Δ Delta

learning with difficulty

δυσμαθία

Slowness to learn, in the argument against quietness · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔυσμαθία, difficulty in learning, slowness of understanding; the opposite of εὐμαθία, ease in learning.
  • In the CharmidesTwice in one exchange: “Which is finer, learning easily, or learning with difficulty?” and “learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly?” (159e).
  • In this edition“Learning with difficulty”.
  • A place to read159c–160b.
English renderings
δυσμαθία, dysmathia, “learning with difficulty”

Meaning

The noun joins δυσ-, “ill, hard”, to the root of μανθάνειν, “to learn”. It names a defect of nature rather than of effort: the δυσμαθής is the slow learner, as the εὐμαθής is the quick one. In Plato the pair belongs to the description of natures fit for philosophy.

Use in the book

The word comes in the second half of Socrates’ case against quietness, when he passes from the body to the soul: “And what about this? … Which is finer, learning easily, or learning with difficulty?” “Learning easily.” “And learning easily … is learning quickly, isn’t it, and learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly?” “Yes” (159e; see εὐμαθία). Teaching, recollecting and remembering follow, all finer done quickly (159e; see ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι; διδάσκω), and then quick-wittedness, a sharpness of the soul and not a quietness (160a; see ἀγχίνοια; ὀξύτης).

The step from “with difficulty” to “quietly and slowly” is the one on which the argument turns. “Quietly”, ἡσυχῇ, was the boy’s own word for the bearing of temperance (159b; see ἡσυχῇ), and “slowly” is Socrates’ addition: the edition’s note at 159b calls it “a word Charmides never used”, and reports that on one reading the refutation “trades on that shift” (see βραδέως). Joined to learning with difficulty, the boy’s virtue becomes a defect of nature. On that reading the argument proves only that slowness of mind is not temperance, which the boy never claimed; others reply, as the note records, that his word can cover slowness.

Places to read

The passage in which the word occurs, with the steps on each side of it.

  1. 159c–dIn the body the quick and nimble are finer than the quiet.
  2. 159eLearning easily is finer than learning with difficulty; learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly; so with teaching, recollecting and remembering.
  3. 160a–bQuick-wittedness is a sharpness of the soul; the one who deliberates most easily and quickly is praised.

Translation in this edition

Δυσμαθία (159e1, 159e4) is “learning with difficulty”, and εὐμαθία “learning easily”: the nouns become gerunds, so that the next step, “learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly”, reads as the further claim it is.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Theaetetus finds in one boy what the Charmides’ argument sets apart. Theodorus says that he has never met so wonderful a nature: a boy who learns with an ease few could match, and is at the same time gentle beyond the ordinary and brave besides. The sharp, quick-witted and retentive, he says, are mostly hasty in temper and rush headlong like unballasted boats, more manic than brave, while the steadier come to their studies somehow sluggish and full of forgetfulness; but Theaetetus comes to learning and inquiry evenly, without stumbling and to some purpose, with great mildness, like oil running without a sound (144a–b). The Republic draws the same division between quick and steady natures (503c–d; see ἀγχίνοια), and among the marks of the philosophic soul asks whether it is quick or slow to learn, since no one will love what he does with pain and little result (486c).

Socrates claims the defect for himself. In the Theaetetus he says he is vexed at his own slowness to learn and at what is truly idle talk, dragging arguments up and down through dullness, unable to be persuaded and hard to part from any argument (195b–c); in the Republic he pleads that he is, it seems, a slow learner (358a). In the Charmides he says the same of himself in other words when Critias says that knowing oneself and knowing what one knows and what one does not are the same: he is his same old self, he says, and “again I don’t understand” (170a). The slowness the argument of 159e treats as a defect can be read as the one Socrates professes when he needs an argument made clearer.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle separates what Socrates’ list puts together. The same people, he says, are not good at remembering and at recollecting: for the most part the slow are better at remembering, the quick and those who learn easily better at recollecting.1 At 159e both are “finer” done quickly.

Source note

1. Aristotle, On Memory and Recollection 1, 449b6–8.