11.18.1GreekIf not atoms, nature governs the whole; if so, the worse are for the sake of the better, and these for one another.
- 12.1.1GreekMarcus can have now what he prays for if he leaves the past behind, entrusts the future to providence and directs the present towards holiness and justice.
- 12.14GreekEither a necessity of fate, or a providence that can be propitiated, or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader; each has its reply, and under the last Marcus is to be glad of a ruling mind that the surge will not carry away.
- 12.24GreekWhat happens from outside is either by chance or by providence, and neither chance is to be blamed nor providence charged.
Translation in this edition
Πρόνοια is "providence" at eleven of its twelve occurrences (2.3 twice, 2.11.1, 4.3.2, 6.10, 9.1.4, 12.1.1, 12.14 twice, 12.24 twice), and "forethought" at 8.3, of Alexander, Gaius and Pompey, where Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar, proposed παράνοια (paranoia), "derangement", as the edition's note says. The verb προνοεῖσθαι is "provide" (6.44.1), and the adjective προνοητικός, of Antoninus, "looking ahead" (1.16.3). At 12.14 πρόνοια ἱλάσιμος (pronoia hilasimos) is "a providence that can be propitiated" and πρόνοια ἐπιδεχομένη τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι (epidechomenē to hilaskesthai) "a providence that admits of being propitiated"; φυρμὸς εἰκαιότητος ἀπροστάτητος (phyrmos eikaiotētos aprostatētos) is "a confusion of aimlessness without a leader", and φυρμὸς ἀνηγεμόνευτος (phyrmos anēgemoneutos) "a confusion without a guide". Ἄτομοι is "atoms" at all nine places; the word is feminine, as the article shows at 6.24 and 8.17. Τὸ διεζευγμένον is "the disjunction" (4.3.2), and ἤτοι … ἤ (ētoi … ē) "either … or". Κυκεών is "jumble" at all three places. At 4.27 "mixed together" renders συμπεφυρμένος, Schultz's correction, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' συμπεφορημένος (sympephorēmenos), "heaped together", and "But surely" renders ἀλλὰ μήν, Rendall's correction for the manuscripts' μὲν ἀλλά, "but … all the same". Φυρμός is "confusion"; ἀντεμπλοκή is "intertwining" (6.10), in the plural "intertwinings" (7.50); σκεδασμός and σκέδασις are "scattering"; σκεδαννύναι is "be scattered" (6.4, 8.25, 11.3), and διασκεδαννύναι "be scattered" (6.24) or, of the spring that clears away mud, "scatter" (8.51); σκορπισμός is "dispersal" (7.50). Ἕνωσις (henōsis), the other member at 6.10 and 7.32, is "unity", and ἥνωται (hēnōtai) at 6.4 "is unified"; at 7.32 "but if unity" is εἰ δ' ἕνωσις (ei d' henōsis), Casaubon's correction, which Leopold prints, for ἢ ἕνωσις (ē henōsis), "or unity", in A, the Vatican manuscript, and ἢ κένωσις (ē kenōsis), "or emptying", in P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed. At 10.6.1 "nature" in "Whether atoms or nature" follows the Latin version of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, where P has φύσεις (physeis), "natures"; Leopold judges the words foreign to the place and would move them to the opening of the chapter before. At 6.10 εἰκαῖον σύγκριμα (eikaion synkrima) is "a random compound", and εἰκῇ (eikēi) at 9.28 "at random".
Greek forms and English renderings
Either providence or atoms · Meditations
πρόνοια, pronoia, "providence", "forethought"; προνοεῖσθαι, pronoeisthai, "provide"; προνοητικός, pronoētikos, "looking ahead"; ἄτομοι, atomoi, "atoms"; ἀμερής, amerēs, "without parts"; κυκεών, kykeōn, "jumble"; συμφύρειν, symphyrein, "mixed together"; φυρμός, phyrmos, "confusion"; ἀντεμπλοκή, antemplokē, "intertwining"; σκεδασμός, skedasmos, "scattering"; σκέδασις, skedasis, "scattering"; σκεδαννύναι, skedannynai, "be scattered"; διασκεδαννύναι, diaskedannynai, "be scattered", "scatter"; σκορπισμός, skorpismos, "dispersal"
Epictetus and the Stoics
The disjunction is a term of Stoic logic. Diogenes Laertius, whose Lives of the Philosophers, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoics' teaching in its seventh book, defines the disjunctive proposition, τὸ διεζευγμένον (to diezeugmenon), Marcus' word at 4.3.2, as one disjoined by the disjunctive connective "either", ἤτοι (ētoi), as in "It is either day or night", and says that the connective declares one or other of the two false.3 Of the arguments the Stoics called indemonstrable, the fourth runs "Either the first or the second; but surely the first; so not the second", and the fifth "It is either day or night; it is not night; so it is day".4 In Leopold's text Marcus' "Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together. But surely an ordered universe" (4.27) has the form of the fourth, with its "but surely", ἀλλὰ μήν, and its conclusion left unsaid; but ἀλλὰ μήν is Rendall's correction, and the manuscripts' μὲν ἀλλά gives "or a jumble heaped together, but an order all the same", which is not that argument. "If not atoms, nature that governs the whole" (11.18.1) can be read as the fifth put as a condition. Elsewhere he states the disjunction and stops, and draws his conduct from each member in turn. The Stoics' case against the atoms is put by Balbus, the Stoic speaker in On the Nature of the Gods, the dialogue of Cicero, the Roman orator and philosopher of the first century BC. He marvels that anyone could persuade himself that certain solid and indivisible bodies, carried along by force and weight, make by their chance collision a world so adorned and so beautiful; such a man might as well think that if countless copies of the twenty-one letters were thrown together somewhere and shaken out on the ground, they could make the Annals of Ennius, the early Roman poet, so that they could be read in order.5 Seneca, the Roman Stoic of the first century, writing to Lucilius, meets the objection "What use is philosophy to me, if there is fate? What use, if God is the ruler? What use, if chance commands?" with three members like those of 12.14: whichever is so, or even if all are, one must do philosophy, whether the fates bind us by a law that cannot be swayed, or God, the arbiter of the universe, has ordered all things, or chance pushes human affairs about with no order; philosophy will urge us to obey God willingly and to resist fortune.6 Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, begins his discourse on providence: from each of the things that come about in the universe it is easy to praise providence, if a man has two things in himself, the power to see what has happened in each case, and gratitude.7
Other ancient sources
Epicurus did not deny the gods. In his letter to Menoeceus, which Diogenes Laertius preserves, "gods there are", imperishable and blessed, but they are not such as the many believe them to be; and the first of his Principal Doctrines is that what is blessed and imperishable has no troubles itself and makes none for another, so that it is held by neither anger nor favour.8 These are the gods of 2.11.1 who "do not care for human affairs", as the edition's note there says (see Gods). The soul, for Epicurus, is made of atoms, and when the whole compound is dissolved "the soul is scattered" and no longer has the same powers, nor motion, nor sensation;9 and the second of the Principal Doctrines is that "death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us".10 Lucretius, the Roman poet of the first century BC who set out Epicurus' teaching in Latin verse in On the Nature of Things, states the alternative that Marcus sets against providence. It was not by counsel, he says, nor by any clever mind that the primary bodies took up each its place in the order; harried by blows through boundless time and trying every kind of motion and union, they come at length into the arrangements of which this world is made.11 The soul too, once it has withdrawn from a man's limbs, is poured abroad and dissolved into its first bodies.12 The note at 7.50 takes "a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms" to be probably the Epicurean account.
ἀμερής
Attested: ἀμερῆ (amerē; 9.28). Without parts, indivisible; the neuter plural serves as a noun, "things without parts". In the alternative of 9.28, between an understanding of the whole that has an impulse towards each thing and one that had its impulse once, Marcus adds "For in a way, atoms or things without parts", a sentence the edition's note calls obscure. Lemma: ἀμερής.
ἀντεμπλοκή
Attested: ἀντεμπλοκή (antemplokē; 6.10), ἀντεμπλοκῶν (antemplokōn; 7.50). A twining in with one another, the tangling of particles in the atomists' account. "Either a jumble, an intertwining and a scattering; or unity, order and providence" (6.10); death is perhaps "a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms" (7.50). Lemma: ἀντεμπλοκή.
ἄτομος
Attested: ἄτομοι (atomoi; 4.3.2, 7.32, 9.28, 9.39, 10.6.1, 11.18.1), ἀτόμους (atomous; 6.24), ἀτόμοις (atomois; 7.50, 8.17). Uncut, indivisible; in the feminine plural, the atoms of Epicurus. "Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms" (4.3.2); "On death: either scattering, if atoms; but if unity, either quenching or migration" (7.32); "The atoms or the gods? Both are madness" (8.17). Lemma: ἄτομος.
διασκεδάννυμι
Attested: διεσκεδάσθησαν (dieskedasthēsan; 6.24), διασκεδάσει (diaskedasei; 8.51). To scatter abroad, disperse. Alexander and his muleteer "were scattered alike into atoms", if they were not taken back into the seminal reasons of the universe (6.24); a clear, sweet spring into which mud or dung is thrown "will very quickly scatter them and wash them out" (8.51). Lemma: διασκεδάννυμι.
κυκεών
Attested: κυκεών (kykeōn; 4.27, 6.10, 9.39). A mixed drink, which the edition's note describes as barley, wine and cheese that separate unless stirred; in Marcus a world of mere mixture. "Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together" (4.27); "or atoms, and nothing but a jumble and scattering" (9.39). Lemma: κυκεών.
προνοέω
Attested: προνοοῦνται (pronoountai; 6.44.1). To think of beforehand, provide for. If the gods took counsel about Marcus, they had no cause to do him ill: "For what would have come of it for them, or for the community, for which they chiefly provide?" (6.44.1; see Gods). Lemma: προνοέω.
προνοητικός
Attested: προνοητικόν (pronoētikon; 1.16.3). Provident; the neuter with the article serves as a noun. Among Antoninus' qualities, "looking ahead from far off, and arranging the smallest matters in advance without theatre" (1.16.3). Lemma: προνοητικός.
πρόνοια
Attested: προνοίας (pronoias; 2.3, 2.11.1, 9.1.4), προνοίᾳ (pronoiāi; 2.3, 12.1.1, 12.24), πρόνοια (pronoia; 4.3.2, 6.10, 8.3, 12.14 twice), πρόνοιαν (pronoian; 12.24). Forethought; the providence of the gods and of nature. "The works of the gods are full of providence" (2.3); "Renew the disjunction, either providence or atoms" (4.3.2); "a providence that can be propitiated" (12.14). At 8.3 it is the "forethought" of Alexander, Gaius and Pompey, "forethought for how many things, and slavery to how many!" Lemma: πρόνοια.
σκεδάννυμι
Attested: σκεδασθήσεται (skedasthēsetai; 6.4), σκεδασθῆναι (skedasthēnai; 8.25, 11.3). To scatter; in the passive, be scattered. All the underlying things will "be turned to vapour, if substance is unified, or be scattered" (6.4); it will be necessary "either for your little compound to be scattered, or for the little breath to be quenched, or to be removed and posted elsewhere" (8.25); the soul that is ready, if it must be released from the body, is ready to "be either quenched or scattered or remain together" (11.3). Lemma: σκεδάννυμι.
σκέδασις
Attested: σκεδάσει (skedasei; 10.18). Scattering. Each underlying thing is to be conceived "as already dissolving and in change, and coming to be, as it were, in putrefaction or scattering" (10.18). Lemma: σκέδασις.
σκεδασμός
Attested: σκεδασμός (skedasmos; 6.10 twice, 7.32, 9.39, 10.7.2). Scattering, the end of a compound in the atomists' account. "For the scattering will come upon me, whatever I do" (6.10); "On death: either scattering, if atoms" (7.32); dissolution is "either a scattering of the elements from which it was compounded" or a turning of them into earth and air (10.7.2). Lemma: σκεδασμός.
σκορπισμός
Attested: σκορπισμός (skorpismos; 7.50). Dispersal. After Euripides' lines, "Or this: a dissolution of the intertwinings among the atoms, and some such dispersal of the elements that cannot be affected" (7.50). Lemma: σκορπισμός.
συμφύρω
Attested: συμπεφυρμένος (sympephyrmenos; 4.27). To knead together, mix up. In Leopold's text, "Either an ordered universe or a jumble mixed together" (4.27). The form is the correction of Schultz, which Leopold prints; the manuscripts have συμπεφορημένος (sympephorēmenos), "heaped together", from συμφορεῖν (symphorein). Lemma: συμφύρω.
φυρμός
Attested: φυρμῷ (phyrmōi; 6.10), φυρμός (phyrmos; 12.14 twice). A mixing up, confusion. "Why do I even crave to linger in such a random compound and confusion?" (6.10); "or a confusion of aimlessness without a leader" (12.14). Lemma: φυρμός.
Source note
1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.138, citing Chrysippus, On Providence book 5, and Posidonius, On Gods book 3.
2. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10.39–41 (Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus).
3. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.72.
4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.81.
5. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 2.93.
6. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 16.4–5.
7. Epictetus, Discourses 1.6.1.
8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10.123 (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus) and 10.139 (Principal Doctrines 1).
9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10.65 (Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus).
10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 10.139 (Principal Doctrines 2).
11. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 1.1021–1028.
12. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 3.437–439.