From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordHappy, prosperous, blessed with a good lot; the adjective of εὐδαιμονία.
- In the CharmidesSix times. “Those who do well must be happy” (172a); “we are no longer holding to the argument … that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy” (173e); “which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy?” (174a); and Socrates’ last advice to the boy: “For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard … yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate” (176a).
- In this edition“Happy”, “the happy man”, “happier”.
- A place to read173d–174b and 175e–176a.
- English renderings
- εὐδαίμονας, eudaimonas, “happy”; εὐδαίμονα, eudaimona, “happy”, “the happy man”; εὐδαίμονες, eudaimones, “happy”; εὐδαιμονέστερον, eudaimonesteron, “happier”
Meaning
The adjective names the man whose lot is good (see εὐδαιμονία). The edition’s Key Words: “Eudaimōn is ‘happy’ and eudaimonein ‘to be happy’, in the Greek sense of a life that goes well as a whole rather than a passing feeling.” In argument the word is the end at which the others stop: no one asks why a man wants to be happy.
Use in the book
The adjective is the goal of the second half. In the life without error, “those who do well must be happy” (172a; see εὖ πράττειν), and the dream asks whether living knowledgeably would make us so (173d). Critias’ answer leads to the question “Knowledgeably about what?”, and when he will not count the cobbler or the bronze-worker, Socrates concludes that they no longer hold that “the man who lives knowledgeably is happy”: Critias does not admit that these are happy, and marks off “the happy man” as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω; ἐμμένω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The all-knowing man follows, and the question becomes “which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do they all, alike?” (174a), answered with the knowledge of good and bad (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).
The last use turns the word from the argument to the boy: if Charmides has temperance, Socrates would have him think himself happier just in proportion as he is more temperate (175e–176a; see ὅσῳπερ … τοσούτῳ). The adjective at the end can be read as his own answer to the question the argument left open.
Places to read
Every passage in which the adjective occurs.
- 172aThose who do well must be happy.
- 173eWe no longer hold that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy; Critias marks off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things.
- 174aWhich of the kinds of knowledge makes the all-knowing man happy?
- 176aCharmides should think himself happier just in proportion as he is more temperate.
Translation in this edition
“Happy” at each place: εὐδαίμονας (172a3), εὐδαίμονα and εὐδαίμονες (173e6, 173e8), “the happy man” for τὸν εὐδαίμονα (173e10), εὐδαίμονα (174a11); and “happier” for εὐδαιμονέστερον (176a5). At 173e6 εὐδαίμονα is T’s reading and a later hand’s in B; B has εὐδαιμονία. At 176a4 the reading of ὅσῳπερ is told elsewhere (see ὅσῳπερ … τοσούτῳ).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Symposium makes happiness the end beyond which there is no asking. Diotima changes the question from the beautiful to the good: the lover of good things loves that they become his own; asked what he will have when they are his, Socrates finds that easier to answer, “he will be happy”; for the happy are happy by the possession of good things, and there is no need to ask further why one who wishes to be happy wishes it, since the answer seems to have reached its end (204e–205a; see ἐράω). In the Gorgias Polus thinks it obvious that Archelaus, ruler of Macedonia, whose crimes he goes on to tell (471a–d), is happy, and Socrates says he cannot tell, since he has not met him; he would not call even the Great King, the king of Persia, happy without knowing how he stands in education and justice, and, asked whether all happiness lies in that, says that the fine and good man and woman are happy, the unjust and base wretched (470d–e). In the Apology he sets himself against the Olympic victor: the victor makes the Athenians seem happy, Socrates makes them be so (36d).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle gives the reason why the word ends an argument. Happiness, he says, is the one thing we want for itself alone and never as a means to anything further; honour, pleasure, intelligence and each of the virtues we want both for their own sake and because we expect them to make us happy; and happiness is self-sufficient, enough by itself to make a life worth choosing and in want of nothing.1 The Charmides’ question “which knowledge makes him happy?” assumes, as Aristotle does, that happiness is the end by which the other goods are measured.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097a34–b21.