From the book
Hipparchus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordPanourgos means capable of every kind of deed and, in a disapproving application, unscrupulous, cunning or ready for anything.
- In HipparchusThe accusation appears when Socrates asks whether lovers of gain know that their sources are worthless.
- In this editionThe rendering “unscrupulous” gives the adjective’s contextual moral force without losing sight of the intelligence the companion wishes to preserve.
- A place to readἀλλὰ πανούργους — The companion substitutes unscrupulousness for senselessness.
Meaning
Panourgos means capable of every kind of deed and, in a disapproving application, unscrupulous, cunning or ready for anything. The context selects the disapproving force: the companion joins it to base character and shameless pursuit. Hēttōn means weaker, inferior or overcome by; with the genitive of gain it describes being “no match for gain”. It is a comparative adjective, not a noun naming a distinct faculty or appetite.
The pairing creates a revealing tension. These people are not supposed to be fools; they have the resourcefulness to recognise opportunities. Yet the pursuit of gain masters them. Cleverness about means and freedom from an overriding attachment are therefore separate matters in the companion’s description.
Use in the book
The accusation appears when Socrates asks whether lovers of gain know that their sources are worthless. If ignorant, they would be senseless. The companion answers that he means unscrupulous and base people, no match for gain, who know and nonetheless dare. Moral blame is located in what they allow themselves to do despite awareness, not simply in their ability to calculate.
Socrates does not directly dispute the ordinary existence of cunning conduct. Instead he tests the conjunction of knowledge, worthlessness and expected gain through examples of successful practice. If a pilot knows his rudders are defective, he foresees loss; if a horseman knows the feed is useless, he understands that he ruins his horse. These cases make the stated object of the knave’s knowledge look incompatible with an expectation of personal benefit. The companion’s intended accusation may require a distinction Socrates has not yet granted: gainful manipulation of something that is bad as a tool or service.
“No match for gain” also leaves open the phenomenon of acting against a considered judgement. The dialogue does not isolate or analyse weakness of will as such. It substitutes the alternatives of ignorant overvaluation and the universal love of good things. A lexicon should therefore resist turning the phrase into a complete doctrine either affirming or denying knowingly wrongful desire. It is evidence of the companion’s moral picture and of the pressure subsequently exerted on that picture.
The later definitions retreat from the single epithet to more explicit criteria: insatiable attention to negligible objects and willingness to use sources decent people avoid. These changes can be read as attempts to articulate what “unscrupulous” initially compressed. At the end Socrates includes base people alongside decent ones in the extension of lover of gain. That removes the label’s discriminatory force under the accepted premises, while leaving the separate moral descriptions in place.
Places to read
Translation in this edition
The rendering “unscrupulous” gives the adjective’s contextual moral force without losing sight of the intelligence the companion wishes to preserve. “No match for gain” is deliberately vivid and comparative; “addicted to profit” would introduce a modern clinical or behavioural classification not supplied by the text. The edition does not make panourgos a standing name for a formally defined character type.