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do well

εὖ πράττειν

Acting well and faring well, the step from knowledge to happiness · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo do well: both to act well and to fare well, to prosper; the common Greek for success and good fortune, and a greeting.
  • In the CharmidesFive times. With error removed, those so disposed “must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy” (172a); “that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this … we cannot yet learn” (173d); and the verdict, “it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy” (174b–c).
  • In this edition“Do well”, “doing well”.
  • A place to read171d–172a and 173d–174c.
English renderings
καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, kalōs kai eu prattein, “do finely and well”; εὖ πράττοντας, eu prattontas, “those who do well”; εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν, eu an prattoimen, “we would do well”; τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, tou eu prattein, “doing well”; τὸ εὖ πράττειν, to eu prattein, “(made us) do well”

Meaning

Πράττειν is to do, to act, to bring about; with an adverb it also means to fare. The Key Words of the edition draw the consequence: “Eu prattein, ‘to do well’, means both to act well and to fare well, to prosper, as English ‘do well’ also can. The argument about the benefit of temperance rides on the double sense”. The phrase was the ordinary word for success, and the letters that go under Plato’s name use it as their greeting.

Use in the book

The phrase enters with the picture of a life without error. If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, “we would live our lives without error”, handing over what we do not know to those who do (171d–e; see ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος); and so “with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy” (172a; see ἡγέομαι). The sentence makes two steps. The first, from acting without error to acting well, uses the phrase in its sense of acting; the second, from doing well to being happy, uses it in its sense of faring. The edition’s note at 172a: “The step from doing well to being happy (eudaimōn) rides on it.”

The dream separates the two steps. Socrates grants that under temperance the human race “would act and live knowledgeably”, and goes on: “But that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn” (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως; εὐδαιμονέω). Critias answers, “And yet … you won’t easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight ‘knowledgeably’” (173d; see ἀτιμάζω), and the question “knowledgeably about what?” leads to the knowledge of good and bad (173d–174b; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The verdict takes the phrase in its full sense: “it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad” (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

With both senses in view, the argument can be read as having a clear shape. The dream grants that knowledge of the crafts would make us act and live knowledgeably (173d); it does not grant that we would do well in either sense, and at 174c–d Socrates adds that without the knowledge of good and bad even each craft’s work being “done well and beneficially” would be gone from us. The edition keeps the one English phrase at every place; the Note on this Edition records that “do well” is kept both times at 172a, “so that the reader can see the phrase slide from acting well to faring well”.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 172aWith error removed, those so disposed must do finely and well, and those who do well must be happy.
  2. 173dThat by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, we cannot yet learn; Critias: nothing else crowns doing well.
  3. 174b–cIt was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, but only the knowledge of good and bad.

Translation in this edition

“Do finely and well” for καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν and “those who do well” for τοὺς … εὖ πράττοντας (172a1–3); “do well” for εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν (173d4); “crowns doing well” for τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν (173d6–7), where τέλος is “end” or “crown”; and “made us do well” for τὸ εὖ πράττειν … ποιοῦν (174b12–c1). At 172a1–2 Burnet prints καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον, an order found in neither family: T and W read ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, and B repeats part of the phrase, καλῶς πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν; the sense is the same.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato’s Socrates uses the same double step in several dialogues, and the edition’s note at 172a points to one: in the Gorgias the good man does well and finely whatever he does, and the man who does well is blessed and happy (507c; see δίκαιος). In the First Alcibiades the steps are spelled out: whoever acts finely does well; those who do well are happy; they are happy through the possession of good things, which they get by doing well and finely; so doing well is good, and well-doing, εὐπραγία, is fine (116b). The Euthydemus begins its protreptic with the question whether all men wish to do well, a question too foolish to ask, since no one does not (278e–279a). At the end of the first book of the Republic the step is taken from the soul’s work: a bad soul rules and cares for things badly and a good soul does all these things well; the just soul lives well, and the one who lives well is blessed and happy (353e–354a; see ἔργον).

In the third of the letters under Plato’s name the writer asks whether he should greet Dionysius the younger, tyrant of Syracuse, with the usual “rejoice”, χαίρειν, or with his own custom of writing εὖ πράττειν, as he greets his friends; Dionysius, he says, had flattered the god at Delphi with that very word, writing, it is said, “Rejoice, and preserve the tyrant’s life of pleasure” (315a–b). The Charmides knows the same contrast of greetings at 164d–e, where Critias says the god’s word was not “rejoice” but “be temperate” (see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; χαίρω).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon’s Socrates parts well-doing from good fortune and keeps the phrase for the first. When someone asked him which pursuit he thought best for a man, his answer was εὐπραξία, well-doing; pressed on whether he counted good fortune, εὐτυχία, a pursuit as well, he said that chance and action were complete opposites: to light on something one needs without looking for it is good fortune, whereas well-doing is doing a thing well because one has learned it and worked at it, and those who make that their business are, in his view, the ones who do well. The best and dearest to the gods, he said, are those who do well in farming the work of farming, in medicine the work of medicine, in politics the work of politics.1 For Xenophon’s Socrates the knowledgeable craftsman does well; the Charmides asks whether that is enough to fare well.

Aristotle reports that most people and the refined agree in calling the highest good happiness, and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy, though they dispute what happiness is.2 The identification that the Charmides questions was, on his account, common ground.

Source note

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.9.14–15.

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.4, 1095a17–20.