Κ Kappa

doing everything in an orderly way and quietly

κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ

Doing everything in an orderly way and quietly: the boy’s first definition of temperance, a description of how a well-brought-up boy behaves · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordAn articular infinitive: temperance is defined as an activity, “the doing of everything”, qualified by two adverbs of manner.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at 159b: after hanging back, the boy “said that in his view temperance was doing everything in an orderly way and quietly: walking in the streets and talking, and doing everything else, in the same manner.”
  • In this edition“Doing everything in an orderly way and quietly”.
  • A place to read158e–159b.
English renderings
τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, to kosmiōs panta prattein kai hēsychēi, “doing everything in an orderly way and quietly”

Meaning

The definition names no state of soul and no object of knowledge. It says how things are to be done, and its examples are the public life of an Athenian boy: walking in the streets, talking. What it describes is decorum, the virtue the young were taught before they were taught anything else, and the two adverbs between them cover the whole of it: keeping one’s place and keeping one’s calm.

Use in the book

Socrates has asked for the boy’s opinion, not for a formula: “if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it”, and so he asks: “tell me … what you say temperance is, in your opinion” (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). The boy is slow to answer, “At first he hung back, and was not at all willing to answer” (159b), and the hesitation suits the answer he gives. A page earlier his blush and his refusal either to praise himself or to call Critias a liar had shown the virtue before anyone defined it; the edition’s note at 158c calls them, “on a natural reading”, “a picture of sōphrosynē in its commonest sense, modesty, before anyone has tried to define it”. The first definition can be read as the boy describing what he has been taught to do, and the second, modesty, as what he has just done (see αἰδώς).

He then sums the definition up himself, “And in short … I think what you are asking about is a kind of quietness” (159b; see ἡσυχιότης; συλλήβδην), and Socrates takes up the summary, not the definition. “Well, are you right? … People do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate” (159b; see ἡσύχιος). The refutation that follows tests quietness against quickness and leaves order alone (159b–160d; see ἡσυχῇ; κοσμίως). It ends by sending the boy inward: he is to look within himself and consider what sort of person temperance makes him by being present (160d; see ἐμβλέπω). The fault Socrates states is that quick things have turned out no less fine than quiet ones (160d); his next request, to look within, can be read as a further fault, that the definition describes behaviour from outside.

Places to read

The passage in which the definition is given, with Socrates’ request for it.

  1. 159aSocrates asks the boy to say what temperance is in his opinion.
  2. 159bThe boy hangs back, then says that temperance is doing everything in an orderly way and quietly, walking in the streets and talking; in short, a kind of quietness.

Translation in this edition

“Doing everything in an orderly way and quietly” renders τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ (159b3), keeping the word order, in which the second adverb comes after the verb, as an afterthought. “In his view” renders οἷ δοκοῖ (159b2): οἷ is the reading of T and of a later hand in B, where W has οὖν, and δοκοῖ, the optative of reported speech, that of B and W, where T has δοκεῖ (see δοκέω).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Protagoras, Protagoras describes the schooling the boy has had. When parents send their sons to teachers, he says, they charge them to take much more care for the children’s good order, εὐκοσμία, than for their letters and lyre-playing (325d–e): the very lessons, at the writing-master’s and the lyre-master’s, through which Socrates leads the boy in the refutation (159c–160a; see γραμματιστής; κιθαρίζω). In the Republic Socrates lists the small customs that good education rediscovers without law: the silence fitting for the young in the presence of their elders, giving up their seats and standing up for them, care of parents, the cut of the hair, clothes and shoes, and the whole bearing of the body; to legislate for them, he says, would be foolish, for such things neither come about nor last by being written down (425a–b). The boy’s definition names customs of the same kind, and the Republic’s point can be read as the Charmides’ as well: they follow from education, and do not define what it produces.