Κ Kappa

bad

κακός

Bad, never evil: the word at the three joints of the argument · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordBad in every sense: of low birth, cowardly, worthless, harmful, wretched; the opposite of ἀγαθός.
  • In the CharmidesNine times, with the adverb once: everything “bad and good alike” flows from the soul (156e); modesty is “no more good than bad” (161b); the man who makes “not good things but bad ones is not temperate” (163e); and the knowledge “By which he knows good … and bad” (174b).
  • In this edition“Bad”, never “evil”; “makes a mess of” for the adverb (162d).
  • A place to read163d–e and 174b–d.
English renderings
κακά, kaka, “bad (things)”; κακόν, kakon, “bad”; κακούς, kakous, “bad”; κακοῦ, kakou, “bad”; κακῶς, kakōs, “makes a mess of”

Meaning

Κακός is the general Greek word for what is not as it should be. In Homer the κακός is the worthless man, the coward or the low-born, set against the ἐσθλός, the brave and noble; in classical prose it covers the bad in conduct, the harmful in things and the wretched in fortune. The edition renders it “bad” and never “evil”, as the Glossary records (Glossary, “bad”), and the Key Words give the reason: the context of 174b–d “is benefit and harm”, and “evil” would bring in “a narrowly moral sense and a biblical echo that the Greek does not have”.

Use in the book

The edition’s Key Words name three joints of the argument where the pair “good and bad” appears: the Thracian doctrine, the definition Critias offers, and the knowledge he names at the end (Key Words, “Good and bad”). In the Thracian doctrine everything, “bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul” (156e; see ἐπιρρέω). In Critias’ definition, the man who makes “not good things but bad ones is not temperate”, and “the one who makes good things and not bad ones is” (163e; see τὰ κακά). At the end, the knowledge that makes us happy is the one “By which he knows good … and bad” (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The English keeps “good and bad” all three times, the Key Words say, “so that the reader can see Critias’ last answer return to his first”.

Between the joints the word does smaller work. Temperance is good “if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad”, whereas modesty “is no more good than bad” (161a–b; see αἰδώς). Critias is as angry with Charmides “as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet’s own verses” (162d; see ὑποκριτής). The first joint puts the bad before the good, as the source of disease; the last can be read as giving the word its full weight: at 174b–d bad is what harms, and the knowledge of good and bad is the knowledge that benefits.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective or the adverb occurs.

  1. 156eEverything bad and good alike, for the body and the whole human being, starts from the soul.
  2. 161a–bTemperance makes good and not bad; modesty is no more good than bad.
  3. 162dCritias is as angry as a poet with an actor who makes a mess of his verses.
  4. 163eThe man who does or makes bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things.
  5. 174b–dThe knowledge of good and bad makes us do well; without it each thing would not be done well and beneficially.

Translation in this edition

“Bad” for κακός throughout: κακά (156e7, 163e4, 163e8, 163e9), κακόν (161b2, 174b10, 174c3), κακούς (161a9) and κακοῦ (174d6). The adverb κακῶς at 162d3, in κακῶς διατιθέντι, is “makes a mess of”. At 161b1 Burnet, following Ast, brackets μή before οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν (see αἰδώς).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Protagoras Socrates claims Simonides for his own doctrine. The poet was not so uneducated, he says, as to praise those who willingly do nothing bad, as though some did bad things willingly; for Socrates is fairly sure that “no one of the wise men thinks that any human being errs willingly or willingly does shameful and bad things, but they know well that all who do shameful and bad things do them unwillingly” (345d–e). The doctrine can be read as the ground of 174b: if no one does bad things willingly, the knowledge of good and bad is the knowledge that would put an end to them.

Other ancient sources

Homer uses the word of the worthless soldier. Nestor advises Agamemnon to array the army by tribes and clans, for then “you will know which of the leaders is bad, κακός, and which of the men, and which is good”.1

Aristotle ties the bad to the unlimited. Error, he says, is possible in many ways, “for the bad is of the boundless, as the Pythagoreans pictured it, and the good of the bounded”, while success is possible in one way only; and he quotes a verse: “men are good in one way, but bad in all sorts of ways”.2

Source note

1. Homer, Iliad 2.362–366.

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b28–35.