From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordTo think, to suppose, to believe: of what one holds without claiming to know it; often parenthetic, οἶμαι, “I think”.
- In the CharmidesThirty times, from Socrates’ “by now, I should think, he must be quite the young man” (154b) to the boy’s “I think I very much need the charm” (176b).
- In this edition“Think”, “suppose”; “imagine” at 156c, 160a and 167e; “this opinion of yours” at 159a.
- A place to read175e–176b.
- English renderings
- οἴομαι, oiomai, “I think”; οἶμαι, oimai, “I think”, “I suppose”, “I should think”, “I imagine”; ἐγᾦμαι, egōimai, “I think”, “I imagine”; οἴει, oiei, “you think”, “do you suppose”, “opinion”; οἴεται, oietai, “thinks”; οἴεσθαι, oiesthai, “suppose”, “imagine”; οἰηθείη, oiētheiē, “might think”; ᾠήθησαν, ōiēthēsan, “thought”; οἰόμενος, oiomenos, “think”; οἰόμενον, oiomenon, “thinks”
Meaning
Οἴομαι is the commonest Greek verb of opinion: to think a thing so, rightly or wrongly. It makes no claim to knowledge, and its parenthetic form, οἶμαι, softens an assertion as English “I think” does. The Charmides puts it beside the verbs of knowing, and the gap between thinking one knows and knowing is one of its subjects (see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι).
Use in the book
The examination of the boy begins with his opinion. If temperance is present in him, Socrates says, he must have some opinion of it: “Don’t you think so?” “I do.” “Well then, this opinion of yours … since you know how to speak Greek, you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?” (159a; see δόξα; ἑλληνίζω). What the boy thinks is the material the rest of his part works on.
Critias uses the verb to prescribe. Hesiod could not have called the base trades works: “One must not suppose so, Socrates”; and “So we must suppose that Hesiod, and anyone else of sense, calls the man who does his own business temperate” (163b–c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). A reading of a poet is offered as what one must think. Critias uses it, too, to accuse: “I think you are doing the very thing you said just now you were not doing” (166c; see λανθάνω), and Socrates answers that he refutes him as he would himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not (166d; see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι).
The verb ends the inquiry. Socrates, having found temperance of no benefit on the argument’s terms, refuses the result: “Well, I don’t at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed” (175e–176a; see ζητητής); the Greek has the verb once, and the English repeats it. The boy answers that he does not know whether he has it, and adds, “I’m not altogether persuaded by you, though, Socrates, and I think I very much need the charm” (176b; see πείθω). The dialogue that set out to find what temperance is ends with two opinions, and the boy acts on his. It can be read as Socrates’ last lesson that opinion examined and held is not the same as opinion unexamined: both have been shown that they do not know, the boy in his first definitions and Socrates in the last, and both still think.
Places to read
The passages in which the verb carries the argument; its parenthetic uses in ordinary speech are not listed.
- 156cTo imagine one could treat the head apart from the whole body is sheer folly.
- 159aThe boy’s opinion of temperance, which he can surely put into Greek.
- 163b–cCritias: one must not suppose that Hesiod called base trades works; one must suppose that he called the man who does his own business temperate.
- 164cCritias: if Socrates thinks his conclusion follows from what was agreed, Critias would sooner take something back.
- 165aOne might think “Know thyself” and “Be temperate” different.
- 166c–dCritias thinks Socrates is only trying to refute him; Socrates fears thinking he knows what he does not.
- 167aThe temperate man would see what others think they know but do not.
- 171cTemperance could not tell a doctor who knows his craft from one who does not know it but pretends or thinks he does.
- 173aSocrates: “I think I’m talking nonsense.”
- 175e–176aSocrates: “I don’t at all think it is so”; he thinks temperance a great good.
- 176bThe boy thinks he very much needs the charm.
Translation in this edition
“Think” is the usual rendering, “I should think” at 154b4; “suppose” renders οἶμαι at 157e1, οἴει at 163b5, οὐκ οἴεσθαί γε χρή at 163b8 and χρὴ οἴεσθαι at 163c6; “imagine” renders οἴεσθαι at 156c2, where the doctors call the supposition folly, οἶμαι at 160a9 and ἐγᾦμαι at 167e4; and “this opinion of yours” renders ὃ οἴει (159a6), the boy’s thought taken as a thing he has.