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calculation

τὸ λογιστικόν

The art of calculation as one of the all-knowing man’s kinds of knowledge, offered and refused as the one that makes him happy · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseThe calculative, what has to do with reckoning: the neuter adjective of λογίζομαι, “reckon”, used with the article for the skill or its object.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at 174b: “The one, then, by which he knows calculation?” “Not at all.”
  • In this edition“Calculation”.
  • A place to read173e–174c.
English renderings
τὸ λογιστικόν, to logistikon, “calculation”

Meaning

Λογίζομαι is to count and reckon, and by extension to reason and calculate consequences; λογιστική is the art of calculation, which the Charmides defines by the even and the odd and how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other (166a; see λογιστική); the later contrast between practical reckoning and the theory of number is not Plato’s. The neuter adjective with the article is less definite than the name of the art: what has to do with reckoning, the reckoning part of things. Plato used the same neuter for the reckoning part of the soul.

Use in the book

The phrase is the second step of Socrates’ search for the knowledge that makes the all-knowing man happy. Socrates has supposed a man who knew past, present and future, and asks which of his kinds of knowledge makes him happy; after draughts, which Critias waves away (see τὸ πεττευτικόν), comes “The one, then, by which he knows calculation?” “Not at all.” “The one by which he knows what is healthy?” “More so” (174b; see τὰ μέλλοντα; τὸ ὑγιεινόν). The steps run from a game to a science to the body’s good, and Critias’ answers grow warmer, until he names the knowledge of good and bad (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν).

Calculation had been Critias’ own example earlier, and he had used it against Socrates. When Socrates asked what work temperance produces, as building produces houses, Critias answered that the art of calculation and geometry have no such work either (165e–166a; see ἀπεργάζομαι; λογιστική). Socrates then granted that calculation has no product, but answered that it has an object, the odd and the even, other than itself. At 174b the same knowledge is weighed by a third measure, happiness, and it fails. The dialogue has now tried calculation three ways, by its product, by its object and as a road to happiness, and only the second holds. Critias’ “Not at all” can be read as the verdict of a man who had once used calculation to defend his definition and now sees that it makes no one happy.

Places to read

The phrase’s place, in the sequence of kinds of knowledge it belongs to.

  1. 174bDraughts, calculation and the healthy are offered in turn as the knowledge that makes the all-knowing man happy; calculation “Not at all”.

Translation in this edition

“Calculation” renders τὸ λογιστικόν (174b5); At 165e6 Critias’ λογιστικὴ τέχνη is “the art of calculation”, the one place the Glossary gives τέχνη as “art”; at 166a λογιστική alone is “calculation” (see λογιστική; τέχνη).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic gives the neuter a larger home. Socrates divides the soul by the conflicts within it: the part with which it reckons is to be called “the calculating part”, τὸ λογιστικόν, and the part with which it loves, hungers and thirsts and is stirred by the other desires “the uncalculating and desiring”, the companion of certain fillings and pleasures (4.439d). Temperance, a few pages later, is the friendship and concord of the parts, when the ruler and the two ruled agree that the calculating part should rule and do not rebel against it (4.442c–d). The word that names a lesser science in the Charmides names the soul’s ruler in the Republic, and temperance there is the consent given to its rule.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle keeps the Republic’s word and narrows it. Dividing the part of the soul that has reason, he calls the part with which we study things that cannot be otherwise the scientific part, and the part with which we deal with things that can be otherwise the calculative, τὸ λογιστικόν; for deliberating is calculating, and nobody deliberates about what cannot be otherwise.1 Prudence, the true state joined with reason that acts concerning what is good and bad for a man, is in Aristotle the excellence of this part, which he there calls the opinion-forming part (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The Charmides’ word for a lesser science can be read as naming, in Aristotle, the part of the soul that holds the knowledge Critias named.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.1, 1139a5–15; 6.5, 1140b4–6 and 25–28.