Prodicus

Use in the book

Socrates says he has heard Prodicus make countless distinctions between words immediately after Critias separates making, doing, and working. The comparison puts Critias' elaborate lexical defense in a recognizable intellectual setting. Its tone is teasing, but its procedural conclusion is accommodating: Critias may assign each term as he wishes, provided that he makes clear the thing to which he applies it.

The point is therefore not that all distinctions are useless or that ordinary Greek fixes philosophical usage beyond challenge. Socrates asks to separate the terminological decision from the substantive proposal. Once “doing” has been reserved for the making of good things, does Critias define temperance as that activity? The answer can then be examined without disputing the vocabulary at every step.

The dialogue provides no payment, lesson date, or account of an encounter with Prodicus. Other Platonic works make the sophist's discriminations a recurring subject, but the Charmides needs only the audience's recognition of the habit. It would be misleading to label every distinction in the subsequent argument “Prodicean” merely because this one comparison occurs.

Places to read

1. 163d–eSocrates recalls Prodicus and grants terminological freedom subject to clarity

Translation in this edition

“Countless distinctions between words” renders μυρία τινὰ... περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος without making myria a literal tally of ten thousand. Here onomata is broader than personal names.

Πρόδικος

Attested: Προδίκου (prodikou). Prodicus, invoked as a practitioner of minute distinctions between words when Critias separates making, doing and working. References: 163d. Lexical identification: lemma: Πρόδικος. See Prodicus.