From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTo seek, look for, search; to inquire into a question.
- In the CharmidesSeven times. “I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know” (165b); Critias: “you are not inquiring correctly” (165e); and Socrates’ last word on himself, “unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument” (176a).
- In this edition“Inquire”; “looking for” (166b); “seeking”, “search” (172c).
- A place to read165b–166b and 175b–176a.
- English renderings
- ζητῶ, zētō, “I inquire”; ζητεῖς, zēteis, “you are inquiring”, “you are looking for”; ζητοῦμεν, zētoumen, “(we have been) seeking”; ἐζητήσαμεν, ezētēsamen, “(our) search”; ζητεῖν, zētein, “inquiring”, “to inquire”
Meaning
Ζητεῖν is the plain verb for looking for something lost, and the philosophers’ verb for inquiry: to look for what something is. In Plato it is often joint, “to inquire with” someone, and it presupposes, as the Meno shows, that the inquirer does not yet know what he seeks. Its nouns are ζήτησις, “inquiry”, and ζητητής, “inquirer” (see ζήτησις; ζητητής).
Use in the book
The verb defines Socrates’ part. Critias, ready to give an account of “knowing oneself”, treats Socrates as an opponent who knows the answers and will agree only if he wants to, and Socrates corrects him: “That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know” (165b; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἐρωτάω). The inquiry is joint because the inquirer is ignorant.
Critias turns the verb against him: “you are not inquiring correctly”, since this knowledge is not by nature like the others (165e; see ζήτησις); and a page later, “you are looking for some likeness between it and the others” (166b; see ἐρευνάω). Socrates’ search for a product, and then for an object, is in Critias’ eyes the wrong search.
At the end the verb measures the failure. In 172c Socrates wonders whether they have been “looking at something greater, and seeking for it to be greater than it is”, and adds, “And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose” (see χρηστός). At 175a–b he says, “surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well” (see ὄφελος), and at 176a he says that, if the boy has temperance, he would sooner advise him to regard Socrates as “a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument” (see ζητητής; λῆρος). The verb that began as Socrates’ claim to joint inquiry ends as his confession of a poor one.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 165bSocrates inquires with Critias into whatever is proposed, because he does not know.
- 165eCritias: Socrates is not inquiring correctly.
- 166bCritias: Socrates is looking for a likeness between temperance and the other kinds of knowledge.
- 172cPerhaps they have been seeking for temperance to be greater than it is, and their search has been to no useful purpose.
- 175bTemperance would not have proved useless if Socrates were of any use at inquiring well.
- 176aIf Charmides has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything by argument.
Translation in this edition
“Inquire” for ζητῶ (165b8), ζητεῖς (165e3) and ζητεῖν (175b2, 176a4); “you are looking for” for ζητεῖς at 166b9; “seeking” for ζητοῦμεν (172c2) and “our search” for ἐζητήσαμεν (172c5), as the Glossary records. At 165b7 “as though I will agree with you” renders ὁμολογήσοντός σοι, Heusde’s conjecture; B and T have ὁμολογήσαντός σου.
Elsewhere in Plato
The joint inquiry of 165b recurs in Plato in almost the same words. In the Gorgias Socrates says that he does not speak as one who knows, but inquires in common with them, so that if his opponent seems to be right he will be the first to agree (506a). In the Meno, having reduced Meno to perplexity, he says that he does not know what virtue is, but is willing to look into it with him and inquire together (80d); Meno answers by asking how one can look for what one does not know at all, and Socrates restates the puzzle as the argument that one can inquire neither into what one knows nor into what one does not know (80d–e; see ζήτησις). Socrates replies with the doctrine that inquiring and learning are wholly recollection, and that one should not be persuaded by the paradox, which would make us idle, but by the account that makes us active and inquiring, ζητητικούς, and he will therefore inquire with Meno what virtue is (81d–e). In the Apology inquiry is his service to the god: after the oracle he goes about even now inquiring and searching, ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ, among citizens and strangers he thinks wise, and when one is not, he shows him so (23b; see ἐνδείκνυμι; ἐρευνάω).