Pride

Use in the book

The opening lovers are high-minded, but Alcibiades surpasses them in pride. He looks down on them because he thinks he needs nobody, and his vaunting is based on a list of advantages. Wealth, Socrates adds, is what he prides himself on least. The account is both a social contest and an explanation of why a different lover’s approach is necessary.

At 119d Socrates turns Alcibiades’ high-minded self-image against his small choice of rivals. A person who imagines himself so exalted should not be content to exceed unimpressive local politicians. Later the same semantic family appears positively in the catalogue of Spartan strengths. The text therefore does not condemn every form of elevated spirit as identical vanity. It asks whether one’s scale of aspiration is matched by discipline and accurate appraisal. The final statement that Socrates does not distrust Alcibiades’ nature also keeps criticism of his present conceit from becoming a denial of his capacity.

Places to read

1. 103b–104c2Pride defeats the suitors and rests on perceived self-sufficiency.
2. 119c–119eThe high-minded man is shamed for choosing small rivals.
3. 122cHigh-mindedness joins the Spartan catalogue.

Translation in this edition

Burnet’s apparatus at 104c records φρόνειν as printed in one apparatus lemma; the dialogue has φρονεῖν. The edition preserves the range from pride to high-mindedness rather than imposing one moral valuation on all occurrences.

μέγα φρονέω

Attested: μέγα φρονεῖν (mega phronein; 104c). To think highly of oneself or pride oneself, here on wealth. Lexical identification: phrase label: μέγα φρονέω. See Pride and high-mindedness.

μεγαλαυχέω

Attested: μεγαλαυχούμενος (megalauchoumenos; 104c). To boast or vaunt oneself on supposed advantages. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλαυχέω. See Pride and high-mindedness.

μεγαλοφροσύνη

Attested: μεγαλοφροσύνην (megalophrosynēn; 122c). High-mindedness, included as a strength in the Spartan catalogue. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλοφροσύνη. See Pride and high-mindedness.

μεγαλόφρων

Attested: μεγαλοφρόνων (megalophronōn; 103b); μεγαλόφρονα (megalophrona; 119d). High-minded or proud, of defeated lovers and Alcibiades’ elevated self-image. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλόφρων. See Pride and high-mindedness.

ὑπερφρονέω

Attested: ὑπερπεφρόνηκας (hyperpephronēkas; 104a). To think oneself above or look down on others; Socrates reconstructs the reasoning behind Alcibiades' contempt for his lovers. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑπερφρονέω. See Pride and high-mindedness.

φρόνημα

Attested: φρονήματι (phronēmati; 103b). Pride or elevated spirit, in which Alcibiades outdoes his lovers. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνημα. See Pride and high-mindedness.

Use in the book

The genitive μεγαλαυχίας depends on “are filled”: praise fills the beautiful boys with pride and boastfulness. The next sentence uses the comparative adjective μεγαλαυχότεροι, “more boastful,” to explain why they become harder to win.

This is an effect produced in the listener by the lover’s language, so the word belongs to the causal criticism of bad courtship. It should not be confused with greatness of character. The contrasting lesson later brings Lysis down rather than enlarging his opinion of himself.

Places to read

1. 206aφρονήματος ἐμπίμπλανται καὶ μεγαλαυχίας — they are filled with pride and boastfulness.

Use in the book

Socrates concludes that Lysis cannot be μεγαλόφρων if he is still ἄφρων, without understanding. The word echoes the preceding μέγα φρονεῖν, “think highly of oneself,” and draws attention to the shared φρον- element in pride and understanding.

The sense here is not a commendation of magnanimity or noble-mindedness. It belongs to the reduction of Lysis’ self-importance, the practical demonstration Socrates has promised Hippothales. The argument depends partly on the play between having understanding and forming a grand opinion of oneself.

Places to read

1. 210dΟὐδ’ ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ — So you are not proud either.

Use in the book

The coercive art of convincing becomes torture when exercised proudly over another’s conduct and life. Refined pride may esteem rule-following yet resist goodness alone, because goodness belongs to the person and to a merit one cannot give oneself. The opposition between pride and innocent vanity then makes pride the enemy of goodness. Self-love complicates the picture: satisfied amour-propre can be tender or thankful to providence. That does not erase the criticism of pride; it prevents different self-relations from being collapsed into one vice.

Places to read

1. I, p. 166, entry 1, ¶1Pride turns persuasion into coercive domination.
2. II, p. 509, entry 9, ¶1Rule-esteem differs from esteem for another person’s goodness.
3. II, p. 488, entry 6, ¶1Pride is condemned while some vanity is allowed.

Translation in this edition

The English translation keeps pride, vanity and self-love separate. It preserves the torture imagery and the hypothetical “could not give oneself,” which is not a claim that goodness can never be cultivated.

Use in the book

Traherne’s immense claims for the soul can appear proud if detached from their source and purpose. Yet the prayer at the Cross asks for the sun of pride and vainglory to be darkened before Christ’s love. True greatness is received and answered through love, not secured by the eclipse of other people.

The social diagnosis in IV.24 places pride among the vices that fill the world with conflict and desolation. Universal charity would remove the destructive relation while allowing useful trades, cities, and splendours to remain. The target is not every form of eminence or human achievement, but the possessive self-valuation that converts difference into rivalry and injury.

Places to read

1. I.33Pride participates in the social disorder produced by false riches.
2. I.88The speaker asks that Christ’s Passion overcome pride and vainglory.
3. IV.24Pride disorders the world, while charity would preserve innocent useful arts and splendours.

In this edition

Do not equate every statement of human greatness with pride. The text distinguishes the dignity of a gift from the vanity that misuses it.

Use in the book

René says social participation requires him to make his life smaller and that he gives more than he receives (p. 157). These may articulate a real mismatch, but they also organize experience around a high estimate of his own emotional value. Amélie’s assurance that earth offers nothing worthy of him (p. 170) intensifies that logic even while her next page recommends ordinary work and marriage. Her admiration and practical advice pull in different directions.

His enjoyment of exceptional suffering reveals pride’s less obvious form. He admits that an unusual misfortune can itself yield pleasure (p. 185). It is not merely that he demands happiness; he can prefer a uniquely marked grief to common contentment. Souël therefore denies that seeing the world in an odious light establishes superiority (p. 189). The rebuke targets an inference from negative perception to exceptional worth.

The strongest charge is self-sufficiency: Souël calls him presumptuous for believing a person can be enough for himself (p. 190). Since the whole story depicts longing for companionship, the claim is not that René consciously wants no one. Rather, his chosen solitude and concentration on inward experience attempt to sustain life without the reciprocal duties that actual relations impose.

Chactas’s river fable makes pride visible through consequences. The enlarged stream first applauds its power, then discovers that the desolation it has caused leaves it without companions (p. 191). The fable does not ask for the extinction of all strength; it asks for a channel that preserves the life around it. René’s powers would be judged by what they sustain, not by their flood-like amplitude.

Places to read

1. Preface p. 2L'amour-propre et l'intérêt — The author distinguishes personal advantage from consideration owed to purchasers of his book.
2. p. 157rapetisser ma vie — René describes social accommodation as a diminution of himself.
3. p. 185on jouit de ce qui n'est pas commun — His admission extends the attraction of exceptionality even to misfortune.
4. p. 190l'homme se peut suffire à lui-même — Souël identifies self-sufficiency as the underlying presumption.
5. p. 191L'orgueilleux ruisseau s'applaudit d'abord de sa puissance — The river initially mistakes uncontrolled expansion for a successful use of strength.

Translation in this edition

The 1802 variant at p. 174234567 imagines Amélie unable to confess love for a lower-ranking man because of ‘l'orgueil de notre famille’; 1826 removes the rank-based explanation. That deleted hypothesis concerns social pride, distinct from the self-isolating pride condemned at the end.