Ο Omicron

think one knows

οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι

To think one knows: the ignorance Socrates fears in himself and the temperate man was to detect in others · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΟἴομαι, “think”, with εἰδέναι, “to know”: to suppose that one knows.
  • In the CharmidesAt 166d, Socrates’ fear that he might “think I know something when I don’t”; at 167a, the temperate man would see in others “what he thinks he knows but does not”; at 171c, a doctor who “pretends or thinks he does”.
  • In this edition“Think I know”, “thinks he knows”.
  • A place to read166c–167a.
English renderings
οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή, oiomenos men ti eidenai, eidōs de mē, “think I know something when I don’t”; οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, oietai men eidenai, “(what) he thinks he knows”

Meaning

The phrase names the condition that the Socratic examination exists to expose: a belief about one’s own knowledge that is false. It is not ignorance simply, which may know itself, but ignorance that takes itself for knowledge.

Use in the book

The phrase passes from Socrates to the temperate man and back. First it is Socrates’ own fear, the reason he gives for refuting Critias as he would refute himself (166c–d; see λανθάνω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Then Socrates gives it to temperance as its task: the temperate man alone “will likewise be able to inspect others, to see what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not” (167a; see διαγιγνώσκω; ἐπισκοπέω). The edition’s note at 167a observes: “Many readers see in ‘knowledge of the lack of knowledge’ a portrait of Socrates as the Apology draws him: the man who examines others to find who thinks he knows and does not, and who does not think he knows what he does not know (21d; compare 21b, 22c–d).”

The argument then denies temperance this power. Knowing only that another has some knowledge, not of what, the temperate man could not tell the true doctor from one who “pretends or thinks he does” (171c; see ἀληθινός; προσποιέομαι). The note at 170d calls this “perhaps the result that tells most against Critias’ definition”, since the power it removes “is exactly what Socrates does in the Apology”. The dialogue’s refutation of temperance as knowledge of knowledge is, on this reading, a refutation of the claim that Socrates’ own activity could be a single knowledge with no subject of its own.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 166dSocrates refutes for fear that he might, without noticing, think he knows what he does not.
  2. 167aThe temperate man would see in others what they think they know but do not.
  3. 171cTemperance could not tell the doctor who knows from one who pretends or thinks he does.

Translation in this edition

“Think I know something when I don’t” renders οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή (166d2), “what he thinks he knows but does not” τί αὖ οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δ’ οὔ (167a4–5), where αὖ is Bekker’s and B and T have αὐτὸς, and “pretends or thinks he does” προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον (171c7).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Apology gives the phrase its classic form. After examining one of the politicians, a man thought wise, Socrates reckons that probably neither of them knows anything fine and good, “but he supposes he knows something though he does not, whereas I, not knowing, do not suppose that I know either; by this one small point, then, I seem to be the wiser of the two, that what I do not know I do not even suppose I know” (21d). In the Sophist the visitor from Elea marks off one large and troublesome kind of ignorance, a counterweight to all the rest together: “to think one knows something without knowing it”, the source, it seems, of every slip our thinking makes, and the only kind of ignorance to which the name ἀμαθία, want of learning, has been given (229c); his verb is δοκεῖν, where the Apology has οἴεσθαι. The First Alcibiades’ account of the same ignorance as the cause of all errors is told elsewhere (117c–118a; see ἐπίσταμαι).