Η Eta

lead; think

ἡγέομαι

Rightness leading, temperance as guide, and what each speaker thinks · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo lead the way, guide, command; and, from leading the mind, to hold, think, consider.
  • In the CharmidesNine times, in both senses. “With error removed and rightness leading” (172a); temperance “as the guide of the management of household and of city” (172d); and Socrates’ last advice: “I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler” (176a).
  • In this edition“Leading”, “guide”; “think”, “regard”, “suppose”.
  • A place to read171d–172d.
English renderings
ἡγουμένης, hēgoumenēs, “leading”; ἡγουμένη, hēgoumenē, “as the guide”; ἡγῇ, hēgēi, “do you think”; ἡγοῦμαι, hēgoumai, “I think”; ἡγεῖσθαι, hēgeisthai, “regarded”, “regard”; ἡγούμενος, hēgoumenos, “to suppose”

Meaning

Ἡγεῖσθαι is first to go before, to lead an army or a procession, to be the guide on a road; the ἡγεμών is the leader. From “leading” in thought it comes to mean “to hold, believe, consider”, a sense as common in Attic prose as the first. In the Charmides both senses occur, and in the second half of the argument the first sense can be read as naming the question: what leads a life to happiness.

Use in the book

The common sense, “think”, marks positions in the argument. Socrates asks the boy, “do you think the writing-master does nothing when he writes or reads?” “On the contrary, I think he does something” (161d; see γραμματιστής); Critias says that Hesiod regarded only fine and beneficial things as appropriate to one (163c; see οἰκεῖος); Socrates asks whether Critias thinks that the temperate do not know that they are temperate, and Critias says he does not (164a; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ); and Socrates answers Critias’ charge of refuting him, “What a thing to do … to suppose that, even if I refute you as hard as I can, I am doing it for any other reason” (166c; see ἐλέγχω). At the end Socrates tells Charmides, “For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler” (176a; see λῆρος).

The sense “lead” carries the argument. In the life of temperance as first imagined, “with error removed and rightness leading”, those so disposed would do finely and well (172a; see ἁμαρτία; ἐξαιρέω; ὀρθότης). Socrates then doubts the picture: “what we were saying just now, that temperance would be a great good if it were of that kind, as the guide of the management of household and of city, I don’t think, Critias, we were right to agree to” (172d; see διοίκησις). The dream that follows grants temperance the guiding place and shows that it leads to living knowledgeably but not to happiness (173a–174b; see εὖ πράττειν). What makes us do well and be happy, the argument concludes, is the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The verb can be read as asking which knowledge guides, and the dialogue as answering that it is not the one Critias defined.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 161dDoes the writing-master do nothing when he writes? Charmides thinks he does something.
  2. 163cHesiod, says Critias, regarded only fine and beneficial things as appropriate to one.
  3. 164aDoes Critias think that the temperate do not know they are temperate? He does not.
  4. 166cSocrates: what a thing to suppose, that he refutes Critias for any other reason than the one for which he would scrutinize himself.
  5. 172aWith error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed would do well.
  6. 172dWere they right to agree that temperance would be a great good as the guide of household and city?
  7. 176aIf Charmides has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler.

Translation in this edition

“Leading” for ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης (172a1) and “as the guide of” for ἡγουμένη with the genitive (172d4); “think” for ἡγῇ and ἡγοῦμαι (161d3, 161d5, 164a3, 164a4), “regarded” for ἡγεῖσθαι (163c5), “to suppose” for ἡγούμενος (166c7) and “regard” for ἡγεῖσθαι (176a3).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Meno separates leading from knowing. A man who has a right opinion about the road to Larisa, in Thessaly, without having been there or knowing it, would lead rightly too, and while he has right opinion he will be no worse a guide than the man who knows; so true opinion is no worse a guide than wisdom to right action, and they had been wrong to say that wisdom alone leads it (97a–c). The Charmides asks what leads to happiness; the Meno adds that a guide need not know the way to lead well, though true opinion cannot be relied on until it is tied down by reasoning about the cause (98a; see δόξα). In the Laws the Athenian stranger ranks the goods by their leader: the human goods are led by health, with beauty second, strength third and wealth fourth, and the divine goods by wisdom, φρόνησις, with the temperate disposition of the soul second; the human goods depend on the divine (631b–d).

Other ancient sources

The Stoics made a technical term from the verb’s family. They called the commanding part of the soul τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, “the leading part”, an adjective formed from ἡγεμών, “leader”, the most authoritative part of the soul, in which impressions and impulses arise and from which speech is sent out, and which they placed in the heart; and they held that the whole cosmos, as a rational living being, has a leading part of its own.1 The Stoics’ commanding part can be read as holding the place the Charmides asked temperance to fill, the leader of the other knowledges.

Source note

1. Diogenes Laertius 7.139 and 7.159.