From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΔίκαιος, observant of δίκη, custom and right: of men, just; of acts and claims, fair, due; in the neuter, δίκαιόν ἐστι, “it is right”.
- In the CharmidesFour times: what the boy’s birth makes due (157d), the just as the object of statesmanship (170b twice), and Socrates’ verdict on himself, δικαίως (175a).
- In this edition“Only right”; “the just”, “what is just”; “I was right”.
- A place to read170a–c.
- English renderings
- δίκαιον, dikaion, “only right”; δικαίου, dikaiou, “of the just”; δίκαιον, dikaion, “what is just”; δικαίως, dikaiōs, “I was right”
Meaning
Δίκη is first the way things are done, then the right that custom secures, and so a judgement and a penalty. The adjective covers all of it: the man who gives each his due, the claim that is fair, the act that conforms to law. In the neuter it states what is fitting or deserved, as English says “it is only right”, and the adverb δικαίως is “justly”, “with good reason”.
Use in the book
The first use is the language of desert. Critias has said that Charmides is thought the most temperate of anyone, and Socrates replies, “And indeed … it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel all the others in all these things” (157d–e), since no one could easily point to two houses in Athens likely to produce finer and better offspring than the two he is sprung from (157e; see ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων). What is right here is what birth makes due, the claim of a noble family to an excellent son.
The second is the just as a field of knowledge. Socrates asks whether knowledge of knowledge is the same as knowledge of the healthy and as “knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just”; Critias denies it, and Socrates names the two: “the one, I think, is medicine, the other statesmanship, and this one nothing but knowledge” (170a–b; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). A man who knows only knowledge, and does not “also know what is healthy and what is just”, would know that he knows something, but not what (170b–c; see εἰκότως). The just is named beside the healthy as an object a temperate ruler would need to know, and the dialogue’s picture of a household and city run by temperance (171d–172a; see διοίκησις) depends on it. The definition under test cannot supply it.
The third is Socrates’ judgement on his own inquiry: Socrates asks Critias to see that his fear was reasonable and that “I was right to blame myself” for looking into temperance to no useful purpose (175a; see αἰτιάομαι; εἰκότως). The only sentence the dialogue passes with this word is passed by the narrator on himself, and the reason he gives is his own failing as an inquirer, since the finest of all things would not otherwise have turned out useless (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής). The boy’s courtesy at 156a, that he would be doing Socrates an injustice not to know his name, is told under ἀδικέω.
Places to read
Every passage in which the adjective or its adverb occurs.
- 157d–eIt is only right that Charmides should excel the others, given the two houses he comes from.
- 170a–bKnowledge of knowledge is not knowledge of the just, which is statesmanship, nor of the healthy, which is medicine.
- 170bA man who does not know what is healthy and what is just, but only knowledge, will know that he knows, not what.
- 175aSocrates was right to blame himself for inquiring into temperance to no purpose.
Translation in this edition
Δίκαιον (157d9), with the infinitive, is “it is only right”; δικαίου (170b1) “of the just”, and τὸ δίκαιον (170b7) “what is just”. The adverb δικαίως (175a10) becomes a clause: “I was right to blame myself”.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Gorgias Socrates draws justice out of temperance. The temperate man would do what is fitting towards gods and men; doing what is fitting towards men he would do just things, and towards gods pious things, so that he must be just and pious, and brave as well, since it belongs to a temperate man to pursue and avoid what he should. So the temperate man, being just, brave and pious, is the completely good man, who does well and finely whatever he does, and the man who does well is blessed and happy (507a–c). The Charmides’ definitions never reach that chain: none of them makes the temperate man know what is just. In the Meno Socrates gets Meno to agree that no one can manage a city or a household well without managing it temperately and justly (73a–b; see διοίκησις).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle distinguishes two senses of the just: the just is the lawful and the equal, and the unjust the lawless and the unequal.1 The Charmides’ uses can be read against the distinction: the just of 170b, the object of statesmanship, as the lawful; the just of 157d, what birth makes due, as nearer the equal, a matter of what each deserves.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129a32–b1.