Character, piety and divine judgment

Gifts and divine bribery

δῶρα (dōra); δωροδόκοι (dōrodokoi); ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι (hypo dōrōn paragesthai); κακὸν τοκιστήν (kakon tokistēn)

Dōra are gifts; dōrodokoi, literally takers of gifts, is the familiar vocabulary of bribe-taking.

From the book

Alcibiades II

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordDōra are gifts; dōrodokoi, literally takers of gifts, is the familiar vocabulary of bribe-taking.
  • In Alcibiades IIThe Trojan sacrifice supplies the transition from ritual expenditure to gifts paid in vain.
  • In this editionThe edition keeps gifts and takers of gifts so the verbal link remains audible.
  • A place to readThe Athenians implicitly measure favour against the scale of their expenditure.

Meaning

Dōra are gifts; dōrodokoi, literally takers of gifts, is the familiar vocabulary of bribe-taking. The comparison with a bad moneylender makes the commercial and corrupting implications explicit. Socrates rejects an account of divine response in which an expensive presentation can divert judgement.

Use in the book

The Trojan sacrifice supplies the transition from ritual expenditure to gifts paid in vain. Socrates denies that the way of the gods is to be led astray by gifts as a bad moneylender might be. This is more than a claim that the Athenians have offered too little. It discredits the model on which a larger payment would solve their problem.

The correct object of divine attention is the soul, considered as holy and just. A private person or city can afford repeated ceremonies while making many mistakes against gods and humans. If the gods accepted those ceremonies as decisive compensation, the wealthy wrongdoer could convert resources into favour without acquiring the judgement under discussion. Their refusal therefore links religion with the earlier critique of wealth and power without knowledge of the best.

The ending carefully prevents all giving from becoming suspect. Alcibiades gives Socrates a wreath in acknowledgement of good advice and still intends future customary gifts to the gods. Socrates accepts the wreath. The difference lies in the significance of the exchange and the state it expresses, not in a blanket moral rule against gifts. Nor does the closing acceptance establish that Socrates claims the divine status the critique presupposes.

Places to read

  1. 148e–149a2The Athenians implicitly measure favour against the scale of their expenditure.
  2. 149d–149eTrojan gifts fail, and the bad-moneylender comparison rejects inducement.
  3. 149e–150bThe soul’s justice and intelligence displace gifts as the decisive consideration.
  4. 151a–151bA wreath acknowledges advice while customary offerings remain a future intention.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps gifts and takers of gifts so the verbal link remains audible. Its Key Words compare Republic 390d–390e and Laws 885b, without claiming that this dialogue establishes the same full argument. At 151b the printed word is doxa, opinion; gift is an editorial conjecture, not the word translated in the text.