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impostor

ἀλαζών

The impostor whom temperance would turn away · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordAn ἀλαζών is a pretender: the man who claims a knowledge or a power he does not have.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in Socrates’ dream of rule by temperance: temperance, presiding over prophecy, “turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future” (173c).
  • In this edition“Impostors”, as the Glossary records.
  • A place to read173a–d, the dream.
English renderings
ἀλαζών, alazōn, “impostor”; τοὺς ἀλαζόνας, tous alazonas, “the impostors”

Meaning

The origin of the word is unknown. The edition’s note at 173c describes the ἀλαζόνες as the stock pretenders of comedy, men who claimed knowledge or powers they lacked. The word names, from the outside, the man whom the temperate man of 167a would be able to detect, by inspecting in others “what he thinks he knows but does not” (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

Use in the book

The argument had already shown that a temperance which is only knowledge of knowledge could not tell “the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is” (170e; see ἀληθινός; προσποιέομαι). The dream grants it that power anyway, to ask a further question. “If temperance ruled us as fully as could be … wouldn’t everything be done according to the kinds of knowledge? No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know” (173a–b; see φάσκω). Our equipment, clothing and footwear would be made expertly by genuine craftsmen (see ἀληθινός); and prophecy too, granted to be “knowledge of what is going to be”, would be purged, since temperance, “presiding over it, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future” (173c; see ἐπιστατέω; μαντική).

The impostor is the last figure the dream removes, and the prophet the last expert it installs. Socrates soon brings the prophet back as the man Critias may mean, and Critias accepts him “and another as well” (173e–174a); the argument that follows ends in the knowledge of good and bad, without which even a world rid of impostors would not be happy (174b–d).

The edition’s note at 173c adds that the word names the man Socrates’ questioning exposes. The Charmides adds a nearer irony. The definition under which temperance would turn away impostors is Critias’, and it was Critias who, caught by perplexity, “kept covering up his perplexity” before the company rather than admit it (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι). The dialogue can be read as showing that the pretender is not always a stranger at the door.

Places to read

The one passage in which the word occurs, in its setting.

  1. 173a–cIn the dream, temperance would let no pretended pilot, doctor or general deceive us, would see everything made by genuine craftsmen, and would turn away the impostors and set up the true prophets.

Translation in this edition

Τοὺς ἀλαζόνας (173c) is “the impostors”, and the Glossary lists the word under “impostor”. The pretenders of 170e and 173b, προσποιούμενος, are “who pretends” and “who pretended”, so that the English keeps the noun for the stock type and the verb for the act.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Republic, as the young man turns democratic, his desires find the stronghold of his soul empty of learning, fine pursuits and true words, and take it; then “false and boastful” words and opinions (ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀλαζόνες) rush up and hold the same place in their stead (560b–c). In the Philebus Protarchus, asked whether pleasure or mind is nearer kin to truth, calls pleasure “the biggest impostor there is”: in the pleasures of love, the saying goes, even perjury is forgiven by the gods (65c–d).

Other ancient sources

Comedy supplies the type. In the Clouds of the comic poet Aristophanes, first staged in 423 BC, the young Pheidippides knows the men of Socrates’ school as “the impostors, the pale ones, the barefoot ones”, among them “the wretched Socrates and Chaerephon”, the friend who runs to greet Socrates at the opening of the Charmides (153b); in the Birds the hero Peisetaerus answers an oracle-monger with a mock oracle of his own, that when an impostor comes uninvited to a sacrifice he is to be beaten, and later tells the astronomer Meton that the city has resolved to beat all impostors.1 Xenophon says that Socrates turned his companions from imposture by showing what befalls a man who wants to seem a good flute-player, general or pilot without being one.2 Aristotle’s examples of those who pretend, for gain, to qualities that others can profit from and whose absence can go unnoticed are the prophet, the wise man and the doctor.3 The dream’s pilot, general, doctor and prophet are all on these lists.

Source note

1. Aristophanes, Clouds 102–104; Birds 983–985, 1016.

2. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.7.1–3.

3. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127b17–20.