Character, piety and divine judgment

Gods and divine giving

θεός (theos); θεοί (theoi); διδόναι (didonai); τἀναντία (tanantia); ἀποδέχονται (apodechontai)

The dialogue alternates between the god Alcibiades is approaching and gods in the plural.

From the book

Alcibiades II

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe dialogue alternates between the god Alcibiades is approaching and gods in the plural.
  • In Alcibiades IIThe initial observation is deliberately uneven: gods give some requests and not others, and to some people rather than others.
  • In this editionThe singular god at 138a is not named; it should not be confidently identified as Zeus, Ammon or another deity.
  • A place to readUnequal and partial fulfilment makes prayer a matter requiring forethought.

Meaning

The dialogue alternates between the god Alcibiades is approaching and gods in the plural. Didonai is to give; divine acceptance of human offerings is expressed by apodechesthai. The reciprocal language of giving is central, but the text denies that the two directions compose an enforceable commercial exchange.

Use in the book

The initial observation is deliberately uneven: gods give some requests and not others, and to some people rather than others. It does not establish an automatic law of answered prayer. The risk is that they may give exactly what a person mistakenly desires. Successful petition and genuine benefit therefore come apart before any question about expensive ceremonies is raised.

The imagined divine offer of unlimited political power tests the same danger without an actual prayer. A benefit must be assessed by whether the recipient will use it safely and well. The god in this hypothetical is not appearing in the dramatic scene; Socrates is constructing a question that reveals Alcibiades’ valuation of power.

The poet’s prayer allows Zeus to give good things beyond the worshippers’ asking and ward off harmful things despite their asking. The Spartan example likewise leaves outcomes with the gods, who may give what is requested or its opposite. These statements make room for human uncertainty; they do not authorize the reader to infer a systematic doctrine of providence or to explain every historical reversal as divine reward or punishment.

At the close the gods are said not to take bribes and to honour justice and intelligence. Alcibiades’ education must change his relation to them as well as to people. The promise to resume customary offerings if they are willing leaves divine agency acknowledged while human responsibility for the quality of requests remains intact.

Places to read

  1. 138bUnequal and partial fulfilment makes prayer a matter requiring forethought.
  2. 141a–141cA hypothetical god offers political dominion, which must still be judged by its use.
  3. 143aZeus is asked to separate genuine good from the worshipper’s requests.
  4. 148c–148dThe Spartan example preserves the gods’ power to give a request or its opposite.
  5. 149c–150b2Acceptance of offerings depends on more than expenditure.
  6. 151bFuture worship is anticipated under the qualification if they are willing.

Translation in this edition

The singular god at 138a is not named; it should not be confidently identified as Zeus, Ammon or another deity. The source repairs an earlier translation at 138b so that both harmful petition and divine fulfilment are governed by the danger-clause. Its gods remain plural where the Greek is plural.